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1.0 SUITING AND INGRESS 
1.3 Life Support Equipment 
SCOTT 	 I'd like to comment on the POV's that we 
had on launch day. They were improved 
over the ones we had for CDDT for about 
the first 10 minutes of their operation. 
Then they started to cool down, and the 
inlet temperature got pretty cool by the 
time I was ready to ingress in the space­
craft. I think something needs to be 
done to keep them from getting too cool. 
1.8 Ingress 
SCHWEICKART 	 During CDDT, we had all decided that we 
wanted to be strapped in in a reasonably 
loose manner rather than very tightly, 
and I think that all of us felt that 
that worked out quite well. On the launch 
day, when Clyde Teague strapped us in, I 
was quite comfortable, and the shoulder 
straps weren't too tight. I could reach 
the gearbox handle and also the pump 
handle selector with relative ease. I 
never felt any lack of security anywhere 
1-2 -eONFIDEt"T~ 
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1.10 	 Comfort in Couch 
SCOTT 
through the launch because of being 

relatively loose in the straps. 

I think our major problem prior to launch 
was the temperature in the suits. I 
don't remember exactly what we were read­
ing as the inlet -- it was running some­
where between 50 and 80 as we modulated 
it back and forth. The modulation wasn't 
adequate. By having to hold the bypass 
valve in one position for 20 seconds or 
longer, we were either at full hot or 
full cold; and the full cold was too 
cold, and the full hot was too hot. I 
think that we should do something signi­
ficant to improve this. The big problem 
was that the inlet temperature, as we 
read it on the ~ad, didn't seem to agree 
at all (from a sensing standpoint) with 
that which we felt in orbit. When we .. 
were reading 50 suit inlet temperature 
in orbit, we were - I was quite comfort­
able. This was not necessarily so on 
(;O"~FIDENTIA~ 
SCOTT 
McDIVITT 
SCHWEICKART 
1.11 	 Cabin Closeout 
SCOTT 
1-3
­
the ground. It created an unnecessary 
discomfort prior to launch. 
I might mention one thing about the 
humidity. When we did have the suit by­
pass on or the temperature up high, the 
humidity in the suits was such that when 
you breathed on your helmet it fogged up 
and didn't clear right away. As a matter 
of fact, sometimes mine stayed fogged for 
as much as 3 or 4 minutes. 
I might comment also on cycling the bypass 
valve for comfort. On my side of the 
spacecraft, with the long hoses, I evi­
dently picked up a lot of heat exchange 
from the cabin; and Jim and Dave were 
muc~ more aware of the changes in temp­
erature than I was. The primary thing 
I could notice on the right-hand side was 
the change in relative humidity, which was 
evidenced by the fogging of the visor. 
I think that during the cabin closeout, 
when the backup CMF draws water out of 
,  
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SCOTT 	 the system, he should be provided with 
an adequate container and not a plastic 
bag. Dick had to pass the plastic bag 
with water in it over our heads to get 
it out the hatch. One drop of that bag 
• 
and we'd have had a problem. 
1.12 	 Vibration or Noise Sensations 
McDIVITT The vibrations and noise that we en­
countered prior to lift-off were as we 
had anticipated, as we had encountered 
them in CDDT, and as we had been briefed 
by the test conductors. There wasn't 
anything abnormal. 
1.13 Ground Communications and Countdown 
SCHWEICKART 	 Communications during the countdown were 
superb compared to the CDDT. I don't have 
any adverse comment about them. 
• 
CG-NfID ENTtAl 
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2.0 STATUS CHECKS AND COUNTDOWN 
McDIVITT 	 Under "Status Checks and Countdown," there 
was nothing abnormal at all that happened 
during this period except that we might 
say that we could feel swing arms retract. 
It wasn't a big bang or anything; they just 
retracted and you could feel it. 
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3.0 POWERED FLIGHT 
3.1 S-lC Ignition 
McDIVITT The lead into the ignition was very good. 
Stoney talked to us -­ started a count­
down at T minus 15, gave us the ignition 
time, and started on up. Stoney called 
out ignition at 5 in this particular 
case. On our transcript of the air-ground 
communications, it looks as though Stoney 
called lift-off at 03. Whether or not it 
actually occurred before that, I do not 
know. As I was watching the instruments, 
I noticed that when he got down to 
4-3-2-1-0 we had all the lights come on 
and go off the way they are supposed to 
do. The spacecraft started vibrating, 
and I could feel it lift off at about 
the time he said, "Lift-off." Dave thinks 
that we lifted off a couple of seconds 
late, and I am really not sure when we 
did. I could feel it lift off about the 
same time I got the lift-off call from 
Stoney, and I knew we were on our way. 
GONFIDENTIAl 
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McDIVITT 	 The clock started up, and we shifted into 
PII. So, we had all the indications on­
board that the thing had lifted off. 
• 
The vibrations really were not as great 
as I had expected. I could see a vibra­
•tion on the rate needles of about I deg/ 
sec in all the axes. There was no pitch 
rate or roll rate. 
\,3.2 Noise and Vibration Levels 
McDIVITT 	 It was just a vibrational input ~he 
needles that came out indicating plus or 
minus I deg/sec. The noise and vibration 
was much less than I had expected after 
having talked to the Apollo 8 crew-
members. We could hear very well and 
had no trouble discussing anything with 
the other crewmembers. The noise was 
not too bad until we started getting up 
in the MAX g region at approximately 
50 seconds, where the noise and vibration 
• 
did build up some more. We went right 
through MAX g without any major oscilla­
tions. The angle of attack did not get 
~NFIDENTW 
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3.3 	 Holddown Release 
McDIVITT 
3.6 	 Roll Program 
McDIVITT 
3.7 	 Pitch Program 
McDIVITT 
3.8 	 Roll Complete 
McDIVITT 
3.10 	 Cabin Pressure 
McDIVITT 
€ONFIDENlIA-l· 
over about 10 or 15 percent during 
launch. 
I should mention that I could feel the 
holddowns go when we lifted off. 
The roll program started when it was 
supposed to start. 
Also, the pitch program started when it 
was supposed to start. 
The roll was complete. There were not 
any abnormalities during this particular 
time. 
The cabin pressure decreased when it was 
supposed to, and it was very obvious when 
it did. 
3-4 	 -  
3.12 MAX 	 q Noise Levels 
McDIVITT 	 The MAX q noises and the vibrations were 
both high but certainly not unexpected. 
f 
I do not think they were excessively 
high. 
3.13 Control Response 	in High q Region 
McDIVITT 	 The spacecraft and booster flew through 
the MAX q region with no trouble. 
3.14 	 Emergency Detection System 
McDIVITT The EDS seemed to be operating properly. 
3.18 S-IC Inboard Cut-off 
McDIVITT 	 The inboard engine cut off when it was 
supposed to. I called it out and, sure 
enough, it cut down. 
3.19 	 S-IC Outboard Cut-off 
McDIVITT Then, we had the outboard cut-off, which 
• 
was probably the most spectacular part of 
the whole flight that is, when the S-IC 
•
shut down. It almost felt like the retros 
fired before we separated the S-IC and 
the S-II because it threw us all forward. 
Dave and Rusty were in the instrument 
-  
McDIVITT 
SCOTT 
McDIVITT 
3-5Ee~~FIDENTIAl 
panel, and I do not really remember where 
I was. 
One thing I might comment on relative to 
the shoulder harness. It was nice to 
have them comfortable and loose prior to 
launch; but at S-I staging, I got thrown 
pretty far forward into the straps. I 
did not contact the instrument panel, 
but I had to put my hand up on the panel. 
I might suggest a more intermediate 
adjustment to the straps rather than 
having them too loose. 
I had the impression that I was completely 
enveloped in a cloud of smoke at the 
time, although I am not really sure that 
I saw any out through the windows. I 
was not looking out the windows very 
much during launch. As a matter of fact, 
I did not look out until we were almost 
in orbit. But, as a matter of fact, it 
is interesting -- going through the air­
to-ground communications here --that 
the LMP and the CDR seemed to be 
EONFIDENTIAL 
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McDIVITT 
3.22 	 S-II Engine Ignition 
McDIVITT 
3.23 	 Gaseous Products 
McDIVITT 
SCHWEICKART 
intermixed with what they actually were 
saying and what the transcript has. Any­
way, when we did the S-IC cut-off, it 
f 
was very abrupt and very hard with a big 
bang and a cloud of smoke. 
• 
The S-II started up~Sust the way it should 
have. We flew along for awhile. 
Somewhere 	along here, I began to see 
smoke curling down between the boost 
protector 	cover and the window on the 
left-hand side. It wasn't any concern. 
I just thought that the boost protector 
cover was burning. I might comment -­
right at lift-off, something which was 
behind the main instrument panel on the 
fI 
left-hand side, came hurling out from 
behind the paneling. It bounced off my 
• 
helmet and down into the LEB. It was 
quite a sensation right at lift-off. 
Did we ever find out what that was? 
 

--
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McDIVITT 	 No. I don't know what it was. The 8-11 
ignition went the way it should have. 
We flew along. I started up the gimbal 
motors, and they started the way they 
should have. I could feel the 8-11 
second plane 8EP. It made a distinct 
thud when it went off; and the light 
went out, of course. 
3.28 Unusual Noises or Vibrations 
McDIVITT 	 When we got to approximately 7 minutes 
30 seconds, or in that neighborhood, we 
began to pick up a very small oscillation
-
on the 8-11. This built up mildly until 
the staging of the 8-IVB. It was never 
of any concern to us. 	 It was just a 
very, very mild oscillation in the back­
ground, which was certainly nothing to 
be concerned with. Never was any doubt 
about whether or not the vehicle would 
hold together. 
3.29 LET and BPC Jettison 
McDIVITT 	 We jettisoned the tower as planned. It 
went away with a big cloud of smoke and 
3-8 
McDIVITr 
3.30 Guidance 
SCOTT 
ffiNFIDENTItd­
a bang, just the way it should have. The 
S-II steered the way it should have, and 
it was a very nominal ride. We will let 
t 
the other people comment on their impres­
sions of the launch or I will just eon­
tinue. We seem to have some disparity 
between what everybody expected. The 
largest rate that".J: detected, except for 
''-., 
the roll rate, during the entire launch 
profile was 1 deg/sec, which is the 
steering rate of the vehicle. 
I will just go over the guidance part 
relative to the DSKY and the onboard 
chart,I would like to say that the chart 
was very good. It gave us a good indica­
tion of where we were, what was going on, 
and what would occur next, provided that • 
the guidance was good - that the onboard 
G&N was gOOd, which it was in our partic­
• 
ular situation. The S-IC part appeared 
to be very close to nominal all the way 
up to staging. After we staged and got 
 
3-9EOt~FIDf~~TIAl 
SCOTT on the S-II~ the H dot velocity plot 
showed us to be somewhat low. In other 
words, the H dot was lower than nominal 
for the inertial velocity that we had 
off the DSKY. However, this did' converge 
and come back into the nominal curve 
about the time we reached the S-IVB 
early staging to orbit point~ which 
occurred almost exactly at the time the 
ground called it up. The chart and the 
ground were in agreement all the way~ as 
far as times go. At the time we had a 
go from the ground for tower jet~ we 
also had better than 3 minutes TFF off 
the DSKY on the NOUN 50 display, which 
indicated that the G&N also said we were 
go for the tower jet. At approximately 
02:30~ I called the NOUN 50 to take a 
look at TFF and monitored that to tower 
jet; and then, at 5 minutes or so, I 
called the NOUN 62 to watch the inertial 
velocity get the S-IVB to orbit, which 
as I mentioned, agreed with the ground. 
eoNFIDENTIAt 
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SCOTT 
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As we approached S-IVB cut-off, we were 
monitoring NOUN 44 which gave us the H p 
to ensure that we got 75 miles and that 
looked as if it was going to be a close 
race between cut-off and 75 miles •. We 
had just barely passed 75 miles when we 
got cut-off, and it was a rather rapid 
convergence of about 20 miles per step 
out of the DSKY. Several seconds before 
cut-off, we were still minus H , which p 
was a little exciting at that time. 
There seemed to be some question about 
the validity of the G&N during launch, 
probably, because of a possible platform 
misalignment or the X-PIPA bias; but the 
insertion reading out of VERB 82 was an 
apogee of 103 and a perigee of 89.5, 
which was somewhat different from the 
initial ground call of 107 by 98.9. 
Later, after insertion, the refined 
ground-based orbit was 103.9 by 102.3. .' 
There was a disparity between the G&N 
an\i..the ground tracking as far as the 
"", 
initial orbit was concerned. Later, 
--eeN ~ID ENl IAl:­
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3.33 S-II/S-IVB Separation 
McDIVITT 
3.34 S-IVB Engine Ignition 
McDIVITT 
when we got ready to do SPS number 1, 
the ground called and commented that we 
would be off by some 2 ft/sec because of 
an X-PIPA bias problem; so this probably 
was the contributing factor to the orbit. 
The initial IMU realignment to P52 was 
pe'rformed at approximately 40 minutes 
after the optics were installed. I got 
a set of gyro torquing angles which were 
plus 0.116 and minus -0.032 and a minus 
0.108. These are fairly close to what 
Y9u would expect from a nominal platform. 
The S-IVB staging was much less severe 
than that of the S-IC and the S-II. 
The S-IVB engine ignited the way it should 
have which was very mild. It was a less­
than-lg ride. It steered the way I had 
expected it to -- the way I had seen it 
steer in simUlations. We never had any 
very large oscillations. Again, the 
eONFIDENTIA~ ­
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McDIVITT 	 steering rate was 1 deg/sec, just the 
way it should have been. 
3.37 Scale Change 	 • 
McDIVITT 	 I never changed the scale to 50 15; I 
used 5 and 5 all the way into orbit. 
3.40 	 Distinction of Sounds and Vibrations 
McDIVITT There were no oscillations on the S-IVB. 
~-,,---------------
The separation lights 	all performed the 
w~ I had 	expected them to perform. 
During this time, I was getting a good 
description of our trajectory from Dave. 
He was telling me where we were on the 
curve. We got into orbit. 
SCHWEICKART 	 Between S-IC inboard cut-off and the 
outboard cut-off, I had a very definite 
impression of longitudinal vibrations or 
oscillations, almost a chugging kind of 
feeling. It would be hard to estimate 
the frequency, but it was somewhere down 
i 
, 	
.-­
below 10 cycles. Also, there was a very 
definite physiological feel in the seat 
of the pants. I was not expecting these, 
·  
3-13
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3.42 
McDIVITT 
3.43 	 Communications 
McDIVITT 
SCHWEICKART 
and it lasted right through S-IC cut-off. 
My reaction to S-IC cut-off was very much 
like Dave's. I had the feeling that we 
did not experience simply a release of g 
but that 	we actually experienced a slight 
negative 	acceleration at S-IC cut-off~ 
which threw both Dave and I forward toward 
the instrument panel. I vaguely recall 
using my 	 hands to hold me off the panel. 
The S-IVB shut down very mildly~ and we 
checked the DSKY. I will let Dave discuss 
what we saw there. 
My communications with the ground were 
good all 	the way up. I never had any 
difficulty reading them~ and I assume 
they had 	no difficulty reading me. 
I felt that the COMM was good all the 
way up~ with the exception of the vicinity 
of the MAX q region. Here, my own subjec­
tive impression was that~ had we not been 
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SCHWEICKART 	 wearing helmets, it would have been very 
difficult to communicate at that point 
in the flight. I think, perhaps, that 
• 
each of us had different impressions at 
that point; but I was not able to read 
, 
Jim and Dave too well at that point. 
Also, I was aware that, to be heard, I 
almost had to yell into the microphones. 
However, it did not last too long, and 
the majority of the launch had a very 
low noise level. The communications on 
the S-band during launch were generally 
worse than what I had expected. Some­
where in the time period, just before 
3 minutes, the S-band began picking up 
a good bit of noise. The noise increased 
from time to time to the p~int that I was 
forced to reduce my S-band ~olume to 
communicate with the other crewmembers. 
It began to clear up at approximately 
5 minutes 30 seconds or more into the 
flight. In fact, I guess it was just 
before 6 minutes that we seemed to get 
\, 
-  
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3.44 Control and Displays 
McDIVITT 
a nice clean lock on, and the noise 
stopped. It was before switching to 
OMNI D. The noise then lasted for almost 
3 minutes on the S-band. I had a feeling 
that I should have had the freedom to go 
ahead and to switch antennas manually to 
improve the communications on the S-band. 
I think that if the entire crew were on 
S-band, it would have been bothersome to 
the point that it would have interfered 
with crew operat ions. Luckily, we ran 
with only the LMP on S-band, and it was 
not really necessary for me to be involved 
in communications between Jim and Dave. 
Once we got onto OMNI D at 06:15, as I 
recall it, the S-band stayed nice and 
clean all the way into orbit and through 
Canaries. 
One of the things that was of some concern 
to us was when Rusty called out that we 
had lost SPS helium pressure at lift-off. 
As soon as we got through the crucial 
eO~~FIDf(\JTIAL 
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McDIVITT 
SCHWEICKART 

mode LA and IB regions, I wanted to find 
out if we really had an SPS engine because, 
if we didn't, it would have been a little 
difficult to perform mode 3 and mode 4 
abort. We got confirmation from the 
ground that we had good SPS helium pres­
sure and that we had just lost either 
the gage or something onboard the space­
craft that contributed to the readout. 
I could also feel the lift-off. I think 
the thing which preoccupied me, at that 
point, was that the SPS helium pressure 
indication looked as though it was tied 
to the ground. Exactly at the instant 
we had lift-off, the needle went right 
to zero. I did not say anything about 
it until approximately 30 seconds into 
the flight, when most of the commotion 
of tower clear and all those kinds of 
things were over. At that time, I mentioned 
I .. 
it to Jim. I think we were somewhere up 
in mode lC region when I asked Jim whether 
he would like for me to mention that to 
the ground. He said, "Yes, 11 and I called 
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SCHWEICKART 	 Houston with it. Houston called back 
with something completely irrelevant to 
the remark on the SPS helium pressure 
which led us to believe that they did 
not read us. Jim checked on that and 
sure enough they had not heard it. As 
soon as they were aware that we had a 
bad onboard indication, they told us that 
we were go. At that point, we speculated 
it might be a circuit breaker or something 
of that nature, and we planned to check 
it in orbit. It turned out that there 
was nothing we could do about it. It was 
apparently a transducer failure. 
3.45 Crew Comfort Through Powered Flight 
McDIVITT 	 I was as comfortable as, I guess, you can 
get during a power flight. It was mild. 
As far as the g-levels went, they were 
low and sort of like an old lady's ride 
into orbit. 
SCOTT 	 My physiological sensations were about 
the same as those Jim described. 
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4.0 ORBITAL OPERATIONS 
4.1 First Day 
4.1.1 Insertion to Separation 
McDIVITT 2. Postinsertion systems configuration 
and checks: After we got into orbit, we 
checked to make sure that we had a safe 
orbit. As soon as we determined that we 
had a safe orbit, I turned off the gimbal 
motors; and we started into the postin­
sertion checklist, which went very smooth­
ly. We had it configured in the time-
line type of thing with my checklist 
having a director's composition to it so 
that I could make sure that all of the 
checks were done and that each individual 
checklist had a detailed operation in it. 
We went through the checklists and just 
put postinsertion checks, which were a 
conglomeration of things that had to be 
done. They went along fine. We did the 
ECS post insert ion configuration, ECS re­
dundant component check, ECS monitoring 
check, GDC align, EMS test, EPS.monitoring 
'CONFIDE"~TIAL 
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McDIVITT 
SCOTT 

check, installed the optics, service 
module RCS monitoring check, and right 
on down the list. We had no anomalies 
except for one or two. The ~elium pres­
sure on the command module RCS was read­
ing slightly low -- 3900 and 3820. It 
remained at that reading throughout the 
flight which was below the limit that 
was set for us in our checklist. At the 
end of this particular check, I ended up 
with a few things that we had not accom­
plished because of time and inaccessibility 
of some of the handles and things that 
we needed with which to work. These were 
the leak check in the secondary loop, the 
backup voice check, and a PIPA bias check 
which we completed later on in the day. 
Another thing that we did not complete 
during this particular time was the main 
regulator checks, which we also completed 
f· 
at a later time. 
The intent was to perform the main reg­
ulator check over a ground station, but 
CONFIDENTIA~ 
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SCHWEICKART 
McDIVITT 
the timeline just did not work out effi­
ciently so that we could do it. We had 
to perform it without ground contact, 
but the check was acceptable. 
In the postinsertion checks that I pulled, 
there were some recordings I took which 
I suppose should be reported here. The 
three fuel cells were all pulling 25 amps 
apiece; Bat Bus A was reading 32 volts, 
Bat Bus B was reading 32 volts, and Bat 
Bus C was reading 37 volts. I made the 
dc vOltage-amperage check and the battery 
relay bus check. I recorded it at 
3.5 volts, and I am not exactly sure why 
it was down to 3.5 at that time. The 
SPS monitoring check data was recorded. 
The helium pressure was off scale, low. 
Everything else was nominal. The SPS 
oxidizer and fuel quantities read 88.9 
and 88.6, and the unbalance read plus 
50 or 50 increase. 
I guess it is worthy of comment at this 
time that throughout our checklist we 
-COt~FIDENTI,A.L 
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had places to record data, and this data 
was duly recorded in the appropriate 
checklist; so I will not read off a 
thousand numbers which probably do not 
mean anything to anybody anyway. If there 
is any interest in all of these numbers, 
we can get them out of the checklist. 
4. Optics cover jettison: The post-
insertion alignment has been discussed, 
and it worked very well. 
10. All systems verification and post-
insertion configuration -- docking probe 
extension: The optics dust covers came 
off as they were supposed to, and we ex­
tended the docking probe and got the same 
sensations that we had in the chamber. 
The probe went out in 0.2 or 0.3 second; 
and we felt a defini~e thud when it hit 
the end, indicating that it was all the 
way out. We checked the talkbacks, and 
they gave us the proper indications. 
13. S-IVB manueuver to T&D ATT: We 
proceeded with the checklist; we got set 
up to do the transposition and docking, 
-eONFIDENTIAb· 
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SCOTT 	 switched couches with no problem, got 
over MSFN, went through the pre-pyro 
arming procedure, and got a GO for 
PYRO ARM. The S-IVB, during this time, 
was maintaining orbit rate. The only 
thing on the S-IVB worth noting was that 
we could see the attitude control system 
in the S-IVB firing at night -- the thrus­
ters firing. Other than that, the S-IVB 
performed as we expected, completely 
nominal with a well defined ORB RATE. 
The venting of the S-IVB provided no 
problem with doing the alignment at night. 
There were no extra stars, and it was 
easy to track the stars at the ORB RATE 
that the S-IVBhad. 
14. Subjective reaction to weightlessness: 
The sensations to weightlessness were as 
expected. I felt a fullness in the head 
but no vertigo or visual disturbances. 
remained in the couch until we were well 
into darkness to ensure an adequate accom­
modation to the weightless state. When 
I did go down to do the alignment, I felt 
eONFIDENTIAl 
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no unusual sensations other than a full­
ness in the head. 
When we got into orbit, I felt the way I 
• 
had expected to feel. We were upside 
down. I knew we were going to go into 
orbit upside down, and it did not bother 
me to be apparently hanging in the straps. 
I had no sensations of any feeling that 
would be bothersome. 
My first reactions to weightlessness 
were the same as the other two guys. I 
had the fullness in the head, but I had 
been well priefed in advance on it. I 
I 
did not p~ticularlY have any sensation 
of head-down position. I did not move 
around very much, purposely. My inten­
tion was to stay in the couch as quiet 
as the situation would allow and was able 
to do so. I suffered no feeling of nausea 
or vertigo throughout the first day. I 
avoided most of those situtations in­
volving "rapid head motion or rapid in-
dividual movement." I had the feeling 
eGNFIDENTIAb .$ 
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SCHWEICKART 	 that if I had moved my head rapidly~ I 
would have felt dizzy. 
4.1.2 Separation~ Transposition~ Docking~ and Extraction 
SCOTT 	 The S-IVB maneuvered to the T&D 
attitude at the correct time and went to 
the proper angles as were defined prior 
to flight. It took us a number of months 
to get these angles for the S-IVB, and I 
guess the efforts paid off because they 
were proper. It maneuvered to 181.94 and 
14.78. We had preset the G&N error needles 
to these values, and at the completion of 
one S-IVB maneuver, the needles were 
nulled within the S-IVB dead band. 
At the completion of the S-IVB maneuver, 
we proceeded according to the checklist 
to prepare for the separation~ transpo­
sition~ and docking. 
3. S-IVB tank pressure measurement 
reading accuracy: After we armed the pyros 
and began to proceed with the separation, 
we noticed that the launch vehicle tank 
pressure gage was not indicating what we 
expected it to. In looking back, we 
€ONFIDENTIAl ­
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found that we had added a step shortlySCOTT 
prior to flight to pull the EDS circuit 
breakers which, after insertion, disabled 
the LV tank pressure gage. This was go­
ing to be our prime indication of separa­
tion. At this point, we did not take 
time to troubleshoot the problem, feeling 
that we would get a good indication of 
separation. 
4. Pyro operation: At the time of sep­
aration, we got the loud pyro bang and 
a definite indication that we had sepa­
rated from the S-IVB. 
5. Separation from SLA: We started the 
\ DET at the time we separated from the 
\ 
\ S-IVB. The plan was to thrust for 4 sec­
\ondS which should have given ut about 
0.8 ft/sec separation velocitY1 I no­
'ticed 	on the EMS, which had beeh set up 
at 100 ft/sec to compensate for the 
drift, that after 4 seconds we only had 
approximately 0.4. I continued thrust­
ing until we had approximately 0.6 on 
the EMS which took approximately 6 seconds. 
~ONFIDENfIAl-
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SCOTT At the time I attributed this to a dif­
ference between the simulator and the 
actual vehicle. 
We started the pitch around at 15 seconds 
at approximately 2 deg/sec. I guess the 
first indication I had that we were doing 
alright was when Jim saw the S-IVB. As 
I recall~ it was well before we pitched 
90 degrees that Jim saw it through the 
hatch window. His comment was that we 
were in the proper position for the turn 
around. When we completed the lBO-degrees 
pitch maneuver, I noticed that the align­
ment was somewhat off in pitch and that 
to get the needles nulled, I would have 
to pitch up approximately 10 degrees. At 
that time, I became suspicious of our 
angles that we had gotten in preflight 
because we previously had so much trouble 
with them. 
A summary of the transposition and docking 
is contained on the onboard SONY tape. 
Upon looking back at the indications we 
had on accelerations and pitch attitude 
EONFIDENTIAl .. 
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 after the separation and during the 
transposition, it is obvious that quad C 
was not working, because we got less than 
T 
the nominal amount of acceleration. Also, 
we were in the improper pitch attitude 
when we turned around which might justi­
fy the technique of accelerating out at 
a greater-than-necessary velocity to com­
pensate for a quad failure, which is, in­
cidently, one of the things we did not 
have time to simulate very much other 
than the procedures. Another significant 
thing that we noticed was that the vent­
ing of the S-IVB caused a somewhat greater 
acceleration than what we had expected from 
reading the preflight data and also, from 
i 
observing the vent model in the simulator. 
You could vi$ually see the venting take 
place from the side of the S-IVB. It 
is a continuous vent, but you can see the 
pulses as the system vents. We did not. 
get any indication from the ground as to 
what the vent model was --whether it 
was a high vent model or a low vent model. 
-€ONFIDENTIAI:­
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7. Visual inspection of SLA panels: The 
separation from the S-IVB was a loud 
bang as we had expected and we felt the 
acceleration. We could see a lot of 
debris through the windows, and Jim also 
noticed a panel almost immediately -­
one of the SLA panels moving away from the 
spacecraft and moving backwards. The 
control systems worked very well once we 
got the quad problem squared away. Both 
the SCS and CMC DAP were good solid con­
trol systems, and the docking task was 
relatively easy as far as the aligning 
with the standoff cross and doing the 
actual contact. 
8. Photography, sequence and still: We 
had our cameras set up with the 16mm 
sequence camera mounted in the left-hand 
rendezvous window --the number 2 window. 
However, the remote control cable was 
being employed and ran across the cockpit 
to the LMP. I used the 70mm Hasselblad 
camera to take pictures (through the num­
ber 4 window) throughout the transposition, 
EONFIDENTIAL 
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docking, and extraction maneuvers. These 
apparently came out good. 
11. Docking: After we had completed the 
docking and had gotten the good solid 
bang of the latches, we pressurized the 
tunnel. 
13. LM pressurization: Everything worked 
in the LM the w~ it was supposed to work. 
We followed the checklist, and the pres­
surization procedures worked fine. The 
pressurization procedures went very rapidly 
because of the gaseous oxygen that we had 
available in the command module. It took 
something less than 5 minutes; we are not 
really sure of the exact time. By using 
I
the PLSS bottles and the surge tank, we 
were able to equalize the pressure across 
the hatch in a very short period of time. 
.. 
I believe that when we finished the pres­
surization, we still had something on the 
order of 700 psi in the surge tank; and 
we had approximately 4 psi in both space­
craft. 
t:Ot'4 FtDEN:rlAl 
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The upper tunnel hatch mechanisms worked 
properly. It was a well designed hatch. 
15. Docking latches, umbilicals, power: 
We were able to get it out in a very short 
time and to connect the umbilicals. 
The lighting --the tunnel lights -- were 
certainly adequate for us to do the job 
that we had to do. The umbilicals are in 
a rather precarious position and are 
attached to the side of the LM with Velcro, 
and it is a little difficult to see around 
on the other side of the drogue. I was 
very careful about getting those umbilicals 
out, because it appeared that if I had ever 
hit one and got it unstuck from the Velcro 
and if it had gone out through the tunnel, 
we would have had a real problem on our 
hands trying to get it out. We are not 
recommending a change. We are just 
recommending great care in extracting the 
umbilical, because if you do get it stuck 
on the other side of the drogue, you are 
going to have to fish for it; and you may 
even have to take the probe and drogue out. 
-  ­
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McDIVITI' Another little bit of information is that 
when we had finished dumping the PLSS 
tanks, we had the DELTA-P across the tun­
nel at 2.4, and we had expected 2.8. There 
are a lot of little numbers here that would 
probably be of some interest, but the main 
thing that we should get across here is 
that the procedure we had for pressurizing 
the tunnel in the 1M worked very well. It 
was qui ckly done, and we had no problem of 
waiting around for the tunnel to pressurize 
so we could get in there and perform the 
job that we had to do. 
When I looked up in the tunnel, I was not 
able to see any large scars on the drogue, 
but I was not able to really see the drogue 
very well. I went around and checked each 
one of the latches; they were all locked 
and latched. There was no problem at all 
in verifying that they had operated prop­
erly. The bungee fairings were all 
vertical and you could see that immediately, 
which indicated that the things were all 
latched. I went around and inspected each 
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one of them though. It took a little time, 
but I wanted to make sure that we had a 
good solid tunnel because of the stroking 
test, which we were going to do the next 
day. 
18. Evasive maneuvers: The ejection man­
euver went as planned. We thrusted aft 
for 3 seconds at 5 seconds, pitched down 
at 25 seconds, and were prepared to do the 
6-second aft thrusting at 3 minutes after 
ejection. There was no question that the 
vehicles had been ejected from the S-IVB. 
You could see movement and clearance from 
the SLA ring before we even did our aft 
3-second thrust at 5 seconds. After we'd 
completed the 6-second evasive maneuver, 
we could see the S-IVE as we had planned 
and as we had seen in the simulations; but 
it appeared that we were not mov~ng away 
from the S-IVE as rapidly as we had ex­
pected. We maintained a closer relative 
position than we had expected. It was 
easily visible in the forward and hatch 
windows at all times. 
EONFIDENTIAl 
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The preflight curves were really a function 
of the vent model and the magnitude of the 
vent. With no vent, you continue to rise 
above the S-IVB relatively and to fall 
behind. The higher the vent on the pre­
flight curves, the closer, of course, you 
remain to the S-IVB; and you drop down 
below, which is what occurred in our par­
ticular situation. We went up above the 
S-IVB, back down below, and almost directly 
aft of the engine. We crossed directly aft 
of the engine at about S-IVB ignition minus 
approximately a minute and a half, and we 
were about 1000 feet away at the time. 
19. Work load and timeline: The work load 
and the timeline were about as we had ex­
pected. I do not think we ran into any 
unforeseen problems during this entire time, 
except the one that Dave mentioned. It 
took a lot longer to dock because of the 
lack of thrust left or translation left 
that we had. As a matter of fact, we had 
a few rather bad moments there trying to 
figure out what was going wrong. 
-EONFIDENTIAt 
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SCOTT 	 The transfer to the LM power went very 
well according to the procedures, except 
that when we looked at the systems test 
meter we noticed some rapid fluctuations 
in the voltage -- 0.4 to 2.0. There were 
some oscillations about the low values and 
then jumps to the high values. At the time, 
this gave us some concern, but it was sub­
sequently passed up from the ground that 
that was the same cycling that the 1M 
heaters had been performing prelaunch. 
[After a certain period of time, the os­
cillation stabilized 	to less rapid move­
ments and more of a 	 cyclic nature.] 
The evasive maneuver was performed accord­
ing to the checklist 	and occurred approxi­
mately 5 seconds late, correction -- on 
time. We had waited about 3 minutes after 
sunrise to ensure that we had adequate 
lighting to see the 	S-IVB, which worked 
out to our preplanned time of 4 hours and 
11 minutes. 
"€ONFIDENTIAb 
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4.1.3 S-IVB Closeout and SPS Burn 1 
McDIVITT 2. Preparation for first S-IVB restart 
and restart: As we were rotating around s 
we kept the S-IVB in view~ of course, 
because we were staying quite close to it. 
It was interesting to note that the engine 
had gimbaled over to one side. It wasn't 
right straight down the minus X-axis of 
the S-IVB. As we got right behind it, it 
was a little difficult to tell if the 
engine was pointing right at us or not. 
Then as we dropped down a little bit below 
it, we could see that the engine was indeed 
pointing sort of sideways. I don't know 
when it came back into the straight down 
the X-axis or through the c.g. as it should 
have been. We were elose enough behind it 
so that when it lit up there was some con­
c 
cern about what the debris coming out of 
the engine would do to the two vehicles. 
1.. 
However ~ we didn't reorient the spacecraft 
or anything. We stayed where we were, and 
we could see its engine start cycle and 
some particles coming out of the engine. 
-GO~~FIDENTIAl-
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It went through the normal sequence that 
we had expected. There was some debris 
that came down toward us. Whether it ever 
got to the spacecraft or not I can't really 
say, but it looked like it did. However, 
we didn't feel any chunks apply to our 
vehicle from its engine ejection or any­
thing like that. We were able to take 
pictures of it while it started up and 
flew away. There never was any concern 
about it running into us; it was Just a 
concern of the ejection from the engine. 
During the time prior to the S-IVB igni­
tion, we were able to keep it in view by 
using roll only. 
4. S-IVB venting operation (LOX-LH20): 
On the S-IVB venting, after we turned 
around, it appeared to me that the vent on 
my side of the S-IVB would open up for about 
a second (somewhere between a second and 
2 seconds), then close down for 2 to 3 sec­
onds, and open up again for another second 
to 3 seconds. It followed that same cycle 
of open and close, open and close. You 
CONfID-ENTIAl­
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could see it as a sort of very tenuous 
white exhaust coming out of the vent on 
the side. 
As a matter of fact, it looked like that 
was a nonpropulsive vent. There were two 
vents coming out opposed to each other, 
and I'm not sure, as I think about it, 
that I ever saw the propulsive vent come 
out. 
From rtIY side, it appeared as though the 
vent was located toward the forward end 
of the S-IVB but was pointing aft and 
thrusting; that is, exhausting awa:y from 
us and therefore thrusting toward us. At 
one point, when we were lined up with it, 
I got to see both vents at the same time, 
and they \did vent together. There was 
\
apparentlY no rotational motion or any 

apparent motion associated with the S-IVB 

when the vents went off. 
1. 
7. S-IVB closeout: There was very little 
that we had to do with the S-IVB closeout. 
It I S already been discussed in ou.r tran!=!­
position, docking, and ejection of the LM. 
-EGNFIDENTIAl 
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8. IMU orientation realign and alignment 
check: The realignment prior to SPS 
number 1 was nominal. I mean, it was 
preferred. 
9. Preparation for SPS burn 1: The 
first SPS burn occurred at approximately 
6 hours. We were not rushed in getting 
into it. We worked our way down through 
the checklist without any problem, and 
the burn was quite nominal. 
10. Parameters and performance of burn 1: 
In looking back at it now and comparing 
this burn with the retro burn, for example, 
there was a significant difference in the 
acceleration that you feel between an empty 
CSM and a full LM/CSM combination. The 
engine comes on abruptly, but with the 
tremendous mass there, the acceleration 
is very low. It was 5 seconds to get 
36.8 feet per second; or that was with a 
nominal, and that waS about what we burned. 
There really isn It too much to say about 
it. We only used one set of ball valves, 
set A. At the time that we had the burn, 
"CO~-4FIDENTIAl 
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I believe Rusty reported that one of the 
SPS ball valve indicators was a little 
slow to return to its normal open position. 
One was a little slow to open, but the 
ground indicated that, from their data, 
they were opening properly. 
11. D8\Ylight star check: The d8\Ylight 
star check with the optics was performed 
at 6 hours and 49 minutes at sunrise. 
There was one' check each at sunrise minus 
15, sunrise, sunrise plus 5, and sunrise 
plus 10. The significant point here, I 
think, is that the number of stars visible 
at sunrise was 19. The orientation of the 
spacecraft was such that the moon was about 
5 degrees above the top of the field of 
view of the telescope. which was adequate 
to eliminate it from the field of view but 
still pretty close. If it had been in the 
field of view, it would have washed out the 
stars almost completely. 
At sunrise, the earth cloud cover could not 
be seen, but the LM quad visible in the 
telescope field of view began to shine from 
-EONFIDENTIAt 
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reflections from the sun. As the sun rose, 
this became brighter and brighter until it 
was a brilliant source of light through the 
telescope. At sunrise plus 5 minutes, it 
completely washed out the stars. The land­
ing radar is also visible in the telescope 
field of view; and at the right sun angle, 
it too would present a brilliant object 
because of reflection. These two items, 
the Cluad and the landing radar, really 
occlude the field of view, not so much from 
their size, but from their reflection 
capabilities. Even with those there, in 
the daylight the sextant stars can still 
be seen for final alignment in auto optics. 
Back to the daylight star check. One thing 
I forgot to mention was that the moon re­
flected on a split in the prism of the 
telescope and provided a nice wide band of 
artificial light across the center of the 
telescope, a brown light. 
13. Doff PGA's: Towards the end of the 
day, we doffed the PGA's and stowed them. 
The LMP's PGA was stowed underneath the 
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left-hand couch. The CDR's PGA was stowed 
in the lower part of the L-shaped bag, and 
the CMF's PGA was stowed in the upper part 
of the L-shaped bag. We didn't have much 
difficulty doffing the PGA's. At least, 
I didn't. 
In doffing and donning the PGA the next 
day and in getting your head in and out of 
the neck ring while bending almost in half, 
(once you got your ~ead inside the 
suit, so that you really couian,lt see), 
'" 
there was a sensation of tumbling, even 
though you weren It. At least, that waS· my 
subjective sensation. The other guys might 
comment on their's. 
I never had any abnormal sensations in 
getting in or out of my suit at any time. 
I put it on very quickly and took it off 
very quickly a number of times, and I felt 
nothing. 
The first time I put mine on, on day num­
ber 2, I ducked my head rapidly and stuck 
..~ t through the hole and did get a slight 
sensation of gyro tumbling, but after that 
· 
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there was never any problem. 
14. Powerdown SC: In powering down the 
spacecraft. we powered down the computer, 
the IMU, and the SCS. We had a checklist 
that we had worked out preflight, and it 
worked very well. We went right through 
it with no problem at all. We ended up 
with our spacecraft in a situation with 
all the thrusters disabled. The stabili­
zation control system was disabled so that 
it could not fire any thrusters, and the 
PGNCS was disabled so that it could not 
fire any thrusters. Our primary concern 
was to get the guidance system set up so 
that we wouldn't have any inadvertent jet 
firings during the period that we were 
sleeping, and we would not have to worry 
about the IMU going into gimbal lock. We 
were able to go through this powered down 
checklist rather quickly. 
On the first day, we were supposed to start 
our rest period at 9 hours. I have a note 
in the flight plan that we finally got to 
bed at 11 hours, 2 hours late. It was an 
-  
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McDIVITT associated comment of terrible housekeeping. 
It was just a matter of trying to get all 
the things done that we were supposed to 
do. We'll comment on these in greater 
detail later. As for the timeline for the 
first day, we found that the housekeeping 
required a fair amount of time, and we 
hadn't really put it in the timeline. 
\ 
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4.2 Second Day 
4.2.1 Powering Up and Down of Spacecraft 
McDIVITT In the morning, when we started powering 
up the spacecraft, we had a checklist 
that we followed carefully and got every­
thing running again -- just the wa::y we 
had anticipated. We did not find any 
problems except that it took a little 
longer to get everything done -- not 
just the powering up and the powering 
down of the spacecraft but the auxiliary 
things as well; such as changing the 
lithium hydroxide canisters, trying to 
chlorinate the water, getting to the 
bathroom on" time , getting something to 
eat, and then suiting up. All these 
things took a very long period of time. 
4.2.2 Plan Updating 
McDIVITT 	 We got the flight plan updates early, 
and we were able to incorporate them. 
4.2.3 	 Communication Setup for Rest Periods 
McDIVITT The communication setup that we had 
EONFIDENTIAt 
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McDIVITT used for the first night rest period 
was A and B RECEIVE VHF with the S-band 
turned down. It turned out that the 
VHF B frequency picked up a tower. I 
assumed it to be an airfield tower some­
where in southeast Asia. We could hear 
the communication between the aircraft 
and the tower on four passes during the 
night, two of them relatively long. It 
almost seemed like we were getting better 
coverage out of the tower than what we 
got out of a lot of the MSFN ground 
stations at the time. Obviously, it 
interrupted the sleep period for the 
first night considerably. After that, 
we went to a VHF A only at night, and 
we were going to use the crew alert light 
as the backup for that. We all slept a 
lot better after getting off the chatter. 
4.2.5 	 IMU Orientation Alignment and Realign 
SCOTT The initial IMU's, P51 and P52, were ab­
solutely nominal. No problems. 
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McDIVITT 	 We did the realignments between each of 
the burns. It was at this time that I 
first noticed that the shaft mechanical 
read-out on the optics panel was stuck at 
64. I had intended to use the mechanical 
read-outs as a quick way of doing a star 
sextant check, but found out we couldn It 
do that because of the lack of the shaft 
drive. The realignments were all pretty 
nominal. We did have to rush through a 
couple of them because of the realign burn 
schedule that we had. Without having had 
a great deal of practice using the optics, 
I discovered that the landing radar, the 
Res quad, the earth, and the moon made a 
box within which it was pretty difficult to 
identify stars through the telescope. If 
you spend a long enough time in looking, 
dark adapting, and maneuvering around to 
avoid looking at the objects that we al­
ready discussed, it wasn't too difficult. 
It was pretty hard to identify some of the 
stars. The torquing angles were all rea­
sonably small; I don't think there is any 
CONFIDE~~TIAl 
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McDIVITT 	 need to discuss them. The alignments all 
went reasonably well. Okay, I may have 
spoken incorrectly here. The problem with 
using the mechanical read-outs was that 
the read-out didn't operate. The drive 
apparently drove the shaft around. The 
units and tenths digits in the mechanical 
read-out on the optics panel did not move. 
They were stuck at 64. 
4.2.8 Performance of Burns 2, 3, and 4 
SCOTT 	 SPS number 2 was a G&N burn of 1 minute 
and 51 seconds with a 40-percent amplitude 
stroker to be initiated after the first 
minute of the burn. After the start and 
during the first minute, the G&N rolled to 
the left edge of the deadband, pitched up 
approximately 3 degrees on the error needles, 
and yawed right about a degree so that the 
error needles were offset by 3 degrees and 
a degree when the stroker was initiated. 
The 40-percent stroker resulted in a zero­
\ , 
to-peak of approximately O.l-degree maximum 
pitch oscillation, and it damped in approxi-
CONFIDENTIAt 
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SCOTT 	 mately 5 seconds. One other thing noted 
was that when the DELTA-V thrust B was 
turned on at ignition plus 3 seconds, there 
was a slight chug in the engine in the 
thrust level. 
McDIVITT Prior to starting the stroking test, we 
had been maneuvering the spacecraft; and 
with the tremendous mass of the vehiCle, 
the minimum impulse was almost imperceptible 
on the rate needles. We had used the 
acceleration command on a number of occa­
sions, and when we did, I felt that there 
was coupling between a pitch input and a 
vehicle response of some sort -- an oscilla­
tory response in both pitch and yaw. It 
felt as if it were coupling the same way 
that the SPS stroker test coupled on the 
MEl04 simulations that we ran at North 
American. Frankly, I had expected to see 
some tremendous oscillations when we did 
the first stroker, and I didn't expect that 
we'd even get into the second stroker because 
of the way the spacecraft combination res­
ponded to just the RCS thruster inputs. 
-cONFIDENTIAt 
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SCOTT 	 Yes, I agree with that; and it seemed that 
with a good acceleration pulse, the whole 
combination would bend. You could almost 
feel it bending; but when we actuated the 
stroker, we didn't get this same bending 
sensation physiologically that we had ex­
perienced with the acceleration command RCS. 
The feeling was not so much like a loose 
joint between the two vehicles but more 
like there was a flexible rod that would 
couple pitch and yaw because of the 
bending. 
After the stroker damped on SPS number 2, 
the needle stabilized to a yaw left of 
approximately 3 degrees and a pitch of 
approximately 1 degree. At the completion 
of the burn, the residuals were relatively 
small. They were minus 0.1, plus 0.1, and 
plus 0.3. 
SPS number 3 was a G&N burn of 4 minutes 
and 42 seconds, with a lOa-percent ampli­
tude stroker after 1 minute and an MTVC SCS 
rate command for the last 45 seconds of 
the burn. The start was the same as SPS 
£ONFIDENTIAL 
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SCOTT number 2. When we initiated the full-
amplitude stroker, the response was similar 
to the mission evaluator at North American, 
except that the amplitude was not as high 
as we had experienced there. The pitch 
rates during the first 3 seconds were 
approximately 0 to minus 0.2, 0 to peak, 
and then at damp to plus 0.2 and oscillated 
around the plus 0.2, coupling in yaw as it 
did on the mission evaluator. There would 
be an oscillation cycle in pitch; then it 
would couple to an oscillation cycle in yaw 
and then back to pitch, with amplitudes 
about one-third the values that we saw in 
the mission evaluator. On the mission 
evaluator, we saw an oscillation of plus 
or minus 0.2 degree per second, approximately 
a minus 0.2 in pitch; whereas, in flight, it 
was just an oscillation from 0 to 0.2. 
Therefore, it was about half the amplitude 
that we saw in the mission evaluator. 
It appeared that all the oscillations damped 
within approximately 10 seconds after the 
completion of the stroker. After the strok-
CONFIDENTIAt 
4-34 
 
SCOTT 

\ 

er damped, the DAP again drifted over to 
the minus 5-degree roll deadband and sat 
at that point until we initiated the MTVC 
by switching the spacecraft control from 
CMC to SCS. When we performed the switch-
over, the SCS TVC brought the spacecraft 
back to zero roll with a noticeable trans­
ient. In fact, the main tran~ient that we 
noticed was in roll. This was noticeable 
physically and on the FDAI. By the time the 
rates stabilized after the swit~hover, the 
G&N error needles were almost full-scale 
yaw left and pitch up, which required a 
manual control back to null the error 
needles, since we were using those for 
our display. The GPI indications at the 
time of switchover were at pitch of approxi­
mately 1.9 degrees and a yaw of approxi­
mately minus 0.6. The trim values were 
set at a pitch of plus 1.1 and a yaw of 
minus 0.2. Thus, there was a noticeable 
difference in the gimbal trim settings 
relative to the actual position of the 
gimbals when we switched over. 
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SCOTT The rotational hand-controller response 
seemed more sensitive than on the mission 
evaluator at North American. However. the 
needles could be nulled without difficulty 
but tended to start moving immediately after 
reaching a null position. 
McDIVITT It was more difficult to stop the needles 
and have them remain at some fixed position 
than it had been in the simulator. The 
stick integrator appeared to work alright; 
it just seemed as if the c.g. was changing 
more rapidly than we had experienced in the 
simulator. The residuals on shutdown were 
plus 2.7. minus 2.1. and minus 2.6. The 
EMS DELTA-V counter was minus 6.6 and that 
was used for the automatic shutdown of the 
EMS. The DELTA-Von the EMS and the V 
c g 
displ~ on the DSKY compared very well 
throughout the burn. 	and the time also was 
fairly accurate. The burn time was approxi­
mately 2 seconds different from the actual 
cutoff time for the 	long burn. 
SCOTT 	 SPS number 4 was a 20-second burn. G&N 
automatic, and that was completely nominal. 
-  
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SCOTT 	 Residuals were plus 0.2, plus 3.5, and 
plus 3.3. Throughout all three burns, we 
had quite a number of SPS PU sensor lights, 
which resulted in, I believe, seven master 
alarms during the long burn. On burn 4, 
the EMS DELTA-V counter performed very well, 
also. The reading at the end of the burn 
was minus 6.2, and-"tbe difference between 
, ..•'" 
the G&N and the DELTA-V counter should have 
""'" been approximately 6.4, according to the 
ground update, the maneuver update. 
4.2.10 Orbital NaVigation Landmark and Tracking 
McDIVITT 	 We did not do any P22' s on this particular 
day, nor did we do 	 any orbital naviga­
tional landmark tracking with the LM on 
because of the very highly packed time-
line. We delayed them until we had 
f 
completed the LM operations. 
'-"4.2.11 ORDEAL and 	ORDEAL ~~tes 
McDIVITT "\,ORDEAL and ORDEAL rates really did not 
apply too much on this particular day 
because we flew with the platform 
aligned out of plane the entire day, and 
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McDIVITT 	 ORDEAL is absolutely useless in that 
mode. 
4.2.13 Drifting Flight Operations 
McDIVITT The drifting-flight operations were okay. 
With the platform on, you have to sort 
of nursemaid it at all times, and we 
found that the spacecraft tended to drift 
into the gimbal lock area on this day. 
We spent a lot of time flying it out of 
the gimbal lock because the particular 
vehicle configuration we had wanted to 
trim. It seemed like the spacecraft 
tried to get back into the plane all the 
time. Because the platform was aligned 
out of plane, we had problems with 
it -- not a lot of problems, but we had 
to stay on the attitude to make sure we 
kept out of gimbal lock. 
One thing that is worthy of comment here 
is that every time we went into drifting 
flight, we brought the vehicle rates 
down to something fairly low. I do not 
believe, as long as we had the 1M 
attached, that we ever awoke to find the 
-  
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McDIVITT ~ rates to be over approximately 0.1 deg/sec 
in any axes. After we jettisoned the 1M 
and were in the command and service 
module only. we awoke to find rates of 
approximately of 0.2 deg/sec or less. 
I think that one day we had 0.3 deg/sec 
in one axis. but it was a situation where 
we did not intend to build up rates by. 
ourselves without any thruster inputs 
during the night, and I rather thought 
that we would. 
*" EONFIDENTIAl 
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4.3.1 	 Command Module 
SCHWEICKART 
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1. Don PGA's: The donning of the PGA's 
took place on the third day. Because of 
going into the 1M, I donned the LCG for 
the first time; and I noted that donning 
the PGA with the LCG is considerably more 
difficult from the mobility point of view 
than donning it with the CWG. The 
mary difference was the increased diameter 
of the arms caused by the LCG. Secondly, 
and of more significance, is the connec­
tion of the water hose to the adapter in 
the LCG. This hose restricted me from 
pushing the suit away to get my head into 
the neckring and made the slipping of the 
head into the neckring a major task. It 
almost required two people to bend the 
suit to get the head into the neckring. 
The same thing is true for doffing the 
PGA; we adapted the technique of having 
another crewman reach inside the suit 
and disconnect the LCG water connector 
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from the suit prior to doffing of the 
suit. Otherwise, it would have been 
nearly impossible to get the PGA off. 
2. Tunnel and 1M pressurization: We 
left the tunnel valve on 1M PRESS 
. overnight; and in checking the DELTA-P, 
we still had a good seal on the LM. 
The LM was still pressurized so there 
was no need to pressurize the tunnel. 
3. Clearing tunnel: We cleared' 
tunnel, and I'll go through the general~ 
hatch/probe/drogue operations for instal­
ling and for clearing the tunnel. The 
hatch, as Jim mentioned earlier, worked 
fine. It was well designed -- easy to 
remove and easy to stow. As a matter of 
fact, it is probably easier for one man 
to clear the tunnel than for two, because 
the other two men can get out of the way. 
It is easy enough to move the components 
of the tunnel around so that one man can 
do it and direct the components to the 
proper stowage location. This is easier 
"­~.\\, 
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than having two men in the tunnel becauseSCOTT 
it gets awfully crowded in the LEB. The 
hatch stowage bag is too small, and there 
seemed to be no need to have that form 
fitted. If the stowage bag was larger, 
it would be easier to get the hatch into 
it and that would be adequate to hold 
the hatch in position during the temporary 
stowage. We did not zip the bag closed 
because it was not necessary at any time. 
We used a utility strap which was placed 
across the front of the bag on two snaps 
to retain the hatch during the tunnel­
clearing operations and that was all 
that was needed. The thermal control 
coating on the outside of the hatch was 
much too delicate for handling inside 
the spacecraft. It came apart, and the 
insulation beneath it flaked off. This 
had been reported a number of times prior 
to the flight but had never been 
corrected; and again, we ran into the 
problem during the flight. The hatch is 
easy to move from the tunnel area to the 
-
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 stowage location with the exception of 
binding on the tunnel handholds. There 
are four handholds located inside of the 
• 
tunnel. I never did seem to find a def­
inite need for these handholds; thus, 
consideration should be given to removing 
them. This would make the movement of 
the hatch and the drogue through the 
tunnel somewhat easier. The probe worked 
as advertised. There were no problems 
with it at all, and the timeline was 
comparable to the l-g counterbalance 
operations on the ground. The probe was 
easy to collapse and to install. It 
took the same number of strokes as we had 
predicted to install the probe, with 
the estimated forces on the rachet being 
less than 50 pounds. There was no need 
to have any retention to remove or to 
in.stall the probe. The center couch 
"\ 
provided adequate support, and you could 
) 
brace your back against the side of the 
tunnel to stroke the probe during in­
stallation. The drogue was probably the 
CONFIDEN+t-AL 
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remove becauSe of the requirement to 
orient properly the lugs on the probe 
to get them through the diameter of the 
tunnel. I guess the entire tunnel clear­
ance went very well; it probably took 
anywhere from 7 to 10 minutes to clean 
out the tunnel completely and to reinstall 
it. The only major obstacle is the suit 
hoses which are constantly in the way and 
which push you the wrong way. They twist 
and are cumbersome; it is difficult to 
get the components down into the command 
module because of the hoses. Some con­
sideration needs to be given to solving 
the problem -- probably more flexibility 
in the hose. The tunnel checklist is 
excellent; it is positioned in the right 
place~ it provides adequate descriptions 
to remove and to install all the hardware, 
and it saves considerable time which would 
be spent holding on to or going through 
a handheld checklist. During tunnel 
€ONFIDENTIAt. 
-----
4-44 EONRDENTIAt 
. SCOTT 	 operations, the temporary stowing (for 
exrunple, putting the hatch under the left 
couch, putting the probe under the seat 
pan on the right couch, and putting the 
drogue between the seat pan and the LEB) 
seemed to work out very well. They were 
easily retained and readily accessible. 
4.3.1 Command Module 
SCOTT 	 3. Clearing tunnel: After clearing the 
tunnel for the first time, we inspected 
the drogue for drunage, and there was no 
apparent drunage at all. The only visible 
effect of the docking was a ma~k about 
the width of a pencil some 4-1/2'inches 
long from the apex of the drogue back in~ 
to the cone. 
4. Closing tunnel: The tunnel closeout 
worked just as well; the only thing worth 
---" 	 noting was that the hatch integrity check 
took approximately 10 minutes. 
5. Orientation alignment and realignment 
of lMU: During the lMU orientation and 
alignment on the third day, we discovered 
'  
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we had a telescope which would occasion­SCOTT 
ally hang up at approximately 64 degrees 
shaft. We never did determine the cause 
of the malfUnction. It occurred a number 
of times until the fifth day. After that 
time, we left the optics switch on all 
the time. We also noticed the occasion­
al hangups of the telescope were at multi­
ples of 64 degrees until, I believe it was 
the fourth day, we noticed that it also 
occurred at other points -- one time at 
15 degrees and another time at 37 degrees. 
It seemed to occur in DIRECT and RESOLVE. 
6. LM power transfer: At the completion 
of Rustyts tunnel transfer to the LM, we 
did a LM power transfer which worked nom­
inally in a VHF checkout. The only 
significant item is that there did not 
appear to be any difference in the CSM 
antennas relative to the LM VHF. After 
Jim transferred to the LM, the tunnel was 
closed; the hatch was closed; and the 
hatch-integrity check was performed. 
The interior of the command module was 
CONFIDENIIAb-­
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configured for an EV transfer, as it 
was on each of the 1M days. This includ­
ed removing and stowing the center couch 
• 
and doing the EV PREP down to the point 
of donning helmet and gloves and de­
pressing the cabin, which was approx­
imately a 10-minute job. This meant 
that the command module was configured 
within 10 minutes of opening the hatch. 
The center couch was easy to remove 
and to stow; it took approximately 
5 minutes to take it out and to stow it 
under the left couch. 
9. Maneuvering for AOT star observa­
tions: At this time, AOT star observa­
tion and 1M S-band antenna checks were not 
made. 
10. Maneuvering for 1M S-band steerable 
antenna attitude: Because no AOT star 
observation or 1M S-band antenna checks 
were made, we did not do the maneuvers 
to those attitudes. Back to the CSM 
configuration, I have a note here that 
--EON FIDENTIAL 
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it took approximately 20 minutes from 
the time the hatch was closed until the 
CSM can be configured completely with 
the couch removed for the EVT, if you 
hustle. 
14. Minimum deadband attitude hold: Note, 
that in going to MINIMUM DEADBAND for the 
coarse align with four-quad roll and 
SCS, the SCS was overshooting by about 
0.1 deg/sec and would oscillate firing 
the jets and not null. By turning 
off two quads, it would still overshoot 
by about 0.05 deg/sec; however, in turn­
ing the LIMIT CYCLE ON it damped out and 
seemed to be a very stable control mode. 
The support of the 1M communications 
checks went without any particular 
problems, and the COMM sounded good 
throughout. 
15. Preparation for docked DPS burn: The 
preparation for the docked DPS burn also 
went a.s planned. The monitor of the burn 
was set up (according to the procedures 
prepared prior to flight) by loading the 
4-48  
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DAP and the CMC with the special para­
meters that MIT prepared to monitor the 
1M burn in real time. 
16. Menitor DPS burn: During the 1M DPS 
burn, the time to go (h and h ) were good
a p 
parameters and correlated very well with 
the numbers that the 1M was reading. By 
looking out the window during the burn, I 
determined that there was no visual plume 
from the DPS. The acceleration level was 
low enough so that there was no problem 
of hanging in the straps; controls were 
easy to reach, and it was easy to monitor 
the systems in the command module. 
The attitudes in the command module were 
similar to what we experienced during the 
simulations, but the excursions were not 
quite as great. As I recall, it was some­
thing like 2 to 3 degrees from zero; 
whereas during the simulations, it was up 
) 
to 7 degrees. 
At the c~~etion of the DPS burn, the 
residuals in the command module read 
"COt>~FIDENTIP\l 
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SCOTT minus 4.7, plus 3.8, and minus 1.3; the 
DELTA-V counter read 1740.6 with an apogee 
of 271.7 and a perigee of 109.1; and the 
cutoff time seemed to agree between the 
two spacecrafts. 
17. IVT to CSM: The IVT back to the 
command module from the LM was the same as 
previously described. 
18. Tunnel operations: Reinstalling the 
tunnel hardware after the CDR and the LMP 
had transferred to the command module 
took 14 minutes for the drogue, the probe, 
and the hatch. 
18. Tunnel operations: The tunnel opera­
tions were the same as previously de­
scribed. 
19. Center couch installation: The 
reinstallation of the couch was no prob­
lem, and the reconfiguration of the com­
mand module back to a normal three-man 
operation went nominally. 
21. Preparation for SPS burn number 5: 
-CONFIDENTIAt 
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The IMU alignment and preparation for 
SPS number 5 was nominal. 
22. SPS burn number 5 performance and • 
final parameters: SPS burn number 5 was 
supposed to be a minimum 40-second burn 
to ensure that we would be able to use 
the SPS for future maneuvers; there was 
some concern prior to ~ flight that 
there would be a lot of chugging and a 
possible engine shutdown. We had some 
very elaborate plans to take care of all 
these contingencies. The ignition was 
normal; we came out with bank B. We 
got the little chug that we usually 
got with bank B, and then we started 
getting a relatively large attitude ex­
cursion. The attitude error needles 
pegged in yaw to the left, and the attitude 
continued to go out but at a decreasing 
rate until it finally stopped. I would 
) 
guess the attitude excursion and yaw 
initially was approximately 1 degrees. 
It then steered back through zero, off 
the other side, and shut down before the 
-EONFIDENTIAl 
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steering oscillations had damped out. 
There were not any propulsion chugs. The 
propulsion portion of the burn was very 
nominal. We got the thing started and 
stopped, and the chamber pressure stayed 
up near 100 percent or 100 psi. There 
were no significant discrepancies. The 
only problem was the steering. We ended 
up with residuals of plus 1.9 in X, 
plus 11.1 in Y, and plus 3.4 in Z, with 
a DELTA-V counter reading of 9.9. The 
resulting orbit was 129.6 by 127.7, I 
think. This was the greatest excursion 
that we saw in any of the burns during 
the mission, and we had expected it. We 
had seen in simulations that this parti­
cular 40-second burn with the LM config­
uration attached always ended up with a 
fairly large dispersion in Y; sure enough, 
we got this predicted 11 ft/sec. We did 
not clean it up by burning out the resid­
uals; this was not included in the flight 
plan, and we ended up with somewhat of a 
noncircular orbit for rendezvous. I 
-  
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think, from a propulsion standpoint, it 
was a highly successful burn. Although 
'.,we had subjected the service module to 
negative gls for almost 6 minutes or 
more, we were able to retain enough fuel 
in the O-g cans to get the engine running. 
The resultant maneuver kept the fuel in 
the can and did not allow any noticeable 
amount of the gas to get into the chamber 
or to create any abnormalities as far 
as chamber pressures went. I might add 
that we used a four-jet, l8-second 
ullage for this maneuver to make sure 
that we did have the fuel settled. In­
terestingly enough, in the P30, our 
h and h came out as 135.3 and 128.1; 
a p 
and we ended up with a resultant orbit 
of 129.6 and 127.7. These things are not 
too correlatable but just bits of infor­
mation. 
23. Power down of spacecraft: I think 
the powering down of the spacecraft was 
comparable to the one described earlier. 
~ONFIElENTtA1. 
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24. Doff PGAfs: Also, the doffing of 
the PGAf s was comparable to the one de­

scribed earlier. 

Another point on the CSM attitude control 

during d~ 3 with the docked configura­

tion was the continual necessity to moni­

tor and the attempt to avoid gimbal lock. 

Again, we had an out-of-plane alignment 

for the docked DPS burn, and I had to 

continually avoid (with minimal impulse) 

the gimbal lock region. It seemed as 

. though the spacecraft wanted to trim 
inplane into the gimbal lock region con­
tinuously throughout the d~. 
The timeline in the morning from the end 
of the rest period to the time when we 
were supposed to transfer to the LM was 
extremely tight. There were a lot of 
problems that we had not anticipated 
prior to flight. I believe the major ones 
were the suit hoses and, because of the 
bulk of the suit, the inability of the 
three crewmembers to operate simultane­
ously and to maneuver around in the space­
4-54,  
McDIVITT 	 craft when all three crewmembers were 
suited. However, this particular day was 
complicated by the fact that the LMP 
became ill just prior to the time when 
the CMP was to perform the IMU alignment 
at approximately 41 hours. This delayed 
the alignment time until just prior to 
sunrise. At this time, it was too late 
to complete th~MU alignment, and we had 
to slip the IMU to the following dark-side 
" 
pass. This put us approximately 
1-1/2 hours behind entry to the 1M. 
SCOTT 	 There is a correction for the time re­
quired to configure for the EVT in the 
command module, which was stated as 
approximately 20 minutes. After the 
hatch is closed out and the CSM is set 
up for the EVT, the time to configure 
from this point is approximately 
40 minutes. It requires 20 minutes to 
reconfigure after completing the day's 
activities, reinstalling the center couch, 
and reconfiguring for standard operation. 
ro-NFIDENTIAt 
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4.3.2 LM Initial Preparation and Checkout 
SCHWEICKART 	 1. The 1M AOT star observation pad and 
the S-band steerable pad: We did not pick 
up because we were running approximately 
1 hour 10 minutes late at ingress to the 
1M. 
Once Dave got the tunnel hatches, probes, 
drogues and things out, operating the 
dump valve went smoothly because it was 
in the OPEN position. In the DUMP posi­
tion, there was no hiss, no differential 
pressure across the hatch. Opening the 
hatch was no problem as far as mobility, 
handling, lighting, or anything else was 
concerned. Upon going into the 1M, I 
realized after I had gotten over there 
that the hoses were on the right-hand 
side of my PGA, which we had not mentioned 
in the checklist. They should be con­
nected to the left side, so that one can 
connect the LM hoses to the right side. 
The transfer hose was barely long enough 
to get the job done. There were switches 
in the forward left-hand and the forward 
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right-hand side of the cockpit (the audio 
control switches) which were just barely 
within the reach envelope with the trans­
fer umbilical connected. Aside from 
that, the IVT went smoothly. I connected 
the inboard aft LM re~raints to hold me 
down to the floor, and I had no trouble 
in getting back and forth from one side 
of the spacecraft to the other. 
4. Entry status: The entry status check 
went nominally. There were no comments 
on the entry status check. Everything 
was as planned. 
5. Systems activation and checkout: 
The system's activation went along as 
planned, with the exception that the 
glycol temperature got in the vicinity 
of 70 degrees prior to completing the 
circuit breaker activation of panel 16. 
So, we went ahead and activated the 
primary glycol EVAP flow to get the 
cooling started. On the CAUTION and 
WARNING checkout, the lights (as called 
out in the checklist) were exactly the 
teNFIDENTIAl 
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ones that were on. That was the first 
time that we had seen any simulation or 
any place where the lights were as adver­
tised. They were exactly as listed in 
the checklist. One other thing -- on 
the suit fan H20 separator check, the 
H 0 SEP component light would take a2
very long time (greater than 3 minutes) 
to come on. Then, rather than use the 
time, because we knew from prior activa­
tion of the suit fan that the H 0 SEP2
component light did work, we went ahead 
and switched over to the other suit fan 
without waiting for the H20 SEP component 
light to come on. On the S-band VHF 
activation, we started out with a great 
deal of noise in the 1M, which we finally 
recognized to be S-band hiss. When I 
turned the S-band volume down, the VHF 
came through loud and clear; and there 
was no noticeable difference in any 
antenna combination between the CSM and 
the LM. They all sounded essentially 
identical and were all 5 square. 
~NFID ENTIA:L 
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SCHWEICKART 	 6. Close tunnel operations: Following 

the transfer of the commander into the 

1M, we began the LM closeout. The OPS's 

were verified only to the extent that 

the pressures were up in the nominai re­
gion on this day, because we were well 

behind the timeline at this point. The 

tunnel closeout started at about 44:27. 

McDIVITT 	 The tunnel closeout was performed ac­
cording to the checklist; we put the 
drogue in place, placed the probe in 
through the drogue, and examined the 
capture latches. We could determine 
from the 1M side that the latches were 
closed. This information was given to 
the CMP. Then, we closed our 1M hatch. 
Total tunnel closeout took 17 minutes. 
At the completion of the tunnel close­
/ 
I 
out, we tried to stow the OPS's and ran 
into a fit problem. The pin that goes 
through the cylindrical hole on the 
fitting, in the pack where the OPS pal­
let fits, would not fit in its own hole, 
even with the pallet off. I never was 
-e0NFIDENTIAL 
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able to make the pin go through the hole 
and to lock in, although it had been done 
on the ground. After a considerable 
amount of pushing and shoving, I got the 
pin into the point where I thought it 
would, at least, hold the OPS pallets. 
Unfortunately, it did not. Later on, 
during the course of the day, the OPS 
pallet (with its 80 pounds of OPS's) was 
found, a number of times, floating around 
in the back. On subsequent days, I took 
a piece of the Beta cloth netting that 
was fastened near the handle (which made 
it very difficult to operate) and actually 
pulled that Beta cloth out and used the 
web of it to hold the handle in the pin 
hole so that, although the latching de­
vice didn't work as it was supposed to, 
it did retain the OPS pallets on other 
days. During this period, it was not 
tethered to the floor by the tie-down 
system. I was floating around free on 
my hoses, and I found that I did not 
have too much difficulty except when 
..  ­
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working in the extreme rear of the space­
craft. I also found later on, when I 
tried to do the docking, that the top of 
my helmet was very badly marred. I am 
sure that this marring came from the 
three times that I had stowed the OPS 
pallets in the back. 
8. Daylight AOT star visibility: We did 
not do the daylight AOT star visibility 
check because of the lateness of our 
start and our attempt to get back on the 
timeline. 
9. Communications tests: The communica­
tion test, I believe, is a VHF activation 
(I've already commented on that). 
11. Lighting of interior: The lighting 
in the rear of the spacecraft is very 
poor; and when you are trying to operate 
back in the area of the OPS pallet. The 
lithium hydroxide canisters, or the bat­
tery compartments, there's practically no 
lighting at all from the flood lights. 
You either have to bring the utility 
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lights back, which are extremely good 
lights but which don't have any place 
really to fit in the rear, or to use 
your flashlight -- and that makes it a 
little inconvenient. 
12. Window shades: The window shades 
don't really keep the light out; they 
keep the sun out but not the light. 
They were somewhat marred; and the big 
problem that we had with the window 
shades was that, when we unfastened them 
from the windows, they did not roll up 
into the tight roll like they had on the 
ground. They were in a rather loose 
roll, and what we finally ended up doing 
was to wedge them down behind the bars 
on the windows or continue to fold them 
up and to try to get them out of the 
way. I found them to be in the way a 
lot more than I had anticipated. 
13. COAS ~ighting: It was at this time 
that I first noticed that the COAS light­
ing against the cloud-covered earth was 
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very poor. Even with the COAS turned 
full bright, the reticle was very diffi­
cult to see against the clouds. I 
checked it out in both the forward and 
upper windows and used this time to see 
how the COAS pattern lined up with the 
target window i'n>the conunand module. It 
-""'" 
wasn I t a very good lineup<..., but we had 
expected that this WOUldn't'b'e lined up 
in the docked configuration. It turned 
out that the center of the docking tar­
get was 4-1/2 degrees low in the COAS 
and a half degree to the right. 
14. S-band steerable antenna: This 
antenna check was not performed because 
of the late ingress into the 1M. 
15. MSFN S-band conference: The MSFN 
S-band conference was not performed be­
cause of the late ingress into the 1M. 
16. Landing gear deployment: The land­
ing gear deployment was done over the 
Canaries and followed the checklist 
essentially as written. My subjective 
-eONfIDENlIAt 
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that you could hear the pyros go off when 
the landing gear was dropped. Within 
about 1 to 2 seconds, there was a rather 
solid thud as all four gears seemed to 
hit the stops together. At that point, 
Jim called out a gray indication on the 
talkback; and the gear was down and locked. 
When we put the gear down, they just went 
down with a big clunk, and it was pretty 
obvious that we had at least one gear 
down. We could look out and see some of 
them. In fact, I think we could see three 
of the four gears. 
SCOTT 	 From the command module left-hand rendez­
vous window, you could see one gear come 
out and snap into place. 
SCHWEICKART 	 17. PLSS preparation: The PLSS prepara­
tion went essentially as planned. We 
found no trouble in connecting the OPS 
to the top of the PLSS. I think that 
the new pin that was put in about a month 
or two before lift-off made the operation 
much smoother with regard to bringing the 
-eOt'-lFIDENTIAt 
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problem in connecting any of the communi­
cations connectors. Rather than have the 
PLSS tethered somewhere in the cabin, we 
felt that the safest mode of operation 
was to have it on my back; therefore, we 
released the straps from their stowage 
location and strapped on the PLSS. With 
the PLSS on my back, mobility at that 
time was rather severely restricted. 
I had no trouble in maintaining position 
and never felt that I was endangering 
anything in the cockpit by having it on 
my back. It was more a matter of not 
moving around very much or not being 
able to move around very much. One opera­
tion concerning the PLSS worthy of note 
was locking the battery into the PLSS. 
This is an operation with which we had 
experienced difficulty from time to time 
on the gr~d. For apparently unex­
plained reasons, even after a good bit of 
" 
training and familiarity with the lock­
ing mechanism, one could spend 2 to 5 min­
-  
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utes trying to lock a battery in; and then 
with one more try~ it would go right in. 
That very thing happened in flight. I 
spent about 3 to 4 minutes and was just 
about to give up on it. I tried one 
more time, and it went in like a piece 
of cake. To this day, we don't know what 
the difficulty was, but my feeling is 
that we ought to consider seriously 
a redesign on the battery-locking 
mechanism. It shouldn't be very complex. 
In my opinion, the present design is a 
little bit overly complex for the job 
it does. 
19. Post-PLSS check: There was essen­
tially nothing in the post-PLSS check; 
that's just a matter of taking it off and 
stowing it. We had no trouble with that. 
20. Establishing PGNS, AGS, and LGC 
activities: To establish some reasonable 
probability of completing the docked DPS 
burn, we had to arrive back at a timeline 
where we could start checking the space-
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craft out again at the time in the time-
line when it was supposed to start. The 
first item that we had to get to was the 
DPS/APS RCS TEMPERATURE/PRESSURE check 
which wa's,~upposed to occur just prior 
to carnarv~~> Then we had to get our 
PGNS turned on,~lf-tested, and things 
like that. Therefore, ~ made an effort 
"­
" to get back on the timeline at this point. 
From this point on, we followed the time-
line precisely. At some points we were 
a little ahead, but we never fell behind 
again, once we were established on some­
thing that resembled what we had planned 
on doing. 
SCHWEICKART I believe that the only thing worthy of 
comment on the DPS/APS RCS TEMP/PRESSURE 
check was that they were all approximately 
\ 70 degrees. It did not appear that at 
any time during the flight we came even 
close to freez~ng any of the propellants.\ 
The PGNS, turn-on and self-test went as 
expected. The AGS activation and self-
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test also went as expected. The rate 
gyro check was pretty much as we'd experi­
enced in the spacecraft testing on the 
ground. The rate needles on the 2 sides 
of the spacecraft exhibited their own 
peculiarities as far a hysteresis and 
inaccuracy were concerned. The 5-degree 
per second scale especially lacked sensi­
tivity. Jim will comment on this later 
as to its effect on the operations. As 
far as I could see, there was no differ­
ence between what we saw in flight and 
on the ground. That means that there was 
no improvement in what we saw in flight. 
Jim mentioned that on his FDAl, there did 
appear to be a greater offset in flight 
than there had been on the ground. The 
LGC clock initialization went quite smooth­
ly as did setting T h . We conducted the 
ep em 
E-memory dump during the tunnel closeout to 
get a leg up on the checking of the E-
memory. To our knowledge, that went smooth­
lyon the ground. We had no return from 
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the ground on that. On second thought, one 
thing that came out of that was readjust­
ment of the unit-W vector. We had two 
erasable memory locations which had to be 
readjusted because of the 3-day slip in 
launch time. 
21. 1MU coarse align while docked: The 
LM 1MU docked alignment went essentially 
the way that we had trained on it. As we 
came through the tunnel, the docking-ring 
angle (I don't think that's been mentioned 
yet) was plus 2.1 degrees indicated, and 
that cranked into the equations. The first 
set of gyro torquing angles from the 
ground came out to be plus 0.91, minus 
- 0.15, and plus 1.20 degrees, which ap­
peared to be quite nominal because of 
coarse align errors. 
The P1PA bias check was performed as 
planned. The results showed that the 
P1PA's needed ~djusting. The launch 
values of the X, Y, and Z biases were 
plus 10, plus 6, and O. After perform-
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ing the PIPA bias check, we adjusted them 
respectively to plus 12, minus 3, and 
plus 1. This was repeated twice, just 
to make sure that we were getting con­
sistent results on the PIPA bias check. 
We did get consistent results. 
It was at this point that we executed a 
rather significant operator error. It's 
interesting that we were led into this 
trap because of the simulations in the 
1MB. The three PIPA registers that we 
adjust were erasable memory locations 
1452, 1454, and 1456. In the training 
cycle, these were always set at zero; 
that is, we always simulated essentially 
zero PIPA biases in nominal cases and then 
superimposed a bias in each of the PIPA's, 
which we loaded. The intervening loca­
tions (that is, 1453, 1455, and 1457) also 
were always zero in our simulations and 
led us, without ever really checking it, 
to the idea that the PIPA bias was a 
double precision entry in the LGC. When 
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we went to load our new values after the 
PIPA bias check in flight~ we therefore 
loaded not only 1452, 1454, and 1456, but 
also zeroed the three other registers, if 
the total double precision word should 
'­have been reloaded. Luckily, this was 
observed by the ground. They called up 
that we should reload 1457, and that cued 
us to the idea that we had probably mis­
loaded the other two, 1453 and 1455, also. 
We called down to the ground to check this 
and, sure enough, they wanted us to reload 
those also. 
I guess that what this points out is that 
the LMS training ought to be as authentic 
as it can possibly be. Rather than having 
perfect PIPA's zero scale factor errors, 
and things of that kind, we ought to have 
some numbers even if they stay the same. 
One ought not to be led inadvertently into 
traps such as assuming that we've got a 
double-precision word when it's really 
single precision. 
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22. RCS pressurization, cold fire, and 
hot fire: Again, the RCS pressurization 
went essentially as planned. The pres­
sures came right up to the expected val­
ues of 185 psi. The RCS cold fire worked 
exactly as it had in the LMS except that 
the hand controller proportional checks 
worked very smoothly; that is, steps 3 
and 5 in the checklist (where we deflect 
the controllers to the soft stops and 
observe the DSKY registers count up in 
proportion to the deflection). There was 
no interruption of the display as we had 
witnessed all through our training in the 
LMS. The normal 2-second update cycle of 
the LGC was apparent, but the values in 
the registers never jumped back to zero 
and stayed there for several seconds 
before going back up, which was the case 
in the LMS. 
The RCS hot fire also went essentially 
as during our training, with the additional 
benefit that there was no problem whatever 
in audibly verifying that one or more jets 
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were firing as they were called on. The 
rate needles essentially moved as expected; 
that is, there was no apparent coupling 
during the tests. This led us to conclude 
that the proper jets, that is, all the 
jets were firing. 
It was about this time that we received 
notification from MSFN that the up-firing 
, thruster on QUAD 4 had a faulty thrust­
chamber pressure switch indication. This 
would affect our RCS/TCA CAUTION and 
WARNING system to the extent that an OFF 
failure, that is, a failed OFF condition 
on that thruster would not be detected 
by the CAUTION and WARNING. 
The indicated supercritical helium 
pressure was zero. We had no displ~ of 
that quantity. At a later time, we checked 
it and it read 730. This display during 
the flight would read alternately no indi­
cation or the actual pressure, which was 
always approximately 730 throughout this 
day. Following the DPS/APS/RCS temperature/ 
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pressure check, the supercritical pressure 
read 830 psi. 
24. LR, RR self test: The landing radar 
self test went as called out in the check­
list. All the displays indicated as we 
had been led to anticipate in training and 
systems tests on the ground. There were 
no apparent spurious lock-ons of the land­
ing radar all through the tests or, for 
that matter, through the rest of the 
flight. The behavior of the cross point­
ers and the range/range rate tape was as 
we had seen it in FRT on the pad. 
The rendezvo~s radar self test was some­
what of a surprise to us. The indications 
on the range/range rate tape display were 
as expected. However, the interface with 
the LGC was somewhat of a mystery to us. 
The behavior was not consistent nor was 
it what we had expected from our training. 
In particular, the range-rate indication 
and the range indication in NOUN 71 of 
the rendezvous radar self test routine 
CONFID-ENTLA.b. 
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did not appear as it was displayed on the 
tape meter or called out in the checklist. 
We reran the test three or four times, 
and in most cases, the range rate would 
appear and look essentially normal. I 
have written down in my checklist minus 
494 ft/sec. However, the range, all but 
one time, read zero all through the test • 
. There was one time that we repeated the 
test; and for approximately 4 seconds 
during the test, ~. did see a range of 
\ 
195.5 miles. Howeve:r",,~he next time 
".. ~,-
we tried it, it read zero·~in. We could 
not get consistent behavior from the self 
test. 
It's of significance to mention that we 
did not unstow the radar for this test. 
Because of the problems that we had had 
wi th the nausea earlier, at this point we 
were not planning to perform the EVA the 
following day. For this reason~ the 
rendezvous radar was left in the stowed 
position. 
The landing radar temperature started 
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out at 81 degrees just prior to the burn 
and, Just after shutdown, indicated 
100 degrees. It stayed fairly steady at 
that point. On the order of 2 to 3 min­
utes after cut-off, the landing radar 
temperature was still 100 degrees and, as 
I recall it, finally reached a maximum 
of approximately 110 degrees. 
25. Updating, alignment calibration of 
AGS: The REFSMMAT and state vector up­
date were as expected. The AGS initial­
ization was the next place we ran into 
a problem, and this is one that surprised 
all of us. Everything went normal except 
that, in the updating process, the AGS 
414 would not go back to all zeros when 
the PGNS sent the update across the inter­
face. We repeated the AGS initialization 
several times, all with .the same results; 
that is, no apparent response in the AGS 
with regard to receiving the update. 
The ground advised us later that we had 
to be in high bit rate on the telemetry 
to get the update across. This is the 
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 first time that we had ever heard this. 
After going into high bit rate and at­
tempting it again, it worked as we had 
seen it.work all through the training 
cycle. 
On checking the h and h in the AGS,
a p 
they compared within tolerance with the 
PGNS orbit parameters. Again, the AGS 
calibration went as we had simulated it. 
I think it's worthY,of mention that the 
'. 
accelerometer bias coe~icients exhibited 
" 
almost no change on all of the AGS cali­
brations. However, the gyro drift coef­
ficients were not quite as consistent. 
Prior to the AGS calibration, the gyro 
drift coefficients were reading plus 
0.27 deg/hr, plus 0.47 deg/hr, and plus 
0.06 deg/hr X, Y, and Z. Following the 
calibration, they had changed to plus 0.21, 
plus 0.36, and minus 0.20. Th~refore, the 
largest shift that we saw was a negative 
shift in the Z gyro of 0.26 deg/hr. On 
subsequent AGS calibrations, the bias 
coefficients and the accelerometer coeffi­
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cients remained essentially as we was them 
here in the first calibration. However, 
the gyro drift coefficients again altered 
almost every time we did them, although 
never by more than about 0.2 deg/hr. 
26. Preparation for DPS burn: The DPS 
pressurization went as expected. The 
only thing worthy of note was that the 
descent supercritical pressure, although 
in limits, was at the bottom end of the 
expected range. We had a range of 715 
to 1200 psi on the supercritical pressure, 
and at this point in flight it was read­
ing 730, only 15 psi above the minimum. 
The 1M docked IMU alignment was quite 
successful. We read the angles back to 
the ground at this point and received 
new gyro torquing angles. They were 
minus 0.04, plus 0.18, and minus 0.16 de­
gree of required torquing. So it looks 
as though we experienced less than 0.2 de­
gree torquing with about 1-1/2 hours be­
tween alignments. That appears to be well 
within the ball park. 
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The command module maneuvered us to the 
attitude, and we were very close to the 
correct attitude when we switched over 
and took control with the 1M. The com­
mand module went inactive. We made the 
final maneuver without any problem. There 
was not a large amount of thruster acti­
vity. We maneuvered over and held at the 
right attitude. The checklist that we 
were using to prepare for the burn seemed 
to have all the things in it that we 
needed. We were a little ahead of time 
when we got to our attitude, and we went 
right on through and never were behind in 
this particular portion of the mission. 
In the preparations for the docked DPS 
burn, the NOUN 86 data compared very close 
with the pads sent up from the ground. 
I put the NOUN 86 data into the AGS. It 
was at this time that we noted that ad­
dress 407, which we set to a zero prior 
to the burn and the first acceleration 
is supposed to freeze the inertial refer­
ence frame by switching 407 to a plus 1. 
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attitude control prior to the burn to 
plus 1 and had to be 	reset several times 
to plus all zeros. I 	 believe that I 
finally terminated the 	monitor on 407 on 
the order of 30 seconds before the igni­
tion. At that point, I switched over to 
read the 500, 501, and 502. 
The behavior of address 407 was exhibited 
through the rest of the flight and did 
require special care. I think that this 
is a situation which very definitely 
needs improving. You can't sit there 
and babysit 9ne address continually. 
4.3.2 1M Initial Preparation and Checkout 
SCHWEICKART 	 27. Docked DPS burn: About 20 seconds 
prior to engine cut-off, the heater CAU­
TION light came on, and it was speculated 
at that time that the cause was high tem~ 
peratureson the RCS quads. However, 
on reviewing that now in my mind, I don't 
believe that was the case, since the quads 
were not being used. We had inserted a 
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firing during the docked DPS burn, and 
I have a feeling that it was probably 
the landing radar temperature or one of 
the antenna temperatures. The landing 
radar temperature prior to the burn was 
81 degrees. Somewhere in the middle of 
the burn, I observed it to be 95 degrees. 
Immediately following cut-off, it was 
indicating 100; and at cut-off plus 
somewhere between 10 and 15 minutes, it 
., 
peaked out a~ approximately 110 degrees. 
McDIVITT 27. Docked DPS burn: At ignition, the 
engine lit very-smoothly, the thrust-
chamber pressure went from zero to 
10 percent very smoothly, and there was 
I. 
\ 
\ a real lack of noise. I had expected to 
hear the engine a lot in the spacecraft, 
and we really heard it hardly at all. 
There was a sensation that it was running. 
There wasn't any doubt that the thing was 
actually running, but certainly there 
were no big bangs, thuds, or anything 
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like that. 
Throttle-up to 40 percent at 5 seconds 
after ignition went smoothly, and there 
didn't seem to be any appreciable lag at 
all between the thrust chamber pressure 
and the throttle position. It followed 
right with it, with no lag whatsoever. 
At 26 seconds after ignition, the engine 
then throttled up to full throttle. 
Again, it was a very smooth throttle-up 
with no apparent chugging or noise to be 
concerned with. There was just the firm 
feeling of the engine throttling up and 
a definite feeling after the thing was 
under control. 
The attitude excursions were much less 
than we had anticipated. We were 
obviously trimmed in the right place, 
and the engine mount compliance and those 
things seemed to have been taken care of. 
The attitude excursions were probably 
less than a couple degrees. The rates 
were very low. The spacecraft guidance 
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was obviously compensating for all the 
things, and we got right up to 100 per­
cent and had very little excursions. 
The monitoring problem was considerably 
simplified over what it could have been, 
because we had anticipated somewhat 
larger excursions. We had a limit of 
45 degrees transient and 10 degrees 
steady state. We never even came close 
to any of these. 
We had pressurized the DPS earlier, and 
the other squibs fired at ignition. The 
pressures that we were looking at were 
nominal at ignition and began to drop 
down to the region of approximately 
180 psi. I believe it was 180 psi. 
believe that it dropped from 240 to 
180. I was somewhat concerned that it 
would continue down, but the pressure 
turned around there and went right back 
up to the normal regulated pressure of 
240. 
At ignition, I switched the master alarm 
switch from ON to OFF before I started 
-  
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the throttle-up. This is to protect us 
against any inadvertent relay closures 
in the pyro system during engine firing. 
It had been suggested by FOD. We accom­
plished this and then throttled up so 
that the throttle-up took place maybe a 
second or so after 5 seconds as in the 
flight plan. 
The propulsion and guidance parts of the 
burn were very nominal until we got out 
to about 5 minutes, or shortly before we 
started the throttle profile. At this 
time, there was a very slight oscillation 
that could be felt in the spacecraft. 
I'm not really sure exactly what was 
causing it. You could speculate on a 
number of things. There was a definite 
oscillation -- a very low amplitude -­
but it could be felt. The LM yaw-rate 
needle was moving slightly. I can't 
explain exactly why. That was the needle. 
We were getting a very little bit in roll 
rate also. The roll rate on the left 
hand side looked like the oscillations 
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were something on the order of one-half 
deg/sec, peak to peak. You could see 
the needle moving, but little else was 
apparent. The attitude on my attitude 
indicator did not appear to vary at all. 
I think that it's appropriate at this 
time to have Dave mention what he saw 
on the CSM. 
The steering and the propulsion parts 
of the beginning of the burn were exactly 
nominal. The only off-nominal things 
that we had anywhere through the burn 
was this slight pulsing approximately 
45 seconds before we began the throttle 
profile. They were very low amplitude 
and low frequency and did not cause any 
concern whatsoever. The only reason 
we're mentioning them here is that they 
were discernable, and other people should 
be prepared to feel something like that 
if they do a docked DPS burn. I'm not 
sure that the 'same kind of dynamics 
would be present for a nondocked DPS 
burn • 
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At approximately 130 ft/sec, we began 
the throttle profile which was the stan­
dard throttle profile. We felt nothing 
abnormal during this period. There were 
some very slight transients in attitude, 
but we had expected these because of the 
engine mount compliance, the bending of 
the structure, and things like that. We 
found nothing really abnormal. This 
part of the burn went very smoothly. 
We got down to the fixed-throttle point, 
the fixed-throttle position, of 40 per­
cent for the last part of the burn with 
about 30 seconds to go. Just exactly as 
we had planned preflight, we ran through 
that and shut the engine down manually 
at 3 seconds to go. 
We locked up the ullage and the regulators 
at 10 seconds from cut-off and, from that 
moment on, operated the descent propulsion 
system on the locked-up pressure. There 
were no apparent spurious lockons by the 
landing radar during this period. 
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 During the burn, my sensations on the 
right-hand side were essentially the 
same as Jim's. I saw no visual evidence 
whatever of a plume, nor was I able to 
hear the descent engine running. It was 
very quiet, essentially the same as the 
descent engine OFF, with regard to noise 
and vibration. I felt no noticeable 
vibration. The only thing that was 
apparent was the commanded changes in 
thrust level. 
Following shutdown, the residuals read 
plus 4.2, zero, and plus 0.2 in X, Y, 
and Z. 
Following the burn of the AGS, residuals 
of 500, 501, 502 plus 3 ft/sec minus 
5 and O. Calling the orbit parameters 
with the VERB 82, they came out to 
109.2 by 273.0, which was right on the 
money. The oscillations that we experi­
enced toward the end of the fixed-throttle 
point part of the burn appeared on the 
rate needles to be very similar to what 
I had witnessed on the FMES at Grumman 
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as fuel slosh. That was not only by 
watching the rate needles, but you could 
also feel it as a very definite movement, 
a force on the body. 
On my side of the cockpit, I didn't notice 
the yaw rate. I don't think I even looked 
at it, but my roll rate needle appeared 
to be oscillating in the order of plus 
or minus 1 deg/sec peak to peak. I would 
guess that the frequency was somewhere 
between 6 and 10 cps, something like 
that. It is very difficult to estimate. 
Make my lower limit on that something 
like 2 cps. 
28. Sequence camera (DPS plume effect): 
I looked down to see what the plume looked 
like, and the plume was practically non­
existent. It was very difficult to see 
anything, to see that there even was a 
plume. Unfortunately, we were face down 
going across a cloud layer prior to the 
time that I looked down at the plume, 
and I certainly wasn't dark adapted. 
When I looked down where the plume should 
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have been, there just wasn't anything 
there. Therefore, I would assume that 
the plume, with regard to a detriment to 
visibility, is--p~~ctically nonexistent 
"""'--. 
in the environment in which we were. 
I'm sure that it would be different if 
we were trying to land on the moon, but 
in orbit it's no factor whatsoever. We 
were doing the burn in daylight so that 
there wasn't any light reflected from 
the plume. 
The 16mm sequence camera was operated 
as called out in the checklist for the 
burn. 
29. AGS calibration and LR self test: 
Concerning calibration of the AGS, the 
proper attitude could be obtained by 
maneuvering the command module to an 
offset of 22 degrees in pitch and 
22 degrees in yaw from 0-0-0 on the ball 
or 180-180-0 on the ball. The roll angle 
didn't seem to make too much difference. 
This would give a proper orientation if 
the REFSMMATS were the same. For the 
--CONFIDEI\ITIAl· 
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actual calibration, the CSM was damped 
to less than 0.1 deg/sec and then allowed 
to drift for 6 minutes, which would main­
tain the 1M within its 22-degree deadband 
with no problem. 
SCHWEICKART 	 Following the burn, we picked up with the 
AGS calibration again, and the accelero­
meter bias coefficients remained what 
they had been after the first calibration. 
The gyro drift coefficients changed again. 
This time, following the calibration, they 
were reading plus 0.07, plus 0.28, and 
plus 00. The landing radar self test 
following the burn was absolutely identical 
with what we saw prior to the burn. 
31. Sublimator dryout: We initiated 
the sublimator dryout before we had 
begun clearing the tunnel, or just about 
the time we had begun. As a result, 
both the commander and the LMP were on 
the suit loop through what I would guess 
to be 90 percent of the dryout time. 
The significance of this is that the 
water in the suit loop, since we've 
COMFIDE~~TIA~ 
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SCHWEICKART 	 shut off the primary EVAP flow, had no 
place to go. Therefore, that water 
was entrained somewhere within the suit 
loop, even though the dryout appeared 
to follow very close to the expected 
temperature curves that we had in the 
systems data book. I guess that we 
ought to correct that to say that the 
LMP was on the suit hoses for more than 
90 percent of the dryout; the commander 
was on for longer than expected, but 
we'd guess now on the order of one-half 
hour. 
4.3.2 1M Initial Preparation and Checkout 
SCHWEICKART 	 32. Deactivation and power down: In 
the final power-down, where the repress 
valve is positioned from AUTO to CLOSE, 
there was an extremely loud and sharp 
bang which was caused by moving the 
valve from one position to the other. 
When I first heard this sound, I 
immediately switched back to AUTO. 
Then, I recalled that LM-4 had exper­
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ienced a similar noise upon reposition­
ing that valve in the altitude chamber 
run. We had not seen this in LM-3 
during the altitude chamber run. I did 
recall this; therefore, I positioned 
the valve from AUTO to CLOSE which re­
sulted in another extremely loud and 
sharp report. The closest thing to which 
I could compare it would be a rifle going 
off about 2 feet from your ear. It was 
loud enough that the CMF in the command 
module heard it --with some alarm. The 
magnitude and nature of this sound re­
mained as some concern to me throughout 
the flight. 
It is difficult to imagine a mechanical 
system, especially one which involves 
seals and things of this nature, which 
could tolerate or generate that magni­
tude of noise without suffering some kind 
of degradation. I don't know whether or 
not there was any degradation associated 
with this phenomena. We had reasonable 
eel'~FIDENTIAl' 
4-92 eo~~FIDEt~TIAl\ 
SCHWEICKART 

assurance from the ground that this was 
normal. 
32. Deactivation and power down: The 
power-down part of the checklist went as 
expected. The only problem that we ran 
into was that, as we finished the final 
deactivation, there was a little dis­
crepancy between panels 11 and 16 when 
we came to the configuration of the 
translunar bus-tie breakers. Upon 
looking at the checklist at this point, 
it's not clear why the confusion was 
generated. In any case, we recognized 
that the final circuit breaker configura­
tion was proper, with both translunar 
bus ties in the open position. However, 
the confusion this day set up, unfortu­
nately, the error in configuration on 
the following day (the EVA day), to 
which we will get. 
Our power transfer back to the command ]r 
module power was nominal. The indication 
internal to the 1M was that the caution­
and-warning power-caution light on 
"(ONFIDENTIAl 
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panel 2 extinguishes. At night, the 
command module pilot can look out the 
number 2 window in the command module and 
see the docking light go out on the 
power transfer. 
33. IMP and CDR IVT to CSM: The IMP 
IVT to the CSM was done with no particu­
lar difficulty. At this point, the dump 
valve on the upper hatch was left in the 
AUTO position. 
34. Work loads and timelines: Work­
loads and timelines were a major factor 
in the activities of this day. As men­
tioned earlier, we began the day approx­
imately 1-1/2 hours late; it went fairly 
quickly and we caught up a little. We 
were operating approximately 1 hour late 
on our timeline, which meant that some 
of the checks that we were to do over 
fixed ground stations were going to have 
to be skipped. We had already eliminated 
the daylight AOT star visibility check. 
We got a little fUrther behind when the 
LMP became sick again. We established a 
4-94 CONf1DEt'4TIAl 
McDIVITT point to get back on the timeline regard­
less of what had happened in the early 
part of the day's activities. This 
pOint was at approximately 47 hours and 
10 minutes when we began DPS, APS, ReS 
temperature/pressure checks. From that 
check to the docked DPS burns, we had to 
follow pretty much the original time­
line, or we were going to have to slip 
the docked DPS burn a revolution, which 
then would have taken 1-1/2 hours out 
of the rest cycle if we were going to 
continue the next day with the same 
timeline. Therefore, we had to fix this 
as the point to return to the nominal 
timeline. We did, and from that point 
through the rest of the' day, we operated 
on the timeline that we had established 
for ourselves. 
Some of the communications checks were 
achieved this day, and some of them were 
achieved on the EVA day. We'll summarize 
all those in one big package later. We 
found that, once we were on the indepen­
tONFIDENTIA~ 
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dent vehicle activity timeline, we were 
able to stay on it very much as simulated 
in the preflight activities. 
On the third day, we had decided that 
there would not be an EVA for the 
following day. Both spacecraft would 
be depressurized, the hatches would be 
opened, and we would exercise the PLSS 
as much as we could, depending upon the 
well-being of the LMP at that time. 
When we awoke in the morning, we started 
on a plan that had been generated by the 
flight-planning people on the ground. 
It included the hatch opening on both 
spacecraft, the donning of the PLSS 
(but not the integration of the OPS into 
the EMU package), and having the LMP re­
main on the 1M suit hoses and the PLSS 
hoses rather than the OPS hoses and the 
PLSS hoses. 
-EONFIDENTIAt­
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Concerning the command-module fourth day, 
it's worthy of note here that the house­
keeping 	prior to beginning operations 
for the 	day's activities was quite a bit 
more than we had planned on in the pre­
flight planning. 
1. Don PGA's: The nature of the suit-
hose combination, which we'll go into in 
much greater detail later, was something 
that took considerably more time to pre­
pare ourselves, and caused us to work in 
a serial rather than a parallel fashion 
once we were suit~d. 
2. Tunnel operatio~s (anomalies): Once 
\ 
again we found ourselves late beginning 
the tunnel operations. 
3. General transfer operstions! The 
tunnel clearance went as before - very 
easy, followipg the checklist, the masses 
were easy to move and easy to store. The 
only problem encountered, as it was each 
peration around the hoses. 
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SCOTT 	 The hatch-integrity check took a little 
longer than anticipated, about 10 minutes 
to depress the tunnel and make sure that 
there waS a good seal on the hatch. 
4. PLSS communications check with LM: 
The communications check with the PLSS 
and the LM went very well. The COMM was 
good and clear. The VOX on panel 9, with 
panel 10 in the backup mode, worked very 
well except for the delayed time at the 
end of the transmission, which is too 
long. The configuration inside the com­
mand module was with the CMF on the CMF 
hoses and COMM using panel 10 in backup, 
the CDR and LMP hoses in a position to 
support an EV transfer and a vacuum trans­
fer inside the command module for the CDR. 
5. Maneuvering to EVA attitude: The EVA 
attitude was established using the BMAG's 
only. The lMU was powered down because 
we didn't anticipate doing the EVA. I 
maneuvered the vehicles to an attitude 
relative to the sun as near as possible 
based on our preflight orientation 
~ONFIDENTIAt 
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the sun from shafting in the command 
module and on the command module MDC. 
Pointing the plus Z-axis at the sun and 
pitching down 15 and rolling left 80 
worked out very well. Throughout the 
EVA, there was no sun shafting inside the 
command module. 
6. Preparation of· ECS and cabin for 
DEPRESS and PGS integrity: Cabin prepa-
ration for the EVA went according to the 
checklist with no problems. The check­
list seems to work very well and the 
sequence is also very good. The EVVA 
was difficult to get on. It appeared to 
be too tight for my helmet, and I had to 
take my helmet off and use quite a bit 
of force to get the latch over center on 
EVVA. 
In preparing for the DEPRESS and evaluat­
ing the equipment, it became apparent 
that the EVA gloves would be impossible 
to use on the rotational controller. So 
I put the right EV glove on and used the 
-  
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SCOTT IV glove on "my left hand so I could con­
trol the spacecraft if it was necessary. 
I put the rotational hand controller on the 
left armrest of the left couch and stowed 
the translational hand controller in the 
LEB. 
It sure seems that there's a lot of 
work necessary to make the EV gloves 
operational. The pair I had were abso­
lutely poor. The set that I had was one 
generation earlier than the set that 
Rusty had, which apparently were a little 
better. I wanted to make sure I had one 
EV glove in case the hatch got hot or 
cold before closing. 
After the initial preparation of the 
cabin to the point where it could be de­
pressed and the CMF could prepare for a 
DEPRESS relative to EVT, it took about 
20 minutes from the time I was ready to 
start to DEPRESS to go through the integ­
rity check (helmet and gloves) and get 
the hatch open for DEPRESS. If the PGA 
integrity check were eliminated for some 
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reason, it would take about 10 minutes 
to go through a complete DEPRESS, if the 
situation arose where an EVT were nec­
essary after a rendezvous. 
The hatch was disconnected from the 
-- counterbalance with a pit pin. The 
counterbalance was vented completely. 
The pit pin was stored in R-l so it 
wouldn't get lost. When the counter­
balance was vented, it was about one-
third full scale on the gage, and it 
took it about 1-1/2 to 2 minutes to vent 
completely. 
The suit-loop-integrity check in the 
command module was approximately 0.2 psil 
min, well within the tolerances. 
During this period of activity, we had 
attempted to shorten the work period and 
.~ 
lengthen that night's rest period because 
we had a great desire to get started on 
time the next morning and also consider­
ing the delay we'd been having achieving 
the transfer to the 1M. We felt that we 
should wake up at least an hour early on 
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the rendezvous day because this was a 
day when we could not slip anything. We 
had a very, very tight timeline prior to 
separation, and if we got started late, 
we would be in reasonably bad shape. We 
didn't want to slip the beginning of the 
rendezvous by one REV because it would 
have made the ground tracking less desir­
able than it already was. So we had 
eliminated essentially one REV from the 
flight plan by doing the EVA on just one 
dayside pass rather than one dayside, 
a darkside, then one dayside pass. Even 
with the elimination of this 1-1/2 hour 
period, we finally found ourselves get­
ting to bed approximately 1/2 hour after 
we would have normally. So, we found 
ourselves with about 2 hours more work 
after the EVA was over than was in the 
flight plan. 
This was typical of the problems that 
we'd been having in preparing ourselves 
and the spacecraft in the morning, and, 
I guess,- unpreparing ourselves in the 
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evening. What it amounted to was a very 
short rest period between the EVA d~ 
and the rende zvous d~. 
7. DEPRESS: The cabin was depressed 
about 8 minutes prior to sunrise and it 
took about 3 minutes to run through the 
standard procedures for depressing. The 
hatch was opened about 5 minutes prior 
to sunrise and it took less than a min­
ute with the standard hatch-opening pro­
cedures. It took about 40 pounds to 
push the hatch to the full-open position. 
It would st~ at any intermediate position 
at which it was left. At the full-open 
position, it seemed to want to st~ there 
fine without any need for a lock of any 
type. 
The only comment I have on the hatch 
gearbox is poor markings on the shear 
pin. 
8. Sequence camera operations: The 
sequence camera mount on the hatch was 
good. The wire which runs to the re­
mote cable seemed to work out very well. 
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as advertised. The Hasselblad worked 
well. It was tethered with a tool tether 
to my wrist. On trying to put a second 
magazine in the sequence camera, I had 
considerable difficulty primarily due to 
the EV gloves and the inability to man­
ipulate fingers with that thing. Once I 
got the magazine in, the camera wouldn't 
run. A subsequent investigation in the 
spacecraft after a fuse change enabled us 
to get it running again. 
12. Side hatch operations: On closing 
the side hatch at the completion of the 
d~side pass, there were no noticeable 
temperature extremes within the IV gloves. 
The hatch came with little effort - ap­
proximately 40 pounds or less. Once I 
got the hatch to the ajar position, I 
held it such that the dogs were over the 
striker plate with about 30 pounds of 
force. I stroked to close with the 
normal four strokes on the gearbox. 
E0NFIDENTtAi­
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SCOTT 15. REPRESS: The REPRESS took approxi­
mately 4 minutes to go through the hatch­
integrity check - or checking the 
seal - and to bring the inside of the 
command module up to 2 psi with the PLSS 
package. Then, from 2 to 4 psi, the 1M 
oxygen was used through the tunnel. It 
took it a couple of minutes to get up to 
the tunnel and open the tunnel REPRESS 
valve. From 4 psi to 5 psi, I used the 
PLSS tank again. !t bled the surge tank 
on down to about 700 pounds, and that took 
another 2 minutes or so. 
The procedures on REPRESS are straight­
forward and simple to use. It's easy to 
reach the necessary valves with the center 
couch out, and with the mirror it's easy 
to observe the cabin pressure and the 
suit pressure. I believe that the pro­
cedures as developed will work adequately 
for any necessary EV transfer. 
16. PostEVA systems configuration: The 
postEVA systems configuration took approx­
imately 50 minutes from the time the cabin 
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and access to the LM was available. This 
included repositioning the center couch, 
reinstalling the hand controllers, the 
L-shaped bag, stowing the thermal samples, 
and the other sundry items that go with 
reconfiguration. A few small things were 
not performed in an effort to prepare 
the tunnel as soon as possible. 
17. IVT to CSM: The tunnel, again, was 
no problem. Everything worked nominally. 
18. Power transfer: The power transfer 
systems test meter appeared to be some­
what different from previous d~s. It 
cycled at the lower end of the scale 
rather than going up to the 2 volts as 
it had done previously. 
19. Tunnel closeout: After the transfer, 
the tunnel closeout took approximately 
15 minutes, and again no anomalies. 
Because of the necessity for Rusty to go 
back and pull the LM trans-lunar BUS 
ties circuit breakers, we had to reopen 
the tunnel and rec10se the tunnel. This 
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10 minutes from the time we started with 
the closed tunnel until we had reclosed 
the tunnel. 
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SCOTT 	 1. IVT to 1M: On the ingress to the 1M 
on the EVA day, the only difference noted 
in the tunnel operation was that, since 
. the dump valve had been Iert in AUTO 
rather than DUMP or OPEN following 
activities of the first day, there was 
a slight pressure differential across 
the hatch. This was noted as a slight 
hiss as the dump valve was actuated prior 
to ingressing the 1M. I have no way of 
knowing what the actual differential was, 
but to give some feel for it, after 
actuating the dump valve the hiss was 
audible for perhaps 2 to 3 seconds. 
McDIVITT 	 With these extra systems tests, we were 
able to do the regular check that we had 
skipped on the previous day. We were 
somewhat late due to the activities 
described on the CSM side of the inter­
face. We therefore deleted some of the 
COMM checks. We reconfigured and changed 
the checklist back to the normal OPS, 
PLSS, EMU, and EVA modes. We elected to 
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arrive at a configuration where we could 
proceed with a seminominal EVA mode at 
the appropriate time, which, in this case, 
was 73:07 for sunrise. 
Early in the morning of the EVA day, we 
changed the checklist in our flight plan 
update to configure the EMU for the LMP so 
that he would be using both PLSS and LM ECS. 
After we had begun the configurat ion , it 
became obvious that the LMP was in good 
enough physical condition to perform 
the EVA. Also, it was obvious that we 
could achieve an awful lot more by 
completing the EVA mode rather than by 
doing the COMM checks. So, we changed 
the checklist back to the nominal form. 
Then, we went back and completed those 
steps that we had eliminated earlier. 
We configured ourselves according to 
the checklist with the exception that 
some of the camera equipment was not in 
the 1M because we had not anticipated 
doing the full EVA. 
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The rest of the IVT-entry status checks. 
activation of the systems, power transfer, 
communications in S-band, and that sort 
of thing were as already reported. 
Because of lack of time on the systems 
day, there were a few things that we 
had not performed. These were systems 
32 and systems 33, which I'll expand on 
in just a moment. We had reason to be­
lieve that we ought to do them on this 
particular day to fulfill the objectives. 
I'll talk about it in just a moment. 
SCOTT 	 6. EVA preparation: Handling of the 
ISA during the EVA PREP appeared to be no 
problem. It was mounted over the MDC 
and did not significantly interfere with 
operations within the cabin. The OPS 
preparation on this day revealed that the 
commander's OPS heater test circuit did 
not work. I ran about three checks on 
the heater circuit and neither of the 
two green lights came on. 
In all other aspects, the OPS checked out 
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nominally, as did the LMP's OPS. When I 
handed the commander's OPS to the comman­
der, he ran another check on the OPS; and 
it operated properly, that is he got the 
green lights. The commander ran the 
check on his OPS three times, and he got 
the green lights all three times which 
indicated proper heater operations. We 
had no way of knowing whether this was 
an intermittent operation of the indica­
tor system or whether there was indeed 
some malfunctioning of the heater cir­
cuitry. We decided to continue with the 
LMP's OPS mounted on top of the PLSS. 
Also, we decided that if an actual con­
tingency transfer on that day was re­
quired, the LMP would mount the comman­
der's OPS on top of the PLSS; and the 
commander would use the LMP's OPS for the 
contingency transfer. 
The PLSS operation was nominal this day. 
We did not remove the battery used the 
day before; therefore, we experienced no 
further difficulties associated with 
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of the hoses and preparation of the 
COMM leads were as we had experienced 
in the various training exercises and 
the test runs on the preflight PLSS 
test. 
Donning the PLSS, checking the RCU, 
and working together in the cockpit 
with the EMU mounted on the LMP's 
back proved to be no particular problem. 
The two crewmen exchanged places, as 
called out in the checklist. for the 
donning process. I was on the left-hand 
side of the. cockpit, so I used the 
commander's two inboard restraints 
one on the left side and one on the right 
si de of the suit. They held me in posi­
tion facing the center of the cockpit. 
A following is subjective evaluation of 
the work required in the EVA PREPS. The 
zero-g effort of handling the various 
bits and pieces of equipment associated 
with the EVA appeared to be a good bit 
easier in zero g than what we had found 
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in the one-g training exercises. 
Upon observing Dave handling the PLSS, 
the OPS pallets, the big pieces of 
equipment on the command module side, 
and similar things on the LM side, I found 
that the heavy masses were much easier 
to control than what I had anticipated. 
They were really no problems at all. 
There was only a problem on the LM side. 
Because I had elected to remain un­
restrained to the floor, I had a little 
difficulty sometimes controlling my 
body. I just floated free and held onto 
the large,masses. They were quite easy 
. to handle. Even in the free-floating 
mode, I didn't have any trouble getting 
them where I wanted them or pos1tioning 
them with respect to Rusty when he was 
trying to install them. 
Installing the EVA tether, connecting 
the LMP suit, and handling the EVVA, 
while using the anti fog in the helmets 
were all done with relative ease. There 
were no unexpected complications which 
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than anticipated) of the work associated 
with donning the equipment was done un­
aided. I installed my EVVA by myself. 
Jim was doing something else at that 
time. 
The EVVA was self-donned. The wiping 
of the helmets with the antifog and that 
kind of thing was all done by the LMP. 
In regard to the restraint system as I 
was using it, I found that I had no 
problem in maintaining my position. I 
had no tendency to inadvertently back 
into switches, circuit breakers, or 
anything of that kind. Therefore, I 
felt free to take part in 
j
the PREPS to 
a greater extent than what we had planned 
on the ground. I'd like to comment one 
little bit on the helmet protector that 
we wore during the flight. The first 
time I'd ever seen it was when I opened 
up the L-shaped bag right after trans­
position and docking. It was a slightly 
"E-ONFIDENTIAt 
SCHWEICKART 

~QNFIDENTIAL 

different configuration -- and I found 
it to be considerably harder to place 
on my helmet than the previous ones. 
7. Camera preparation: We elected not to 
use the standard Hasselblad during the 
EVA in the 1M because it gave us two 
70mm cameras and a 16mm camera to handle. 
There were not any good places to tether 
these cameras when they were not in use; 
so, we elected to use one 70mm and one 
16mm camera. As I had previously men­
tioned, we were sort of configured at the 
beginning of the day for no EVA. As the 
day went along, we elected to go with 
the EVA. 
When we were loading the ISA to bring 
the things from the command module to 
the 1M, we left the 16mm sequence camera 
bracket in the command module deliber­
ately. After we got into the 1M, we 
found that we prob,ably should have 
brought it with us. The superwide­
angle Hasselblad and the 16mm sequence 
camera was configured in a normal manner 
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and was placed in the ISA. We used 
both in a handheld mode rather than a 
fixed mode during the EVA. 
8. PLSS communications check: The 
PLSS COMM checks worked better than 
expected. After activating the commun­
ications system on the PLSS, I was able 
to communicate directly with the command 
and service module via VHF; and at sev­
eral points in the timeline prior to 
egress I was able to hear transmissions 
directly from MSFN. These were not via 
relay but were actually direct radiation 
to the PLSS OPS antenna. 
9. Preparation for DEPRESS and DEPRESS: 
The preparations for depress followed the 
checklist and included the 2-minute 
oxygen purge of the 1M suit loop prior 
to initiating the pressure-integrity 
checks. The only modification that we 
made to the 2-minute purge was made prior 
to flight. In flight, we did follow the 
checklist. 
 
4-116 
SCHWEICKART 
ceNFIDENTIA~ 
9. Preparation for DEPRESS and DEPRESS: 
The cabin DEPRESS was initiated after 
the pressure-integrity check. The only 
thing worthy of special comment was 
that the lunar surface filter was placed 
over the dump valve to prevent any of 
the flotsam and jetsam floating around 
the cockpit from being trapped within 
the dump valve. This slowed the pressure 
decay in the cabin to some extent. 
However, the total time elapsed was not 
sufficient to cause any discomfort within 
the EMU. 
The purge requires no particular comment. 
It operated as expected. This was 
followed by the commander's suit-integrity 
check. For this check, the LMP dis­
connected by using the suit isolation 
valve to suit-disconnect, while the 
commander made his pressure-integrity 
check. The PLSS fan was activated to 
keep the CO level on the helmet down for2 
the LMP during that time. The commander's 
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pressure-integrity check was nominal; 
and on returning to five psi or slightly 
above, the PLSS fan was turned off and 
the LMP reconnected with the 1M suit 
loop. 
I noted during the regulator check, which 
we had run earlier in the day, that my 
right ear was not clearing properly. 
I anticipated some problem in perform­
ing the PISS pressure-integrity check. 
Following the commander's pressure­
integrity check, a final verification was 
made on the configuration of both the 
commander and the LMP, as well as the 
positioning of tethers and so forth. 
At that point, the LMP's pressure­
integrity check and cabin DEPRESS were 
intiated. Upon activating the PLSS 02' 
the pressure started up very nicely in 
the EMU. However, as I suspected, my 
right ear did not clear properly; 
therefore, I had to interrupt the normal 
buildup of pressure by turning the 
PLSS 02 to CLOSE. 
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 11. PLSS Control during DEPRESS: The 
feedwater warning tone in the PLSS came 
on as expected. After the hatch opened, 
the feedwater valve was opened; and 
within about 3 minutes, the tone went 
off. I immediately placed the diverter 
valve to MAX cooling; and within 
10 to 15 seconds, I was abla to sense 
cold water beginning to circulate through 
the LCG. After a short time in MAX 
cooling, the diverter valve was placed 
in MIN cooling and was left there for 
the remainder of the EVA. 
11. PLSS control during DEPRESS: Ano~ner 
change, which had been introduced to the 
checklist to minimize the possiblity of 
getting gas into the LCG cooling loop, 
was to hold the activation of the PLSS 
ptunp until after the cabin had been 
depressurized. This was done as rec­
ommended. As the cabin depressuriza­
tion progressed, the absolute pressure 
in the EMU dropped down to about 5 psia. 
This assisted in clearing my right ear. 
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12. Visor fogging: No visor fogging was 
noted during the entire operation. 
The comfort in the suit prior to the sub­
limator startup was quite similar to 
what we had experienced preflight, that 
is, the temperature began to rise slowly 
but never became objectionable all through 
the operation. 
12. Visor fogging: There was no fogging 
on the visor. One thing noted in the 
visor was a bullIs-eye on the EVVA when 
it got in the right sunlight. We checked 
the thermal samples on the command module 
and the one next to the hatch was gone as 
if it had been removed normally. The 
three on the service module were in place. 
I attached the thermal sample tether to 
them and retrieved them into the command 
module with no problem. There was no 
strain on the hoses at any time. It was 
easy to reach down to the edge of the 
service module with the CMF hoses. Move­
ment inside the command module from the 
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SCOTT 	 hatch to the center portion (with the 
center couch removed) and into the left 
couch was relatively easy. It would be 
no problem during an actual EVT ingress 
to get--out-e'f',--th.a way into the left couch. 
However, it would be necessary to have 
the X-X strut and the foot of the left 
couch disconnected, which we had done. 
The work that Rusty did on the handrail 
seemed to go easily. He was at no time 
in danger of contacting any antennas. 
It seemed like it was under control at 
all times. The control mode in the com­
mand module seemed adequate. I was never 
aware of any attitude excursions, jet 
firings, or anything. It seemed to remain 
very well in the attitude that we estab­
lished at the beginning, which was MAX 
dead band with LOW RATE and SCS with 
BMAG's uncaged. 
13. Insuit stuffiness: The suit was 
comfortable throughout, and maintained 
the same temperature as experienced in 
th~ chamber. The suit flow was at MAX 
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inside the spacecraft. The IV gloves 
seemed to work very well. The only time 
I noticed the temperature change was when 
it was placed in direct sunlight; and 
then it got warm. I did notice at one 
time a coldness when I grabbed something. 
I don't remember exactly what it was, but 
I did grab something that was cool. 
15. Integrity checks: After several 
seconds of trying to clear my ear 
(without too much success), the pressure 
buildup was continued by opening the O2 , 
We eventually got up to 3.7 psid for the 
integrity check which, I believe, was 
quite successful. The decay Was between 
0.1 and 0.2 psi/min. 
16. Hatch operations: The final 
pressurization took considerably longer 
than anticipated, probably due to the 
installation of the filter. The time 
required to depressurize from an indi­
cated 0.5 psia until the time when the 
hatch finally opened, which I guessed 
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to be 4 to 5 minutes was longer than an­
ticipated. 
16. Hatch operations: I'd like to 
spend just a minute on the hatch. There's 
really nothing significant to say about 
it except that, when Rusty had the PLSS 
on and we were pressurized, it was very 
difficult to get down to the handle. In 
one g I just sort of fell to the floor, 
and my weight was sort of pushing up 
against the LMP's legs. It got me down 
near the handle; but in zero g, I did 
not have that ~dvantage. I finally had 
to end up throwing myself down there -­
to wedge myself down in a position where 
I could get a hold on the handle. It was 
with a little more gusto than what I per­
sonally prefer to perform within that kind 
of environment. But, it was the only 
way I could get to the handle. 
When I got down to when I could reach 
the handle, it was easy to push in and 
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to twist. When we pulled the hatch open, 
it took a lot of force. The pressure 
had dropped down to essentially zero, 
and it looked as though we were going 
to be able to get the hatch to open. 
So, I kept pulling, but we still ob­
viously had a DELTA-P across it. 
It did operate slightly different than 
in the chamber. In the chamber, once 
I had broken the seal, it was easy to 
pull the thing open all the way. In 
this case, when I broke the seal, it 
still hung up around the top edge. It 
seemed as though I had to push the hatch 
toward the floor of the spacecraft to 
break it loose from the top. Once I had 
done that, it opened and after that, it 
worked fine. However, during the EVA, 
I tried to keep the hatch open at all 
times to eliminate any chance of it 
getting stuck in a closed position and 
in case there was something different that 
I hadn't been able to see when I was 
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underneath the instrument panel. 
When we went to close the hatch at the 
termination of the EVA, I again found it 
difficult to get down on the floor in 
such a position that I could push the 
handle in and turn,_tt.. But again, by 
sort of throwing myself down there and 
wedging my body between Rusty's legs 
and the floor, I could get a hold on 
the handle and could get it closed 
quite easily. We were then able to 
cinch it up. It just took a little 
longer than anticipated. 
Rusty just added a little fact here that 
I didn't realize until just this moment. 
He was actually pushing on me to help me 
get down to the floor. In such a suit, 
you can't really feel all the external 
input. We did have a little trouble; 
but once we got down low enough so that -.. 
I could get my hand on the handle , it 
was easy to turn. 
Once the hatch was opened and the EMU 
functioning properly we advised the 
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command module pilot that he was cleared 
to depress the command module. Then he 
initiated those operations. 
11. Mounting of sequence camera and 
. operations: The superwide-angleHassel­
blad was passed out by the commander, 
.and about 10 to 15 minutes of photography 
was taken. at that time. Unfortunately, 
the EVA camera handle did not mate prop­
erly with the superwide-angle Hasselblad. 
This was primarily because the film 
magaz.ine was greater in dimension than 
the camera body. Therefore, the camera 
handle would not mate flush against the 
undersurface of the camera. Thus, al­
though the camera was very securely 
mounted to the handle, it was free to 
rotate with respect to it. Therefore, a 
little more concern and care had to be 
.taken in handling the camera than what we 
had anticipated from training. 
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 18. Egress and EVA: At this point, the 
decision was made to evaluate the opera­
tion of the handrail. I removed 'IllY boots 
and the golden slippers and progressed 
from the front porch up the vertical sec­
tion of the handrail to the point where 
it bends around the top of the 1M near 
the radar antenna. In moving up and down 
this portion of the handrail, it became 
immediately obvious that the problem of 
body control and maneuverability was 
vastly simplified in actual flight com­
pared with any of the simulations that 
we had run on the ground either in the 
zero-g airplane or in the water tank. 
There was absolutely no problem in main­
taining complete control of body position­
ing. In fact, this was done at several 
points using just one hand and the mobil­
ity in the wrist of the suit. 
Due to the timeline considerations of 
getting back in and completing the EVA 
dq at the earliest possible time, there 
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was no nighttime evaluation of the EMU, 
nor was there any television done of or 
during the EVA. 
Another EVA element worth mentioning was: 
since we did not expect to'go EVA, the 
same LCG was used on the systems day as 
was utilized for the EVA. Per preflight 
plan, I would have changed into the 
second LeG that was stored aboard the 
command module for the EVA. However, the 
decision was made realtime to go EVA. 
Therefore, we had a 2-day-old LeG. Al­
though it worked properly from all indi­
cations and <as expected - after removing 
the suit at the end of the fourth day 
the LeG was visually congested with en­
trained bubbles. 
18. Egress and EVA: At this point, 
we were essentially ready for the EVA 
about 15 minutes prior to sunrise. 
After being advised that the command 
module had depressurized and that the 
hatch was open, I began repositioning in 
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 the cabin. I got to the point where my 
feet were outside the door. I was laying 
horizontally on my side, ready to complete 
the egress. 
In repositioning (using a little liberty 
here) from the vertical to the horizontal 
position within the cabin, there was some 
slight difficulty in getting the PLSS 
and the OPS past the various pieces of 
the cabin. Also we had experienced this 
in the water tank, but this was done 
with no more difficulty than we had seen 
in the ground simulations. It appears 
from the commander's observations that 
the primary interference in reposition­
ing was the top of the OPS in the helmet 
contacting the Z-27 bulkhead. 
After positioning for the EVA, I main­
tained myself half in and half out of 
the cockpit until we subjectively de­
termined that the lighting conditions 
outside were adequate for photo-coverage. 
At that point, I moved into the complete 
egress of the EMU • 
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to it. And every time I tried to get it 
down through the door, the springiness 
of the cord pulled it back up. When we 
started this thing through the door, I 
could feel it bouncing off the top of 
the hatchway. I guess when it finally 
got clear of the hatchway, it worked 
alright. But, I did have to continue to 
feed the cable through the door; and it 
got hung up one time, 
When it came back through again, later 
on, I had the same trouble trying to get 
it back up through the hatchway, except 
sort of in the reverse technique. It 
came back in set on 1/500 of a second, 
with the decal torn off on the side. Un­
fortunately, that part of the conveyer 
system dido It work. The 70mm thing worked 
very well. I think the conveyer system 
in concept is an excellent idea. Our big 
problem, I believe, was to not have enough 
of the sequence camera cord free to take 
the tension off the camera until clear of 
the hatchway. 
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 The egress itself went very smoothly, 
with no problems maintaining control 
during the egress. The first step after 
completing the egress was to get my feet 
into the golden slippers. I had no 
difficulty whatever. After completing 
the egress and after donning the golden 
slippers, the tether was used as a 
conveyer, by using the third hook on it. 
22. Photography: Following the 10 to . 
15 minutes with the superwide Hasselblad, 
it was passed back in to the commander 
and the 16mm camera was passed out and 
another 10-minute period or so was de­
voted to taking pictures of both space­
craft and the CMF and his activities 
using that camera. About a quarter of 
the w9¥ through the magazine, whi ch was 
being run at 6 frames per second, I 
realized that the shutter speed was set 
at 1/60 of a second. At this point, I 
readjusted it to 1/250 of a second. 
There's some question in our minds whether 
the shutter speed had been altered in 
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the process of passing the camera out of 
the spacecraft, or, whether it had been 
left there inadvertently from internal 
pictures taken earlier in the day of the 
tunnel-clearing operations in the command 
module. 
I had checked the camera and set it to 
the proper stops before I sent it through 
the door. I believe that our conveyer 
system left a little bit to be desired 
with the sequence camera, whereas it 
didn It with the 70mm camera. The 70mm 
was an untethered camera and was hooked 
to the lifeline and transported back and 
forth that waY. It worked quite well. 
Our conveyer type of arrangement had 
worked good in our simulations, because 
the weight of the camera held it away 
from the upper portion of the hatch door. 
This worked quite well with the 70mm, 
too, because it didn It have any restrain­
ing devices on it. However, when I 
hooked the sequence camera to the conveyer 
belt, we had the sequence camera cord, 
'  
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23. Thermal samples: After passing the 

camera back in to the commander, the EVA 

thermal sample on the LM was retrieved 

with essentially no problem. And that, 

also, was passed in to the commander'. 

25. 1M repress: The hatch was closed 

and the repress begun according to the 

checklist. 

The way our checklist was written, we 

could enter into it at the plus 215 point 

and just proceed down through the check­

list without making any major changes to 

it. It certainly simplified the opera­
tions once we started back in. 

The one step that we overlooked in the 
checklist at that point was the closing 
of the feedwater valve prior to ingress. 
I recognized this immediately after com- .. 
pleting the ingress and closed the feed-
w.a.ter valve. I would estimate that we 
remained in the vacuum condition for 
approximately 7 or 8 minutes following 
closing the feedwater valve. So, I would 
guess the PLSS sublimator was not com-
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pletely dry by the time we repressed the 
cabin. 
25. LM repress: In the postEVA cabin 
repressurization cycle, once the command 
module had gotten partially repressurized 
(using the PLSS fill bottles) the 1M was 
utilized to bring the remaining pressure 
up to 4 psi. After bringing both space­
craft to 4 psi, the tunnel activity was 
initiated and the remaining cleanup was 
performed in the LM. 
26. Ingressing: The ingress to the LM 
was done shortly before sunset and was 
done asymetrically with respect to the 
egress; that is, there was no problem or 
hangup whatever in ingressing the 1M. 
I slipped right in and right up to a 
vertical position without any particular 
problems at all. 
27. PostEVA activity: In the postEVA 
activities, we again followed through 
with the checklist. There was no problem 
whatever in removing and replacing the 
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PLSS CO cartridge, or in recharging the2 
02 bottle in the PLSS. The indication 
on 02 quantity prior to recharging was 
about 800 psi, and very shortly after 
opening the PLSS fill valve the pressure 
Jumped right up to 900 psi indicated. We 
terminated the fill at that time. 
The PLSS was doffed at that point and the 
LMP went back on the LM suit loop. The 
recharge of the water system was begun 
and no problems were noted in that re­
charging operation. 
There was no fatigue associated with the 
EVA. The workload during the entire time 
was lower than anticipated preflight. At 
no time was there any sign of fatigue, 
either tot al body fatigue or of the arms. 
There were no particular eye sensations. 
And the light levels inside the EVVA 
throughout the EVA were very comfortable. 
I was wearing just the clear plastic 
overvisor on my visor. I stuck my head 
out into the sun a couple of times and 
I really didn't experience much in the 
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way of eye strain, or anything else like 
that. I suspect that I wouldn't want to 
stay like that for long periods of time, 
but for short periods of time, it seems 
like that particular protector was cer­
tainly adequate. 
I also had my IV gloves on during this 
period of time when we were transferring 
equipment back and forth. I noticed that 
my hands got warm very fast when I put 
them in the sun and left them there for 
even 2 or 3 minutes. I could feel the 
heat coming through those black gloves. 
During the EVA, the cooling in the suit 
was very good. I left the diverter valve 
in MIN cooling throughout the entire EVA, 
and never had the feeling that I was 
getting warm. Toward the end of the EVA, 
I remember thinking that I might want to 
go to intermediate cooling just to see 
if I got too cold there, but something 
else came up at the time and I never did 
that. I stayed in MIN cooling. The only 
place that became noticeably warm at all 
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was the fingertips. This was expected 
from the thermal vacuum runs that we had 
made in the SESL chamber A prior to flight. 
The temperature at the fingertips was 
less than we had experienced in Chamber A. 
I have no objective w~ of estimating 
how hot mY fingers got, but the only 
thing I can s~ is that it was quite a 
bit more comfortable than we had exper­
ienced in chamber A under the thermal 
vacuum conditions, but noticably warm. 
28. PostEVA cabin cleanup (restowage): 
The postEVA cabin cleanup was accomplished 
pretty much according to our preflight 
plan. We didn't encounter any particular. 
problems that were new, that we hadn't 
encountered earlier. 
29. Power-down transfer and deactivation: 
The power-down transfer and deactivation 
in this particular case were accomplished 
more along the preflight plan, that is, 
the tunnel was open and the commander 
~as able to get off the hoses a little 
quicker and get transferred over. 
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30. IVT to CSM: IVT to the CSM wasn't 
any different than the previous day. 
This is the point where we ran into the 
translunar BUS ties. The circuit breakers 
were left in. At this moment, I can't 
figure out how they were because of the 
way the checklist is written. We either 
were looking at the wrong page or were 
anticipating something and got it in the 
wrong configuration. 
31. Workloads and timelines: During 
the course of the day, as the LMP was 
operating, it became obvious that he was 
feeling much better on the fourth day 
than he had on the third day. There­
fore, I elected to expand the EVA some­
what. As we progressed, we not only 
donned the OPS but also integrated in 
the EMU and performed the EVA, very 
similar to the original planning, except 
that the transfer from the 1M to the 
command module was not accomplished. 
Most of the other things were accom­
plished, and we shortened the EVA to one 
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daylight pass outside the spacecraft asMcDIVITT 
opposed to the two daylight and one dark­
side pass outside the spacecraft. 
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In preparation for the rendezvous, we 
changed our wakeup time from over Ascension 
at approximately 86:30 to over Guaymas at 
approximately 85: 40 in an effort to pro­
vide ourselves with a little cushion at 
the beginning of the day. Also, in anti­
cipation 	of this high-powered day, we had 
done some 	 preparation the previous night, 
that is, 	packed the ISA with the things 
that we were going to transfer to the 1M, 
put ourselves in a posture whereby we 
could get 	up, eat, get suited, perform 
theP5l's, and other things that we needed, 
and get right on over into the 1M. As it 
turned out, we were able to do this in a 
more reasonable manner and were able to 
ingress the 1M well in advance of the time 
that we had anticipated. 
We entered the 1M about an hour early; 
and we managed to st ay roughly an hour 
ahead of time until we were well into the 
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1M checklist. Although we tried to stay 
that far ahead, it was difficult because 
of the ground coverage that was required 
for some of the checks that we were doing. 
We approached the undocking period with a 
fairly good margin on time. 
1. Don PGA's: PGA donning went better, 
probably because we were getting more 
proficient. 
2. Tunnel pressure: The tunnel pressure 
was fine. We were still in 1M PRESS, and 
there was no DELTA-P. 
Tunnel pressure: Following pressur­
ization of the ascent system, the ascent 
feed valves were cycled to their proper 
position. When I cycled the ascent feed 
number 1 valves to the open position, the 
valves made a clonk which indicated that 
they had been moved aw~y from full open. 
3. Assisting tunnel closeout: The tunnel 
closeout worked as previously with no 
problems. 
The tunnel operations were somewhat dif­
ferent today, since we were planning for 
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SCOTT a separation and had to go through the 
preloading of probe, which went as adver­
tised. The capture latches were checked 
by Jim after we installed the probe and 
then again after the preload. Everything 
looked nominal. The next step was to cock 
the 12 latches. The first latch "I tried 
had a problem, which was number 1. It 
appeared to get the full preload with one 
stroke. This could be determined by feel­
ing the depth of travel of the bungee and 
the bungee housing and comparing with 
several other latches which worked alright. 
It took about five tries or five cycles 
on the latch to get it to work normally 
with a complete preload with two strokes. 
After that, I tried recycling it and re­
leasing it manually several times, and it 
appeared to work just fine. All the other 
latches worked normally, except number 8, 
which again appeared to obtain a complete 
preload with one stroke on the first 
stroke. Several recycles on that cleared 
that one up. After completion of all 
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12 latches, I was satisfied that eachSCOTT 
worked properly. There was no tendency 
for any latch to hand up, or any hook to 
hand up on the docking ring. They all 
pulled clear on the first stroke. 
The 1M umbilicals were removed without 
difficulty by the CDR in the 1M. The 
hatch-integrity check again took about 
10 minutes. 
4. Rendezvous window docking target: 
The docking target was installed in the 
right-hand window and worked properly on 
dim and bright. There is very Iittle 
distinction between the two. The side 
hatch was configured for the EVT,· as was 
the rest of the inside of the command 
module , within about the same time as 
previously with no anomalies. The space­
craft was configured up to the point where 
helmet and gloves would have to be donned, 
pressure-integrity check performed, and 
then the hatch opened. We were about 
10 minutes from a hatch-open situation. 
The pre-undocking checkouts went nominally. 
--EONFIDENTI.A,l 
4-143EONFIDENltAt 
SCOTT 5. IMU operation: The GDC aligned well, 
ORDEAL was working well. The EMS drift 
test gave us about 0.2 foot per second in 
100 seconds, and the EMS DELTA-V test went 
to a minus 20.3 which was again very good 
for the EMS. 
On the first alignment of the day, we 
again had a problem with the telescope 
hanging up. It did one time during the 
P51 in manual drive. We gave it some 
consideration and decided to watch it 
closely and keep everybody posted on the 
st atus of it. There was no further prob­
lem the rest of the day. It worked just 
fine. 
6. RR transponder: The rendezvous radar 
transponder worked as advertised. The 
systems test meter A was 1.6, B was 1.65, 
and C, although not required as a parameter, 
was about 0.5. 
At approximately 91: 45, about one-half hour 
before undocking, the fuel cell 2 con­
denser exhaust temperature got up to 
178 degrees. It was going up and it 
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SCOTT looked like we had a sick fuel cell 2. 
The ground said they'd keep an eye on it 
and it shouldn't be any problem. It 
wasn't. 
When we ran the lighting check between 
the two vehicles, the lights all worked 
just fine, except for the spotlight. When 
I threw the switch, I heard it come out ­
heard the door open, but saw no light. 
Subsequently, we discovered that the cir­
cuit breaker for that particular light 
down in the right-hand LEB had popped out. 
But at that time, I wasn't in much of a 
position to climb down there and push it 
in. Actually, we didn't even see this 
until the following day. It's sort of 
buried on 225. 
When the 1M radar checks were complete, 
I called P20 to check the tracking. Even 
at the close ranges, it automatically .~ 
pointed the CSM X-axis to within 1 degree 
of the LM. P20 appeared to be much 
smoother at the close ranges than it had 
been in the simulations. 
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set on Aldebaran, which was about 10 de­
grees from the LM. It was again much 
easier than the simulator. The calibra­
tion worked out to be 359.74 and 57.167 
for the shaft and trunnion. 
The only anomaly prior to phasing was the 
time at which I crossed the 170-degree 
point for the horizontal adjust chart. 
It appeared that we would be approximately 
3 minutes early at the horizontal crossing 
and this was the basis of the state vector 
out of the computer. I believe there's 
some question as to the validity of this 
particular technique that we'll have to 
look into. The horizontal crossing oc­
curred at approximately the same time, 
with both vehicles. The 1M gave me a 
call about the time I was getting 180 de­
grees on the state vector local horizontal 
relative to the X-axis. There was no 
particular CSM PREP for the phasing burn, 
other than to line up on the local hori­
zontal and perform a horizontal adjust 
-  
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the phasing burn was not completed. 
So, there was noP30 or p40 associated 
with the phasing burn. 
When the command module began his RCS 
separation burn, I began tracking him in 
PGNS RATE COMMAND. PGNS RATE COMMAND 
provides a very good control system. 
was in fine scaling. I was able to track 
him as he moved away; the rates went to 
about I deg/sec, and he was easily tracked 
in this mode. When we got to Some dis­
tance where the l-deg/sec rate looked like 
it was going to hold, Rusty inserted a 
VERB 76, ENTER, whi ch put us in PULSE. 
I then tracked him in PULSE for.the re­
mainder of the time and PULSE CONTROL 
provided an excellent control mode, even 
with the descent stage still attached. 
As the spacecraft moved out across the 
ground, he was very easy to see compared 
to the other objects I've seen in space. 
I think the silver color of the Gumdrop 
and the way it reflects the sun provides 
an'excellent source of light even against 
 ­
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cloud backgrounds. Whenever he moved 
across the surface of the earth ~ without 
the clouds behind him~ he was very~ very 
easy to see, and we tracked him out to 
some considerable distance. 
8. Maneuvering and maintaining in minimum 
dead band attitude hold: In using stand­
ard procedure to get to an AGS-calibration 
attitude~ we ended up about 22.5 degrees 
attitude difference from where we should 
have been. I believe this was due to the 
difference in the REFSMMATS between the 
two vehicles. The point is that in using 
this technique, we should make sure we 
understand what the position. of the com­
mand module ball should be relative to 
the REFSMMAT in the LM. 
Maneuvering the spacecraft to the proper 
attitude was no problem. It was done 
automatically with the DAP using the 
VERB 49 to a predetermined attitude from 
P30 and P41. 
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10. Photography of undocking: After 
the undocking~ stationkeeping with the 
command module was relatively easy both 
-SCS 	 and DAP... I set it up in the DAP in 
order to maintain a position to enable 
me to take pictures of the LM landing 
gear as it did its 360. I backed off 
somewhat farther than I would normally 
for a landing gear inspection in order 
to include the whole vehicle in the 
pictures. There's no doubt that you can 
tell that the landing gear locks are in 
fact locked. Not necessarily by the marks 
on them but by the geometry ~ and they're 
easy to see in profile as the LM rotates 
around. 
11. Formation flying and LM inspection: 
The lunar contact probes were all four 
down and locked and looked like they'd 
contact the lunar surface or impale the 
lunar surface with a certain degree of 
reliability. There were no apparent 
pieces missing from the LM. It looked 
-GONFIDENTIAl 
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like it was 'all solid and in one piece.SCOTT 
This was some concern since during the 
docked DPS burn we had all noticed pieces 
coming from the LM, small irregular 
pieces. 
12. CSM RCS SEP burn: At the comple­
tion of the inspection of the LM, I 
prepared to do the automatic maneuver to 
the separation burn and P41. When Jim 
took over stationkeeping, I went to 
MINIMUM IMPULSE or free drifting mode. 
There was very little effect, and it's 
obvious that you could stationkeep in 
MINIMUM IMPULSE with no problem at all. 
The separation burn was performed on 
time and the DSKY read 5.0 and the EMS 
was 5.2 feet-per-second. It took 
approximately 12 seconds, whi ch was the 
same time required during the simula­
tions. 
After the completion of the separation 
burn, I maneuvered to a predetermined 
attitude to point the preferred tracking 
axis at the LM for their radar checks, 
€ONFIDENTIAl 
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and also to perform a P52. The realign­
ment was done in daytime, the preflight 
stars were available, and AUTO optics 
drove nominally. 
" 
"'".After the CM SEP burn and the LM weh:t; 
into darkness, it was ve1Y easy to 
.~w •• 
follow the visual of the LM into 
the image of the light. The tracking 
light was clearly visible. When the LM 
. came back in the daylight, it was easy 
to see the light as the LM came into 
daylight, and then see the LM image 
itself with the light superimposed on it 
at the close ranges. The flashing of 
the light is a good point source of light 
for marking in the sextant when the LM 
is at close ranges because the LM fills 
anywhere from a quarter to a full field 
of view, depending on how close you are. 
At these close ranges, you can use the 
tracking light very well as the point of 
taking marks with the sextant. 
Prior to the burn, we always made an at­
tempt to verify our general attitude. 
€ONFJDENTIAt 
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In this particular case, we were able to 
compare the PGNS attitude errors with the 
AGS attitude errors, and look out the 
window and see that we were essentially 
vertical, that's with the X-axis pointing 
awa;y from the earth. We did not attempt 
to use any attitude check stars or any­
thing like that. We knew approximately 
what the attitude was going to be local 
vertical, and we knew what this was on 
the inertial ball. Using AGS and PGNS 
and the out-the-window general view, we 
determined our approximate burn attitude 
and made a GO/NO-GO on that. 
14. Rendezvous radar tracking (P20): 
CSM from post-TPI to TPF -- because the 
1M tracking light obviously was not work­
ing, no marks were made. The P35 was 
called up anywa;y to run a solution for 
the first midcourse to see the comp 
cycles and how it yorked, and it came up 
with a small solution somewhat different 
EONFIDENTIAt 
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but comparable in magnitude to the 1M's. 
The spacecraft was oriented so that the 
X-axis would point to 1M by P20; and as 
soon as the 1M broke into daylight, it 
was visible all the way in even though 
against the light earth background it 
was visible as a dark spot until it got 
in closer and then the image became 
clearly visible. The diastimeter was 
available to pick uprange, and it seemed 
to compare fairly well although it was 
difficult to read because the light in 
the read-out is so dim. I got one read­
ing at about 2 miles and had to pull my 
flashlight out to read the read-out in 
the diastimeter. Another interesting 
point was that the alignment of the two 
images was not horizontal. They were 
approximately 30 degrees off from the 
horizontal alignment, but you could still 
get enough comparison to judge the range. 
As a verification of range, the diastim­
eter worked very well. The mounting 
bracket, in particular, was very good be­
€Q.NFIDE~~TIAt 
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out of the envelope of the left-hand 
couch. The lighting on the 1M was much 
better than we'd seen in simulations at 
G&C. The entire vehicle was visible 
through the diastimeter~ and it was very 
easy to select the edges of the vehicle 
in order to place them properly to get 
the ranging. 
14. Rendezvous radar tracking: At 
3 miles~ the 1M had a range rate of 
42 ft/sec and the CSM had a range rate 
of 43 ft/sec~ which showed close agree­
ment in state vectors. When the CSM 
was indicating 1.5 nautical miles and 
33 ft/sec~ the 1M radar was at 9800 feet 
and 32.5 ft/sec. The first visual con­
tact of the 1M occurred at some point 
after the 3-mile comparison of range and 
range rate~ and it was visible in the 
sunlight as it popped out of darkness. 
Just prior to that, we had made a com­
parison of pitch angles. The 1M pitch 
angle was approximately 86 degrees, and 
~C0NFIDENTIAt 
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90 degrees. 
14. Rendezvous radar tracking: After 
the 1M phasing burn, the target DELTA-V 
appeared to update the state vector prop­
erly, and a P20 maneuver, AUTO OPTICS, 
pointed the sextant to include the 1M in 
the field of view. The P20 drove very 
smoothly and AUTO OPTICS tracked smoothly. 
The 1M was easy to see at daybreak and 
the light was still visible. 
Prior to daybreak, the 1M thrusters were 
clearly visible every time they were fired, 
as a large red-orange vapor cloud. Just 
after daylight, I got a cryo pressure 
light, which made everything feel like 
the simulations. Now I had two lights on, 
the fuel cell 2 and the cryo pressure. 
Shortly thereafter, the fuel cell 2 light 
went out. We had an exchange of switches 
from Houston on the heaters on the H2 
tanks to get them squared away. 
Several comparisons made prior to the 
TPI zero GO/NO-GO with the 1M indicated 
-€oNFI~TIAl 
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vectors. Range and range rates were run­
ning very close to within less than a 
mile, and about 3 to 4 ft / sec. Throughout 
the tracking period, the 1M was always 
visible as an image. It was easy to pick 
out the entire 1M in the se~~~ and the 
marking was done on the tracking light. 
The marks were performed as per the check­
list and the solutions to the TPI zero 
were called up as per checklist. 
As we approached sunset, the 1M was vis­
ible all the way into the sunset and 
changed from a visual image to the flash­
ing light again. So, never was there any 
problem in obtaining visual contact with 
the 1M throughout this phase. One prob­
lem was noticed with the telescope: at 
the right sun angles, the prism split on 
the telescope --blanked out the center-­
and the 1M was not visible when the tele­
scope was lined up with toe 1M in the 
center of the reticle because of the wide 
illuminated band across the center of the 
--EONFIDENTIAL 
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telescope, but -it was plainly visible inSCOTT 
the sextant. 
The CSM alignment performed after the 
GO/NO-GO for TPI zero was nominal. The 
torquing angles were plus 0.083, 
plus 0.008, and a minus 0.034, which in­
dicated a good platform. P20 was used 
to point the CSM at the 1M during the 
flyby, or the closest approach. At that 
range, P20 was still working very smoothly 
and put the 1M within a degree of the 
center of the COAS. 
15. Monitor of 1M insertion, CSI, CDR, 
TPI, and MCC burns: The cOIllIIl8.nd module 
support of the insertion burn was to tar­
get the same burn 1 minute later. This 
was performed on time, no naoma1ies. An 
automatic maneuver to the burn attitude 
was verified by comparison with preflight 
angles and position relative to the hori­
zone The communications preinsertion and 
postinsertion burn worked very well and 
I was able to get the gimbal motors off 
very shortly after the completion of the 
OONFIDENTIAl ""' 
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After the 1M insertion burn P76 was loaded 
with the 1M DELTA-VIs, the bias time for 
the burn time, and P20, I did an auto­
matic maneuver plus AUTO optics to point 
the sextant almost directly at the LM. 
The marks were incorporated according to 
the checklist with no problem, and several 
range and range rate values were read out 
and compared with nominal. They compared 
within about 1-1/2 miles and within about 
4 or 5 ft/sec of the nominal values for 
the times that were specified prior to 
CDH. Just after the first mark period 
after insertion, the ground called an H2 
tank fan ON, which illustrated the help 
that the ground was providing and enabled 
me to spend most of my time on the left 
and center seats which actually enhanced 
the operation. I could be assured the 
ground had a close eye on all the systems. 
I might comment at this time on the tech­
nique that, I guess, evolved from the 
simulations. When we first started, I 
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spent quite. a bit of time monitoring sys-SCOTT 
tems. As we got proficient in working 
with the ground, I got more confidence in 
their ability to monitor the systems. 
spent less and less time monitoring them. 
During the rendezvous, it was a big help 
to have the ground watching as close as 
they did, and it enabled me to spend most 
of my time navigating and flying the space­
craft. As a matter of fact, the only time 
I made a complete systems check was prior 
to each burn, and I would check the com­
plete right-hand side of the spacecraft 
with the gage selectors and would monitor 
for nominal values. 
At approximately 60 miles, the 1M still 
appeared as a good clear image in the 
sextant. The size of the 1M was approxi­
mately 40 arc seconds. It filled the gap 
between the double lines in the sextant 
reticle, and I could still see the foot­
pads on the descent stage. 
One of the problems we encountered during 
. --_.- ....-----­
simulations. was a loss of communications 
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tudes changed for the CSI and CDR burns. 
I have a note here that, about 10 minutes 
prior to CSI, I did lose COMM with the 1M. 
That was about the time I started maneu­
vering to the CSI burn attitude. For CSI, 
I targeted the command module with the 
ground pad 1 minute after the 1M burn 
time, which was a mirror image burn. At 
about 20 minutes prior to CSI, I checked 
the out-of-planes of the 1M with the 
VERB 90 and had plus 0.09 nautical mile 
and minus 0.4 ft/sec at the time of the 
1M CSI burn. At 11 minutes prior to the 
burn, I checked the range and range rate. 
Nominal was 62 miles; I had 60 miles. 
The range rate nominal was 118; I had 
122. 
The period from postCDR to postTPI in the 
CSM is the time during which the most 
amazing part of the whole flight occurred, 
as far as I was concerned. After CDR, I 
did the P76 normally, a P20 to maneuver 
to the preferred tracking axis, and a 
--------
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VERB 57 to get auto optics. When I tookSCOTT 
the first look through the sextant, there 
..',.~~~.-------. 
was the LM about one-half degree from the 
center of the sextant. This was after 
1 hour had elapsed. There had been no 
marks, and two maneuvers had been inserted 
through target DELTA-V into the CMC. The 
ascent stage was a good image in the sex­
tant, and the range at this time was 
slightly over 70 miles. On the first 
mark, after acquiring the LM with NOUN 49 
display, the threshold of the DELTA-R and 
DELTA-V was 2.6 miles and 18.1 ft/sec. 
Prior to flight, we had asked MIT to come 
up with some numbers beyond which they 
wouldn't consider convergence in the solu­
tion. Interestingly enough, the numbers 
they had provided us were 2 nautical miles 
and 15 ft/sec. They said that, at this 
value, they still had obtained good solu­
tions for ~ny postCDH, preTPI maneuver and 
that they hadn't really determined what 
the limit;'s'were. Also, they said that 
this was probably a good limit at which 
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SCOTT we could obtain good solutions. So, I 
decided to go ahead with the state vec­
tors I had,to continue the mark process, 
and to check range and range rate after 
the first W-matrix initialization to see 
exactly where the relative state vector 
stood in the command module with respect 
to the one in the 1M. After the first 
mark period, after W-matrix initialization, 
I got the command module range and the 
range rate at the same time the 1M data 
was passed. It was 67 nautical miles and 
112 ft/sec, with the 1M having 67 miles 
and 107 ft/sec, which meant that the state 
vector comparison was very good. 
At the beginning of the next mark period, 
I again got a 0649. This time it was 
0.3 nautical miles and 3 ft/sec, which 
meant that the W-matrix was converging 
and that the solution would hopefully 
converge, which it finally did. At the 
end of the second mark period, I took a 
look at the W-matrix which was 0.11 and 
1.1 which indicated that it was coming 
tONFIDENTIAl 
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weight to update the state vector. After 
the third cycle through P34, which took 
place after the third group of marks, I 
could see that the solution was converging 
toward the 1M solution as far as time was 
concerned. It continued with two extra 
mark periods, which brought the total num­
ber of marks prior to TPI (after the W-
matrix initialization) to 30. At the 
time of the final COMP cycle on the fixed 
elevation angle, the comparison with the 
1M was within 9 seconds and the DELTA-V's 
compared very well, as can be seen in the 
charts. The TPI burn was monitored by 
targeting a mirror image burn at the same 
time or, as we had planned, program P34 
with the 1M ignition time and by using the 
time option. Then, at the completion of 
the TPI, a P76 was used with the actual 1M 
burn and actual TPI time, plus the bias 
with the burn time. 
17. Formation flYing: After the com­
c,cc~~~_c 
pletion of braking phase, the 1M pitched 
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over so that the CSM could visually ob-SCOTT 
serve the ascent engine. Everything 
looked as if it were intact with no 
pieces missing or insulation torn off, 
and it was easy to look into the engine 
nozzle and even see the injector and 
the chamber, apparently because of the 
sunlight reflection at that particular 
time. The nozzle was black, the cham­
ber was still silver, and everything 
looked clean and smooth. The pulsing 
of the RCS jets was visible. It looked 
as if the particular control modes used 
were very active. During the terminal 
part of the docking, it seemed as if 
the jets were firing almost at intervals 
of 0.2 or 0.3 second. The final ap­
proach to the contact by the ascent stage 
looked very smooth. There were no over­
shoots or oscillations in attitude. It 
appeared, even though it was a very 
slow closing rate, to be a very stable 
closing rate. 
20. Docking and pressure integrity: 
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got into the probe/drogue contact point, 
it was well within the boundary as in- .. 
dicated by the diamond on the target on 
the 1M relative to the CSM COAS; and I 
would have estimated the contact velocity 
at about 0.1 ft/sec. Approximately 
7 seconds later, I got the barber poles 
on the capture latches and then proceeded 
to stabilize and align by using a mini­
mum impulse. As before, it was effective 
to align the two vehicles by using the 
CSM COAS and the 1M target. We had de­
cided prior to the contact that we would 
not do an automatic retract because of 
the questions we had on the EXTEND RE­
LEASE switch. As mentioned previously, 
when I went to check the switch prior 
to the docking after the rendezvous and 
placed the switch in retract, the talk-
backs indicated barber pole instead of 
the gray that they should have been. By 
cycling the switch up to extend and ob­
serving a gray talkback and then back to 
OONFIDENTIAl­
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backs, which indicated that the capture 
latches were cocked and ready to accept 
the docking. However, to preclude a 
retraction without capture in subsequent 
problems, it seemed as if it would be a 
better idea to go ahead and just do the 
capture and, after everything was sta­
bilized, to initiate the retraction. 
After aligning the two spacecraft, I 
retracted on the secondary system, and 
it took approximately 4 to 5 seconds. 
Again, it sounded like we got a double, 
or two groups of latches. It was a 
double sound on the latching, but solid, 
which indicated that we had a secure 
hard dock. I guess we could describe 
it more as a finite period of time of 
noise rather than one bang. It's hard 
to distinguish two separate bangs, but 
it might be interpreted as a group of 
latches going and then the side of the 
tunnel hitting; but there was a definite, 
finite period of time during which we 
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could hear latches. After the capture, 
there were no significant postcontact 
dynamics and no oscillations, just a 
slight drift as we had seen on the T 
and the D trainer. 
21. Docking and integrity checks: From 
the command module side, there was never 
any quest:i,(:lfi about being able to perform 
the final docking. Tb..e only problem was 
that the COAS again faded on a white dock­
ing target on the LM, and it was very dif­
ficult to see the COAS even though it was 
visible. We do need a brighter, sharper 
COAS. 
22. Tunnel operations and IVT: Concern­
ing the tunnel operations, upon removing 
the probe from the tunnel it was warm to 
the touch, approximately 110 to 120 de­
grees. This was to the barehanded touch. 
25. 1M jettison: When we got to the 
LM jettison and the separation maneuver 
from the 1M, we had a very interesting 
experience. I believe that nominally we 
are supposed to jettison the LM at --
CONFIDENIIAl­
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The nominal separation maneuver was to be 
performed at 101:38:14 at the following 
inertial angles: 132.9~ 105.8~ and 23.5. 
The pad passed up to us had us separating 
at 101:32:44 at the following angles: 
137.4~ 92.5, and 21.9. The nominal jet­
tison attitude was 0°, 157°~ and 45°. The 
updated jettison attitude was 18.5~ 282.0~ 
and 44.7 -­
I think that the main point is that we 
were at a different set of angles from 
those which we had practiced in this lit­
tle exercise in the simulator. We had 
gone through this manuever a number of 
times in the simulator. The idea was to 
separate~ to stop the translation between 
the two vehicles ~ and to do an auto maneu­
ver to the separation attitude --then at 
the separation time to do this 3-ft/sec, 
6-second burn. This maneuver was to be 
an auto maneuver us ing VERB 49. We in­
serted the angles in flight and did the 
maneuver, and it drove us right into gim­
bal lock. Since we were using a new set 
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of angles, I guess we should have watched 
the ball a little closer; but we certainly 
weren't expecting a set of numbers that 
would do this. After we got into gimbal 
lock, we had to modify the plan a little. 
We went back to an attitude that put us 
out of plane somewhat and was to thrust 
---~ 
us in a manner which would clear the LM. 
We did this. We went ahead and made a 
3-ft/sec maneuver in a direction that 
would clear us from the LM. We were well 
clear of the 1M and had it in view at the 
time of ignition. We were able to take 
some pictures of it, and I guess these 
have been recorded for posterity some 
place. 
SCHWEICKART 41. DSKY and tape meter changes: On 
the polar plot which we started updating 1 
from 45 miles, all the points we took 
were within about a pencil width of the 
nominal line drawn on that plot. The 
last data point that we plotted was at 
a range of 30 000 feet, and at that point 
it became obvious that there was no neces­
teNFIDENTIAL 
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sity for continuing the polar plot. 
49. RR corona test 1: After we got close 
to the command module and began station 
keeping, we did an auto maneuver at one­
half deg/sec, narrow deadband, and another 
one 2 deg/sec in wide deadband. Once 
again, the DAP performed very well with 
no problem at all. We were then going 
to unlock the radar from the command mod­
u1e and perform a test to see if we had 
any corona problems. We were unable to 
unlock the radar and, I guess, could have 
had the command module to turn its trans­
ponder off, but we didn't bother doing 
that. We went ahead and did the maneuver­
ing and saw no change in signal strength 
on the AGC. We were looking at the trans­
mitter on this particular maneuver and 
saw no changes in anything. We then went 
back and reloaded the DAP for two-jet 
(I think it was system A) tight deadband, 
2 deg/sec, and began the docking maneuver. 
50. Maneuvering to docking attitude 
and translating to capture latch: We 
-
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installed the COAS in the overhead win­
dow, and it was apparent as we were in 
close that the COAS on the command mod­
ule and the command module sunlit com­
pletely faded out at any kind of range 
.. 
at all, and that we would have to use a 
little intuition in the docking. I 
pitched around to the 90-degree point 
and then, looking through the overhead 
window, I found that the upper part of 
my helmet was all scarred up and I was 
having a little bit of difficulty seeing 
the command module through the top of my 
visor and the COAS. When the COAS is 
superimposed on the command module, it is 
impossible to see any portion of it what­
soever. I started to dock and thought 
that I'd better make sure that the whole 
thing works. Therefore, I maneuvered to 
one side and looked to see if it was still 
all there and got a pretty good idea of 
where it should be by looking through the 
overhead window. I moved back in, and 
as I closed, it was still almost impos­
EONF1DENTIA-l 
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my head around and try to see the dock­
ing target and the COAS together, neither 
one of which was very bright. After some 
manipulation, we were able to get in close 
enough where the COAS did appear on the 
docking target, which was back inside the 
shadow of the command module window. As 
I got in close (about 4 or 5 feet), I be­
gan to see the COAS appear against the 
darker background of the window, when 
the window began to fill up a little 
more of the COAS. At that time, I could 
tell what my attitude was with respect 
to the docking target, and I could see 
what my translational position was with 
respect to the docking target. I maneu­
vered around at this fairly close range 
until I was in a proper attitude, and I 
went ahead and docked. During this partic­
ular time, Dave was telling me that I 
was inside of the safe boundary, outside 
of it, or whatever my position was, and 
gave me a good GCA until I got down where 
"€ONFIDENTIAt. 
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that the COAS brightness has to be in­
creased manyfold so that it can operate 
in a bright environment like this; and 
I think it also would be worthwhile to 
brighten up the docking target, if at 
all possible. In positioning ~self to 
look through the overhead window, I did 
not use the pip pins on ~ restraint 
system to hold ~ hips to the panel 5. 
I sort of bent ~ knees and leaned back 
and looked overhead. I couldn't find 
a good position that was comfortable. 
The neckring on ~ suit stuck into ~ 
throat, and I had a very difficult time 
maneuvering ~ head inside of ~ helmet 
to find a clear part that wasn't all 
scratched and gouged on the top of the 
helmet through which to look. I tend 
to believe that these scratches and 
gouges came from operating in the rear 
of the 1M while trying to stow the OPS. 
Rusty seems to think that I should clar­
ify my statement here on the use of the 
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McDIVITT pip pins. I did not use the pip pins be­
cause I felt that I could position my­
self better by using only the restraint 
system and looking through the overhead 
window without the use of the pip pins. 
I'm not sure what the closing rate was. 
It was very low because of the proximity 
at which I finally located the COAS and 
the docking target. The light weight 
of the ascent stage made it so that I 
never really did stop the translation 
left/right and the horizontal components 
with respect to the docking probe and 
drogue. I had to thrust continually 
left and right and fore and aft, or 
whatever that other direction is, to 
keep myself within the boundaries of 
where I wanted to be prior to contact. 
51. Docking: We got in close, and the 
standoff cross on the docking target 
filled the 2-degree mark on the COAS. 
I went ahead and started thrusting. 
This indicated that we were at just about 
the point where we were captured. It 
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clunked in, and I could feel the drogue 
and the probe make contact very gently; 
and Dave called a couple of barber poles. 
Dave said it took 7 seconds of thrusting 
from the time I started until the time 
we got the barber poles. At contact, 
when Dave called the barber poles, Rusty 
inserted the VERB 76 ENTER, which put 
us in a free mode, or a PGNS pulse mode. 
We were at the end of the probe, cap­
tured, but not latched up with the two 
tunnels together. Dave then damped 
whatever residuals rates we had because 
it was very difficult to see these rates 
from the 1M side. 
EONFIDENTIAl ­
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1. IVT: The IVT check was the same as 
on the previous day. 
2. Entry status: The entry status check 
was no different than on the previous day, 
except for the fact that we discovered 
my OPS heaters didn't work. This time, 
my magic touch with the heater switch 
didn't work, and we were never able to 
get the green lights to come on. 
When the LMP transferred over, we ran 
into a problem with the communications. 
His push-to-talk switches on both the 
rotation hand controller and his hoses 
wouldn't work. He was committed then to 
operating off of VOX for the remainder 
of the flight. The commander's side oper­
ated properly, so it appeared that we just 
had a malfunction on the LMP's side. 
As in the other activations, we had to 
activate the glycol evaporator earlier 
than it called for on the checklist to 
keep the temperatures down. 
COt\JFIDENTIA-b­
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completed the radar check and opened up 
the radar circuit breakers, we began the 
first alignment of the IMU using the LM-
only data. We maneuvered, AUTO maneuver, 
to Sirius prior to sunset, and when we got 
there, I was able to see Sirius without 
any problem at all. It came right into 
the center of the AOT. 
After I looked through the AOT for awhile, 
I became semi-dark adapted, although the 
sun was still shining into the spacecraft 
or reflecting off the spacecraft and we 
had all the lights in the spacecraft up. 
I gradually began to see Canus Major with 
all its stars, and finally I could see 
Orion and all of its associated stars. So 
there wasn't any trouble identifying Sirius 
in this twilight zone. As a matter of 
fact, I believe I had 10 marks, five X 
and five Y marks, on Sirius completed 
before sunset. 
- ..-''it...~_ interesting to note here that the 
sun was behind us. Sirius was approxi­
'eeNFIDENTIA~' 
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we had about 90 degrees between the sun 
and Sirius. There wasn't any period of 
dark-adaption to speak of before I started 
looking through the telescope. I essen­
tially looked through it as soon as we got 
to the attitude. I had an eyepatch on for 
maybe a minute or so prior to that time 
but certainly not dark-adapted. 
The technique that we had worked out for 
alignments was for me to watch the star and 
call the pulses left, right, up, and down 
to Rusty, who put them in. It seemed to 
work even better in actual practice than 
it had in the simulator. The simulator 
provides an additional problem in that 
it's very difficult to see near the cen­
ter of the telescope because of the mirror 
configuration in the simulator. In the 
actual spacecraft with actual stars, we 
were able to maneuver through the X and Y 
lines much closer to the center of the 
telescope. It was much more easily done 
and done a lot quicker, too. 
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Acrux. As the maneuver took place, I 

could see the stars coming up and the 

spacecraft pointed essentially at Acrux, 

which indicated our docked alignment was 

once again quite good. Here again, we 

had no problem aligning on Acrux and made 

the 10 marks that we were going to use 

there. I might add that at the completion 

of this, we had five zeros, which was 

something that we had never even come 

close to in the simulator. It's much 

easier to do it in the spacecraft than it 

was in the simulator. The star angle 
difference was five zeros. 
While looking through the telescope at 
the stars, the spacecraft was being man­
euvered in PULSE mode, and the flash of , . 
the thrusters could certainly be seen as 
an orange cloud, but didn't in a:ny way 
affect the ability to see the stars. 
This particular period between separation 
and phasing was probably the most heavily 
loaded as far as workload went in the 
-COI*fIDENTIAL 
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through the AOT alignment in some reason­
able time, so we could press on with the 
preparation for the AGS phasing burn. It 
turned out that we were able to complete 
this in much less time than we had ever 
done in the simulator, which provided a 
little pad at the other end that we could 
certainly use. 
On the completion of the alignment, we 
did a star check using the COAS. This was 
not as easily done as I had hoped. Un­
fortunately, we had the moon in the view. 
We were using Spica as the star. We had 
the moon and a very bright planet, and 
Spica by comparison was quite dim. How­
ever, we were able to identify it, and 
when we did, the COAS calibration showed 
that the star was 0.5 degrees to the right 
and zero up and down, which was certainly 
within the bounds that we expected. 
SCHWEICKART 	 From the LMP's side of the cockpit, the 
alignment went very smoothly. The mode 2 
error needles gave me an excellent picture 
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of how the star was behaving in the AOT, 
and the call0uts that Jim would give ­
one or two pulses right or left, up or 
down - corresponded exactly with what 
was displayed on the mode 2 error needles. 
And this, of course, enabled me to keep 
track very easily of where the star was 
with respect to the center of the X-Y 
lines. The star angle differences Jim 
mentioned were five zeros and the NOUN 93, 
the torquing angles, were minus 0.09, 
minus 0.076, and plus 0.111 degrees, all 
around 0.1 degree, which is very good, 
and which indicated we had a very good 
dock alignment. 
The maneuver to Spica for the COAS check 
was started at about 93: 26, which was 
21 minutes prior to the phasing burn. 
In our simulations, for comparison, we 
were always in the order of 12 minutes 
at this point. So, we ended up doing 
the ali~ent about 9 minutes ahead of 
the best we had done in the simulations. 
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the gimbal-drive and throttle test was 
identical with what we had seen all 
through our training. The values which 
were updated to us from the ground were 
slightly different from those which we 
had expected from briefings preflight, 
but they were within lOth's of degrees, 
so that there was no problem in that. 
SCOTT 	 9. Undocking: At 25 minutes prior to 
the SEP burn, as planned, I moved the 
EXTEND/RELEASE switch from the OFF posi­
tion to the EXTEND position. And the 
talkbacks went from barber pole to gray, 
indicating that the probe had extended 
full, but the capture latches did not 
rel.ease. The LM hung on the capture 
latches and you could feel a definite 
thud as the probe hit the end of its 
travel. At that point, I put the 
EXTEND /RELEASE switch to EXTEND again. 
Again, the talkbacks went gr~, but again 
the LM did not release. Then I cycled 
the switch, the EXTEND/RELEASE switc~, 
tONFIDENTIAL 
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they were both barber pole. Okay, after 
cycling to the RETRACT position, I again 
went to EXTEND on the EXTEND/RELEASE 
switch. The talkbacks were again gray, 
.. 
but this time the LM released, and fell 
off the end. By this time, we had drifted 
'" , 
some 10 degrees in attitude. 
Anyway, I guess I hadn't held the switch 
in the EXTEND pOSition long enough to 
enable the capture latches to release. 
We had tried to do this in the chamber in 
order to give ourselves a check on the 
full extension of the probe; that is, 
cycling and holding the switch a short 
time and releasing the switch before the 
capture latches would release, which they 
\ do after 3/4-inch extensions on the probe.\ 	 ,\ 	 We were unable to do this in the chamber. 

In other words, the capture latches 

released too fast and you couldn't get 

off the switch fast enough to beat the 

latches. Going back and recycling the 
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SCOTT switch to the EXTEND position again and 
holding it, the capture latches still 
didn't release. And only until I recycled 
to the RETRACT position, and then back to 
the EXTEND position, did the capture 
latches release. 
I might as well throw in the cycle of the 
switches when we got ready to redock, 
because there was an anomaly there. and 
maybe there's some association between 
the two. After the completion of the 
rendezvous, I placed the EXTEND/RELEASE 
switch to the RETRACT position in prepa­
ration for the capture. The talkbacks 
were barber pole ~ whereas they should 
have been gray. I again cycled the switch 
to the EXTEND position; the talkbacks 
were gray, indicating that the probe was 
still fully extended. I cycled the 
switch back to RETRACT and the talkbacks 
went gray that time. Everything looked 
nominal for that particular position at 
that time. The normal procedure is to 
hold the switch until the talkbacks are 
CO~~FIDENTIAt 
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gray, at which time I release the switch. 
As I remember, I did that. I don't 
remember exactly when the clunk of the 
probe hitting full extension occurred 
relative to the time I took my finger 
..off the switch. I believe that my finger 
was still there when the talkbacks indi­
cated gray, which is an indication of 
almost complete extension of the probe. 
This should have been well past the point 
at which the capture latch is released. 
Anyway, after we finally got the LM re­
leased, we had drifted off in all three 
axes (primarily pitch) approximately 
10 degrees, because neither spacecraft 
RCS was operating during the undocking 
portion. After release, I backed off 
and took a stationkeeping position rela­
tive to the LM without an attempt to go 
back to the undocking attitude since I 
would maneuver shortly anyway to the 
proper attitude for separation. 
As we started the undocking I could see, 
through the upper window, the distance 
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between the command module and the LM 
begin to open up. I was prepared to 
float gracefully off into space when we 
got to the end of the probe, and, as Dave 
said, there was the clunk. We sort of 
hung there. It's a little difficult to 
judge the attitude changes through the 
overhead hatch window because it's so 
small. You've got to look at them from 
such a funny direction. I also had to 
remove the COAS and had it down in the 
front window at this time. So we didn't 
attempt to do any rate damping or anything 
like that. When we finally were released, 
we sort of fell off the end and were in 
a peculiar attitude compared to what we 
had been accustomed, to in the simulations. 
10. Secondary S-band and VHF B Simplex: 
The secondary S-band COMM checks were run 
at Antigua, and during those checks, it 
was noticed that there was some noise on 
the primary S-band transponder. This 
disappeared just about the same time that 
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the ground advised us that we were clear 
to use the secondary transponder. From 
time to time throughout the day, we did 
experience noise on both the S-band and 
the VHF. As best I can recall, at that 
time we also set up and did the PLSS COMM • 
check with the LM, which worked fine. 
The LM also transmitted to the command 
module, and the command module relayed via 
the CSM one-way relay to the ground. 
Although we didn't get any word back from 
the ground at that time, they reported 
later that the one-way relay worked. 
That was followed by moving right into 
the LM two-way relay for the mode 10. 
The TV pass which followed over the States, 
was successful, except that the voice did 
not get down. Following the day's activ­
ities and during the water boiler of sub- " 
1imator dryout , a backup S-band voice 
check was conducted; and there was some 
confusion at that time as to whether the 
~----
backup S-band voice was going down. This 
confusion came about because we had been 
EONFIDENTIAl" 
4-187'  
SCHWEICKART 	 advised that the down voice backup on 
S-band came hot off the intercom bus, 
and it was not required to use the PTT 
buttons. When I attempted contact with 
the ground without using the PTT, I got 
no response. Alternately pressing and 
releasing the PTT, I conducted several 
short counts from zero to five and back 
down; and CAP COMM reported that whenever 
I released the PTT, the down voice stop­
ped. There is a recollection of the 
ground calling back later that one of the 
COMM checks which did not appear success­
ful at the time was indeed successful and 
that there was a possibility of a mixup 
on the ground relay back to Houston. 
12. AGS: On the rendezvous day, when weMcDIVITT 
pushed the circuit breaker in, we found 
that the LGC was not 	in STANDBY. For some 
reason it came up in 	po6 with the flash­
ing VERB 37 but with 	the STANDBY light 
OFF. We had the AGS warning light ON 
from the time the AGS came on. We were 
advised by the ground that it was an 
--  
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light, and to treat the AGS as an opera­
tional system; which we did. OPERATOR 
ERROR light on the AGS came on when we 
were operating the keys, and they had to 
be operated a number of times. Rusty says 
that he had to hit it as many as three or 
four times on the CLEAR button to get the 
light to go out. 
As we proceeded through the systems checks 
on this particular day, we were staying 
well ahead of the timeline and were not 
having any particular difficulty with 
them. We did a couple of things that we 
hadn't done previously, like pressurizing 
the APS, but it was a nominal pressuriza­
tion. The thing that we had had a prob­
lem with on the preceeding day was the 
rendezvous radar self-test. I made sure 
that we got to this well in advance of 
the time that we had it in the schedule. 
As a matter of fact, I had intended to 
do it at least two times. It was sched­
uled in the timeline over Honeysuckle at 
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about 92 hours. I did it without ground 
coverage at about 91:40 or so. It turned 
out that the self-check was fine. We had 
the rendezvous radar unstowed at this 
time; and we ran right through the se1f­
check without any problem. I did some 
of it twice and it looked like it was 
working fine. Subsequently, we came 
across a ground station and I asked if 
they wanted to watch it from the ground. 
They did not, so instead of completing 
it two times, I went through it about 
one and a half times. 
In performing the PIPA BIAS check for the 
rendezvous day, we did get new values 
there of plus 09, plus 01, and plus 01. 
They were changed from the last PIPA BIAS 
check on the systems day. On the AGS 
calibration, the accelerometer bias co­
efficients remained what they had been 
prior to and after the docked-DPS burn. 
Once again the gyro-drift coefficients 
changed. This time they were plus 0.19, 
plus 0.13, and minus 0.01 deg/hr. The 
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landing radar self-test was nominal, once 
again identical with the previous days. 
Rusty was watching the rendezvous radar 
when I pushed the circuit breakers in. 
He said we had a very, very slight oscil­
lation or movement when we pushed in the 
DC breaker. One of the milestones in the 
preparation for the undocking was the pass 
that began about 91:05 across Antigua, 
Canaries, and Madrid. In our simulations, 
we found that this was the one point that 
we had real problems in getting all the 
things done that had to be done. In 
flight, we were able to go through all 
the things that we needed to do here 
without too much of a problem. Once we 
got through that, we knew that we were in 
a good posture to undock on time. 
When we did the lighting check --where 
we checked all the lights that were avail­
able to us -- I was unable to see the 
command module spotlight. Between the two 
spacecrafts , we now had no spotlights at 
night, which is not a very good posture 
--  
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to be in. There might be some consid­
eration given to using the EVA light as 
a stationkeeping light, although it's 
dim and we certainly haven't had the 
opportunity to see what it can do in 
actual practice. It was at this time 
that I again checked the alignment of 
the COAS with the target in the command 
module window. They were off about 
4-1/2 degrees in pitch and about one­
half (I should say 4-1/2 degrees up and 
down as you're looking through the win­
dow) and one-half degree left and right. 
It was down and to the right. It was 
apparent that the brilliance of the 
COAS was far from what one would like 
in the daylight. I had checked this a 
number of times during the daylight and 
dark. It was perfectly adequate in the 
dark. We were able to detect that the 
flashing beacon was indeed flashing, 
seeing the reflection on one of the 
quads. The CMP could also see the light 
flashing on the quad. We were assured 
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tracking light was operating. 
SCliWEICKART 	 The AGS was also checked at this time. 
Thisc~lose in with the AGS, data coming 
out of 317 and 440 was garbage all the 
wa:y. 
McDIVITT 	 15. Preparation for undocking: The 
preparation for undocking went smoothly 
and we were in a position to undock well 
in advance of the time that we needed to 
be. I think that our first anomaly was 
when we actually tried the undocking 
itself. 
17 • Maneuvering of 	LM: At thi s time, 
we enabled the flight control system, 
and rather than do all the maneuvers 
that we had anticipated, we eliminated 
some of them. 
We enabled the flight control system as 
planned and did our 120-degree yaw man­
'''-...''''­
env~r. Then, instead of doing the 
180-degree pit ch maneuver, where we show 
the descent engine bell to the command 
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just do the 90-degree pitch maneuver, so 
that we could find ourselves in a posi­
tion where we were looking at each other 
and still have enough time to prepare 
for the seperation maneuver. We did this 
under AGS control. After we'd done the 
90-degree ptich-down, we maneuvered to 
an attitude that put us 	in plane. We were 
still somewhat off in pitch attitude. We 
then started our 360-degree yaw maneuver 
using pulse control. We were back on the 
timeline at this time. 	 We were at minus 
18 minutes from the separation maneuver. 
21. Formation flying in AGS and PGNS: 
The pulse modes, both the ones that we 
had used so far, operated fine. The 
ATTITUDE HOLD mode on the AGS operated 
fine, but the RATE COMMAND mode of the 
AGS for orbital flight is a very poor 
flight control mode. It's impossible 
I believe, to command a desired rate 
at low rates using AGS rate command. 
ore than displaced from 
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of 1.5 deg/sec or so. On the simulator, 
I displaced the stick and established a 
rate, and then Rusty would move the 
switch to the pulse position to estab­
lish a rate. We had a considerable 
amount of difficulty getting the rate 
established at some relatively low rate, 
and getting the pulse switch thrown so 
that we could continue on around at this 
lower rate. I think the AGS RATE COM­
MAND mode may be alright for landing, 
but it's certainly a very poor control 
system for orbital flight. 
After completing the yaw maneuver, we 
went to PGNS ATTITUDE HOLD to stop the 
rate. We then went to AGS control and 
did some stationkeeping in AGS. As I 
mentioned, the ATTITUDE HOLD mode is 
fine. It doesn't limit-cycle excessively, 
it attitude-holds properly; it's just that 
whenever you try to do any rate command­
ing, it's very poor. The stationkeeping 
in AGS was no problem at all and the 
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same with PGNS. We did some station-
keeping in PGNS and 	it was als 0 very 
easy to do. It's worthy to note, though, 
that there were very few inputs required 
for stationkeeping. It was easy in 
either control mode. 
24. Rendezvous radar loc.~::on: We brought 
the radar on the line and I was tracking 
the command module with the COAS and the 
radar locked on properly. It was within 
the range and range-rate constraints. 
SCHWEICKART 	 After the radar lock-on, I compared the 
range and range-rate with the VERB 83, 
which I had called off on the DSKY. 
A VERB 83 at this range is a very erratic 
display, which tends to alternate good 
data with garbage on alternate computa­
tion cycles. It, therefore, requires 
waiting a few seconds and watching the 
DSKY display in order to evaluate when 
you're getting the valid display of data 
rather than the garbage display. The 
valid display was up only 25 percent of 
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the time or less during this time period. 
. But ~ did flash up
-
on the DSKY, it 
agreed very well with the tape, within 
1 ft/sec, and you're comparing thousands 
·tt 
of feet. We were at about 1200 to 
l400 feet on the tape meter when the DSKY 
was re ading a quarter of a mile. So, it 
compared very well. 
Following the VERB 83, the VERB 62 radar 
self-check was called, and it agreed 
exactly with the tape meter; there was 
no difference between them whatever. 
After we had completed the alignment, we 
locked the rendezvous radar back on. We 
wanted to make sure that we got on the 
main lobe. At this time, I was actually 
-------~-~-
able to see the command module, and we 
did the first rendezvous 
AUTO TRACK visually. We 
radar lock-on to 
were able to " 
lock-on quite rapidly. At the ranges that 
we were at, the AGC was actually reading 
higher (this is the signal strength read­
out on the rendezvous radar) than the 
little check sheet that we 
,,(;00FID ENTIAl had with us 
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was an invaluable tool during the entire 
flight to determine that one actually had 
achieved the main lobe lock-on rather than 
a side lobe. And at no time during the 
McDIVITT 	 flight did it ever read lower than what 
our chart said. 
The next event was locking the radar 
back on the command module. Here again 
we had no difficulty at all verifying the 
main lobe lock-on. As a matter of fact, 
throughout the rendezvous the ability to 
verify main lobe lock-on was considerably 
easier than I had expected it to be. 
This was because I was able to 
command module at great; distances, which 
I wasn't really sure of preflight, or, I 
was able to identify the main lobe from 
the chart we had for AGC readout. 
It's also interesting that I was able to 
see three lobes on AGe rather than just 
the two that we looked at in the simula­
tor. We had the obvious large main lobe, 
we had a smaller secondary lobe, and the 
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 tertiary lobe looked like it was about 
half the output of the secondaries. 
After initiating P20 to start tracking, 
and verifying the main lobe lock-on, we 
keyed the VERB 80 to start incorporating 
the marks to update the 1M vector. The 
first mark gave us a 3-degree alarm as 
did the second mark. However, the second 
mark waS quite close to 3 degrees, as I 
recall. The first one was less than 
4 degrees off and the second alarm showed 
that it was converging toward 3 degrees. 
The third mark went in without any alarm 
and the remainder of the 12 marks all 
went in with no unexpected displays. 
The AGS solution to the TPI zero indi­
cated that we would have an elevation 
angle at TPI zero of 32 to 33 degrees, 
22 ft/sec on TPI, and 22 ft/sec TPF. 
Following the 12 marks in the PGNCS, the 
LGC came ~_ with 30.59 degrees for the 
elevation angle, and the NOUN 81 data was 
minus 20.7. plus 0.4, and minus 1.8 in 
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DELTA V , V , and V. The Gumdrop called 
x y z 
over an elevation angle after his first 
solution of 211.49. Subtracting lBO, 
that corresponded with our 30.59 to within 
one degree. So, it appeared that the 
navigation was going well from both sides. 
Following the first final computation 
there for TPI ' we reset the RENDEZVOUSO 
RADAR BIAS ESTIMATER to one milliradian 
and conducted a rendezvous radar self-
test and a landing radar self-test, both 
of which appeared completely nominal. 
Following those two tests, we went back 
into the tracking cycle in P20. After 
completing the tracking cycle prior to 
TPIO' the data at 14 minutes (which is our 
final COMP time) came out to 2B.B5-degree 
elevation angle and a DELTA V , V , and 
x y 
V in NOUN Bl of minus 20.1 in X, zero 
z 
in Y, and plus 1.B in Z. The AGS by this 
time had degraded considerably and indi­
cated a 3l.6-degree elevation angle at 
transfer, 20 ft/sec for TPI, and 24 ft/sec 
on the TPF. 
GONFIDENTIA:L 
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The corresponding numbers that were called 
over from the command module agreed to 
0.1 degree in elevation angle, less than 
0.5 f't/sec in X, and Z was about 1. 5 f't/ 
sec difference. So, this fell well inside 
the GO/NO-GO. We had a GO to go on be­
yond TPI. 
As Rusty t s already pointed out, we had 
good agreement with all the inputs that 
we needed to decide onboard whether we 
were GO or NO-GO. There seemed to be no 
problem whatsoever at this moment. The 
GO from the ground was just sort of a 
foregone conclusion. 
All around the football, as we went around, 
I alwS\Vs had the Gumdrop in sight. When­
ever I really wanted to find him I could 
just look out and he was flashing light", 
or, his sunlit reflection was out there. 
We could alwS\Vs see him. 
past the insertion burn 
disappear. 
As 
he 
we 
did 
got 
eve
out 
ntually 
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McDIVITT 	 26. Preparation for phasing burn: The 
maneuver to the burn attitude was done 
manually using pulse mode, which was the 
flight control mode used during almost 
99 percent of the flight. We operated 
in PGNCS pulse. We flew to local vertical 
attitude and it was a good chance to see 
how the spacecraft really performed in 
this semi-heavyweight configuration. 
There was a fair amount of fuel left in 
the descent stage and the ascent stage. 
I think that this mode is certainly ade­
quate for the kind of maneuvers that take 
place in orbit. As we got down close to 
the burn time, we switched to AGS pulse 
and again this control mode is very good, 
very good. 
SCHWEICKART 	 In preparation for the phasing burn, the 
AGS was loaded with the NOUN 86 values, 
which were called after entering p40. 
Again, as was experienced in the docked 
DPS burn, after setting 401 to all zeros, 
it kept changing state to plus one, which 
necessitated special handling. I reset 
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it a number of times prior to the phasing 
27. IMU and COAS: The pointing needles 
on the FDAI seemed to be very accurate 
when compared with the COAS. In trying 
to get the correlation between the needles 
and the COAS, I found that if I put the 
target exactly in the center of the 
COAS - the zero-zero mark - I had the 
needles centered. I was quite pleased 
with this because in our simulations we 
never had everything lined up and it was 
alWB\YS an extra thing to think about when­
ever we were doing the relocks. To make 
sure we had the main lobe lock-on we had 
to place the spacecraft in a certain 
position relative to the COAS during 
simulations. It's a lot easier to just 
stick it in the middle. 
28. Phasing burn performance and param- '.. 
eters: The procedure fof the phasing burn 
was: to start the ullage at 8 seconds and 
get to 5 seconds, to hit an ENTER on the 
GONFIDE~.Al _ 
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necessarily send a fire signal to the 
engine) and then to enable the engine 
gimbal (s 0 that it wouldn't be driving 
prior to this time under AGS control). 
At ignition, we expected it to start, 
obviously; and at 5 seconds after igni­
tion, we were going to throttle rapidly 
to 40 percent and let the AGS control the 
burn at 40 percent. When the engine 
started, we had a very slow, smooth start­
up to 10 percent. At that time, which was 
approximately 5 seconds after engine igni­
tion, I started the throttle up. As I 
throttled up to approximately 20 percent, 
the engine began to rumble in a manner 
very similar to a jet engine compressor 
stall - or at least that's what it felt 
like to me. I could actually feel the 
thing on the floor - and it didn't seem 
to be following the throttle as it had in 
the docked DPS burn. 
I wasn't as surprised as I might have been 
on this because of all the discussion that 
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we'd had with the service propulsion sys­
tem and it being subjected to negative 
gIs, and the requirement for a 40-second 
burn to get all the helium out. We sub­
jected the descent engine to the same 
.kind of thing, and I thought we might have 
some anomalies, but the chugging was a 
little more of an anomaly than I had 
expected. I stopped throttling at 
20 percent and let the chugging go away. 
It left fairly quickly, in a matter of 
seconds, I guess. Then I throttled up to 
40 percent. The throttle-up went smoothly 
and the engine ran properly at 40 percent 
without any problem. It steered within 
a few degrees of the attitude that I 
expected it to be at, and had a very 
nomin~burn with shutdown on time with 
very low residuals. 
Following the phasing burn, the PGNS 
residuals immediately after the burn, 
were minus 0.9, minus 0.8, and minus 
0.6 ft/sec. Our procedure was for Jim to 
switch the guidance control back to PGNS 
'CeNFIDENTbt\L..­
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burn out the residuals. After burning 
out the PGNS residuals to zero, the 
AGS 500, 501, and 502 read zero, zero, 
and minus 1 ft/sec. It's probably worthy 
of note that in burning out the horizontal 
residual components, the Y and Z compo­
nents, there was a good bit of control 
activity taking place. I don't think 
that this is any different from the simu­
lator. The primary difference to us was 
that for the first time we were able to 
sense and hear all the activity when you're 
burning the horizontal thrusters with the 
c.g. so far below them. This came as a 
bit of a surprise to us, and perhaps took 
an extra 10 or 15 seconds of looking at 
it and figuring out that it really was 
working alright. 
The checklist procedure for switching 
inverters for each of these DPS burns was 
followed, as was opening the cross-tie 
balance load breakers, to run the busses 
independently. Unlike the simulator, the 
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BUS_yoltages st8\Ved very close together
. ------... 
even though the commander's BUS was loaded 
more heavily than the LMP's BUS. 
Subsequent to each burn, we had a little 
debriefing that we went through. On this 
particular one, we were looking for the 
ability of the manual translation control 
to do a proper ullage, and there were no 
problems associated with that at all. 
There were no cross-coupling effects that 
we could determine on the FDAI's. The 
spacecraft responded dynamically to the 
gimballing of the engine and the control 
of the engine made by the AGS. It was 
really a very undynamic situation except 
for the propulsion startup. The noise 
level, except for the grumbling that I 
mentioned earlier, was nothing to be con­
cerned with at all, could hardly hear it. 
And the handling characteristics, as Rusty
.-' 
mentioned, after engine shutdown were very 
sloppy. Lateral translation is a very 
poor thing to do in this particular con­
'EGNFIDENTIAl­
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figuration. We didn't experience any un­
expected torques or venting or anything 
like that during the burn or subsequent to 
it. 
The radar tracking and marking at this 
slightly greater range now really began 
to mean something. It indicated that our 
rendezvous radar was working properly and 
we went up through the 12 marks to do the 
cycle for TPI zero. After we had com­
pleted this~ I sort of had a good feeling 
that the radar and guidance/navigation 
systems were working together. My con­
cern over our rendezvous radar was con­
siderably less from this moment on. 
30. Insertion burn: Subsequent to the 
TPI zero GO/NO-GO, we received a pad for 
the insertion and we prepared to do an­
other alignment. This alignment was very 
similar to the first one except that it 
was started in the darkness. We did not 
have the opportunity again to view the 
stars in the daylight. It wasn't an aw­
--  
4-208 
SCHWEICKART 
McDIVITT 
(O~~FIDENTIAt,. 
ful lot different than the first one, ex­
cept that we did an AUTO maneuver and did 
a star check through the AOT rather than 
" 
a COAS calibration check at the end. We 
used Regulus and it appeared right in the 
center of the AOT. We had no problem what­
soever on verifying our alignment. Our 
torquing angles were low and Rusty can 
give you those. 
The star-angle difference was plus 00004, 
and the torquing angles were plus 0.089, 
plus 0.055, and plus 0.037. 
After this, we had to lock the radar on 
and I used a visual lock verification. 
It certainly simplified"the lock-on problem 
when I could see the target. We locked 
on at a ,range greater than 19 000 feet; 
I believe we took three marks before we 
reached this point. We then disabled the 
update ';;~l we had gone out to a range 
in excess of 19 000 feet, got three more 
marks, and were able to procee.d out of 
this program and into the preparation 
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for the insertion burn. 
The insertion burn was to be a PGNS burn 
under AUTO control. We had automatically 
done the maneuver to the proper attitude. 
Again we were using rough attitude checks. 
It was to be a posigrade burn; we knew 
this. We had a local vertical ball. 
ORDEAL was running. We had done a num­
ber of AGS alignments from the PGNS. AGS, 
attitude-wise, was staying very close to 
the PGNS. 
With the number I ball running in orbit 
rate and with the number 2 ball running 
in inertial AGS (number I ball being in 
PGNS) , we could compare all three of 
these inputs and determine onboard that 
we had indeed maneuvered to approximately 
the right attitude. We could look out 
the window and see where the earth was 
with respect to the Z-axis and make a 
rough judgment. 
This time, we used X translation at 
9 seconds; at 5 seconds, we enabled the 
engine firing. We did the entire burn 
-  
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at 10 percent this time. The engine 
-""'-- ---"'­
came on and went off, a good nominal 
burn. There was not an excessive amount 
of steering and very few jets fired. It 
was about as nominal a burn as anything 
I'd ever seen. 
I thought that the jets were being fired 
during the insertion burn a fair amount. 
It's difficult to describe quantitative­
ly, but my impression was that the er­
rors were going back and forth perhaps 
1.5 degrees on either side of center 
and was causing the RCS jets to fire 
rather than being taken out only by 
steering of the descent engine. 
At the end of the insertion burn, the 
PGNS residuals were minus 0.9, minus 0.2, 
and minus 0.3 ft/sec. After these were 
burned out to zero, the AGS 500, 501, and 
502 were plus 1, 0, and minus 1 ft/sec. 
Dynamic responses were practically nil, 
very small attitude excursion. The acous­
tical environment was, practically zero 
level input to the ear through the hel-
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met or the bunny cap that we were wear­

ing. Visual effects of the DPS plume 

were essentially nil. 

At the phasing burn, I was monitoring the 

phasing burn visually through the ren­

dezvous window; the RCS was clearly visi­

ble; it was at night. The DPS portion 

of the burn was not visible. I attempted 

to take movies with the 70 mm lens, but I 

doubt if there was any good results. 

31. Maintaining RR tracking attitude: 
After completing the insertion burn, we 
once again had to lock the radar on to the 
command module. This was done without any 
problem. Throughout the rendezvous, I 
was running slightly higher on the AGC 
than my chart indicated, I wrote down 
some appropriate range and AGC readings. 
This particular one was 45 miles and 
2.4 on the AGC. 
31. Maintaining RR tracking attitude: 
We did an AUTO maneuver to the burn at­
titude and I might comment on the AUTO 
£GNFIDENTIAt 
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sec as a standard maneuver rate through­
out the rendezvous. The digital auto 
J 
pilot did an excellent job. It estab­
lished this rate without an excess amount 
of RCS cycling. It maneuvered right on 
around, and when it got to its final at­
titude, it didn't seem to overshoot; 
stopped at the proper attitude without an 
excess amount of RCS firing. 
The closest approach was 16 000 feet, 
and it was nice to have the radar locked 
on at sometime prior to the closest ap­
proach. Although the ground had called 
out our missed distance to us in simu­
lations, we found that we sometimes had 
difficulty getting back to the right at­
titude and getting the radar locked on, 
verifying that we were really going to 
miss the other vehicle. In flight, it 
was done quicker and we had the informa­
tion available to us previously. It is 
just awfully nice to know that you are 
not going to hit your friends out there. 
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32. Targeting PGNCS and AGS for CSI and 
CDR: We targeted the CSI maneuver for 
the first apsidal crossing and went on 
through here. Rusty decided to call the 
ground for an affirmation of the first ap­
sidal crossing. We had never used anything 
except a first apsidal crossing in any of 
our simulations and hadn't expected any­
thing here. Unfortunately, the ground 
called back and said to use the second 
one, which we did later on; but we got 
the wrong solution. We changed it back 
to the first apsidal crossing and got the 
correct solution. This made it a little 
tight right at the CSI burn. At the 
appropriate times, we copied the range 
rate for our charts and did our marks. 
Then, we were going to do a rende zvous 
radar check when we got to a range greater 
than 50.8 miles. 
33. Preparation for staging and CSI: 
We had 37 minutes between the insertion 
burn and the CSI burn. When we got to 
the rendezvous radar check which was 
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slip and a few other things, we decided 
to delete that part because of the limited 
amount of time and just"-'eOl}tinued taking 
rendezvous radar marks through this period. 
~usty points out that somewhere along here 
we missed the recycle after 4 marks and 
reinitialization of the W-matrix. It 
apparently was at the time period of about 
28 minutes when we were supposed to do that. 
This was caught by the ground and they 
reminded us of it. They took good care 
of us throughout our entire rendezvous. 
I think we proceeded to the 14-minute 
mark without any problem and certainly in 
a fairly nominal condition. The radar was 
working; the rest of the spacecraft was 
working properly. When we hit the final 
COMP at 14 minutes with the second apsidal 
crossing, we received an answer that was 
approximately 85 or 90 ft/sec, which we 
,~ 
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knew to be almost 2 times larger than what 
we wanted. We went back and put the first 
apsidal crossing in and got the right 
'"  
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answer out which compared very closely 
with the ground solution. In a case like 
this~ if the first apsidal crossing hadn't 
solved our problem, we would have called 
P30 and loaded it with the ground solution; 
and then, we would have done the CSI burn. 
Because we were going to stage od this 
particular burn, we had to do some extra 
reconfiguration of the cabin to provide 
ourselves with the proper amount of 02 to 
breath in case we depressurized the space­
craft due to some staging problem. We 
also had to transfer to those systems 
that had their expendables located in the 
ascent stage. We also made an effort to 
deadface the electrical connections that 
ran to the descent stage so that we 
couldn't possibly get any shorts from a 
hot wire. When we finally put the first 
apsidal crossing in, our solution com­
pared quite favorably with the ground. 
Once again, the decision as to whether to 
go with the ground or the onboard solution 
was an easy one. 
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The first solution to the CSI burn follow­
ing insertion came out to be minus 
40.2 ft/sec with a DELTA-H of 9.9, which 
looked quite close to nominal. As Jim 
mentioned, this occurred slightly late 
9n a ground reminder. We neglected to 
hit it at 4-·marks. I believe that we 
actually got our reinitialization done 
and the recycle done at 7 marks. It was 
after this time that I asked the ground 
for their recommendation on apsidal cross­
ing, primarily because I knew that the 
orbital parameters of the CSM were fairly 
different from what we had been simulating.­
I was not at all sure that the first ap­
sidal crossing was the proper one. Prior 
to running the final COMP out of the PGNS, 
I had targeted the AGS with the proper 
times. I had input the second apsidal 
crossing to the AGS and had gotten a 
solution which read on the order of 
85 ft/sec. At that time, I considered 
,...., 
the AGS to be NO-GO based on getting a 
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this type of behavior. I can't say ex­
actly like it, but we had seen illegiti­
mate solutions from the AGS in simulations. 
At that time with no time to troubleshoot, 
I assumed this to be the case here. How­
ever, on hitting the final COMP at 14 min­
utes for the PGNS, interestingly enough, 
we got the same answer. Then, the AGS 
came in as sort of a back door system in 
clueing us that we had a systematic prob­
lem which gave us the same wrong answer 
with both systems. This encouraged us 
to go on to the first apsidal crossing. 
However, this now had cut into our normal 
timeline because we had already gotten 
the final solution and prevented me from 
completing the chart solution. The first 
apsidal crossing gave us a DELTA-H of 
9.8 miles and a TPI slip of plus 3 minutes 
54 seconds. The horizontal component for 
the CSI burn was minus 40.0 ft/sec. This 
compared ~uite favorably with the ground 
solution, which was minus 39.3 ft/sec. Upon 
·  
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working out the chart data postflight from 
~ihe data taken inflight, the chart solution 

to that burn was minus 40.7 ft/sec. The 

reconfiguration of the ECS and the EPS 

prior to staging went as expected. There 

were no big drops in the bus voltages due 

to switching to the ascent batteries. As 

I recall, they were reading 28.4 or 5 volts 

following the dead facing of the descent 

batts. 

The CSI maneuver is normally performed 

local horizontal, with the minus X-axis 

pointing in the posigrade direction. We 

were facing the sky, which was not much 

of an attitude reference. We maneuvered 

there from a position so that we were 

looking at the surface of the earth in 

local horizontal position and then pitch 

up about 90 degrees. We could tell that 

we were roughly in the right attitude. 

, 
As I mentioned earlier, we compared the 

AGS, the PGNS, and the orbit rate infor­

mation to make sure that we were in the 

right attitude. The CSI burn was to be 
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an RCS burn with staging shortly after 
we began the thrusting; it was to be 
4 jet translation. We maneuvered to the 
burn attitude by using PGNS AUTO maneuver. 
Again, it was a good control system. We 
got there without an excess amount of 
thrusting, held in the right attitude, 
and configured the spacecraft for staging. 
At T minus zero, I began the plus X trans­
lation. 
34. Staging and CSI burn: When I had 
verified that the spacecraft was control­
ling in the AUTO mode and that we were 
definitely getting thrust, I hit the 
stage fire switch. We staged in a cloud 
of debris and a big bang. We could see 
the debris being lit up by the thrusters, 
and it seemed to float all around the 
spacecraft. It did not perturb the space­
craft attitude excessively. I continued 
to thrust; and when I had assured myself 
that the spacecraft was indeed under con­
trol and that we could continue thrusting 
CONFIDENTIA~' 
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connects' to be open so that we could use 
APS fuel. These were open, and we did 
most of the thrusting --using the ascent 
propulsion system fuel rather than the RCS 
, 
fuel. At a velocity to go of approximately 
9 ft/sec, they were closed; and we were 
configured to the nominal ReS configura­
tion. We burned the residuals to essen­
tially zero without any problem at all; 
and during this period of time, we called 
the burn to the command module to let them 
know that we were accomplishing it as pro­
grammed. There was some ReS activity in 
addition to the translating activity, but 
I didn't feel it was excessive. One would 
always expect some because there are per­
turbing forces, but it seemed like a rea­
sonably nominal RCS plus X maneuver. 
should add that we were looking at the 
black sky, and it was pretty black every­
where. Yet, I found that the ReS activity, 
which seemed to create a much brighter 
flash around the spacecraft than anything 
-€e-NFIDENTIAb. 
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did not have to configure the interior 
lighting to any particular mode; we just 
had it the way we had been using it at 
night. It certainly was not optimized 
for viewing out the window, but every­
thing was not full bright, and it seemed 
to work pretty well. During the burn, 
the ascent interconnect worked as expected 
with the exception of the closing of the 
ascent feeds at the end of the burn. At 
this point, there was some momentary 
heart failure when I closed the ascent 
feed because the number 2 talkback in 
system A remained gray. I hit the switch 
a couple of times before recalling that 
there was a sticky talkback in that loca­
tion. When I rapped the panel, it went 
back to barber pole. 
On those talkbacks, when any of the 
switches associated with the talkbacks on 
the parker valves is activated, the talk-
back goes to a gray condition regardless 
of whether the valve is opened or closed. 
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is gray and one positions the switch to a 
closed position to ensure that it is 
closed, the talkback will nonetheless 
display gray while the switch is out of 
the neutral position. Thischaracteris­
tic is something which future flights 
should be aware of to keep from misinter­
preting the display. 
Following the burn, and the burning of the 
residuals to zero in the PGNS, the AGS 500, 
501, and 502 read plus 10 and plus 
1 ft/sec. 
After CSI, we again had to lock the radar 
~_~"~'~c~~.",command module, and I was unable 
to see him at this time. When we were 
~ut at ~"-ra~-:;:~ou~ 85 miu!s}~ I could 
no longer see the light. I did not try 
,--".'-~~-.". 
to dark adapt or anything as exotic as 
that. I had noted the AGC reading prior 
to breaking lock for the CSI. It was 
running about 2.2. Then, I went back and 
did a lock-on. We put in the VERB 95, 
which prevented updating of the PGNS. I 
EONFIDENTI,t\l 
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a range of 85 miles, which is above the 
AGC signal strength that I had on the 
card. I was assured that I had the right 
target locked on. We allowed the radar 
updates to continue and proceeded on 
through to CDH. Shortly after this, the 
CMP called and said he didn't see us in 
------.... -~-.------..-~--.-----.--
his telescope. We started checking to 
see if we had a tracking light. We looked 
at the quad, which had been lighted by 
the flashing of the tracking light earlier, 
it. We considered the possibility that 
the light we had seen on the quads had 
been a reflection from something that had 
been on the descent 	stage. Because we had 
already jettisoned the descent stage, we 
thought, or maybe I 	 should say hoped, that 
the tracking light was operating and was 
not just reflecting 	on the quads. Subse­
quent to this, we found out that the 
tracking light was indeed not working and 
---------------- --------.....- ' 
had apparently failed at staging. With 
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McDIVITT our lock-on, we proceeded through the 
checklist as we were supposed to and 
picked up the range rate for the charts. 
36. Preparation for CDH burn: We had 
a little trouble establishing the time 
for CDH with the ground. We had a little 
communications problem that we'll let 
Rusty discuss here in a minute. We did 
get these range rates out, and as we went 
through the maximum range of approximately 
98 nautical miles, my AGC was reading 
2.17 on the radar. With the ascent stage 
only, the pulse mode was still a very 
effective mode. It gave a little snappier 
response than it did when the descent 
stage was hooked on. It compared quite 
favorably with the response of the simu­
lators, but at this point, I began to 
notice even more the lack of fidelity in 
the rate needles that we had onboard. 
Earlier when the pulse input was causing 
a lesser DELTA rate change, I could watch 
the needles and see how the spacecraft 
was actually behaving. If I saw the thing 
McDIVITT 
4-225"EONFIDEI'lTIAt' 
deviating, I had plenty of time to stop 
it. With the higher rate changes per pulse 
without the descent stage, I really got so 
that I had a stronger and stronger desire 
for a set of accurate rate needles. I 
finally had to give up almost completely 
on the rate needles. I went to the radar 
error needles and upon watching the rate 
with which they changed, I used them as 
my rate indicators. I just almost com­
pletely forgot about the rate needles as 
displayed on the FDAI. It's unfortunate 
that they weren't more sensitive and more 
accurate, because we did a lot of pulsing 
back and forth across the correct attitude 
trying to get these needles to stop when 
we could have used the rates; and with 
that information, we probably could have 
stopped it a little better. As we 
approached the CDH maneuver, we again had 
very good agreement between the onboard 
solution and the ground solution. As 
throughout the previous portion of the 
mission, it was easy to decide which one 
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tion and go with its answer. 
Immediately following the insertion burn 
and during the AUTO maneuver for the ini­
tiation of P20 tracking, VERB 06 NOUN 31 
was called to obtain the PGNS burn time 
for the CDH burn maneuver and PGNS igni­
tion time for the CDH maneuver. This 
turned out to be 96:56:29, which we then 
biased upward 1 minute 45 seconds to 
96:58:14 for the actual TIG. This was 
passed to the ground; however, due to our 
normal COMM problems over Tananarive, we 
had no success in getting this word to 
the ground. This was later passed down 
on first contact at Carnarvon. The recycle 
after 4 marks gave us a 10.1-mile DELTA-H 
and a DELTA-T TPI slip of minus 3 minutes 
56 seconds, which corresponded very, very 
well with the 4 minute TPI bias which we 
had put in during the CSI program. I 
might mention that the normal TPI bias was 
3 minutes on TPI, but due to the trajec­
" 
tory that we were in, the ground recom­
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mended using 4 minutes. This worked out 
very well indeed. On the final solution 
at 14 minutes, the DELTA-H came to 10.0 
(right on the money), the DELTA-T TPI 
slip was minus 3 minutes 30 seconds, and 
the NOUN 81 came out at minus 39.2 plus 
0.1 and minus 13.7. This compared with 
an onboard chart solution of minus 39.5 
for X and minus 14.5 for Z, or less than 
1 ft/sec difference all the way around. 
The ground also compared at this point 
with a minus 38.1 and a minus 15.3. 
Interestingly enough, for this burn, the 
AGS solution came out to be minus 40 ft/ 
sec in X and minus 14 ft/sec in Z; so we 
had 4 independent solutions all within 
1 ft/sec of each other. 
CDH was obviously to be done with the 
ascent propulsion system. We did an auto­
matic maneuver to the attitude. Once again 
the DAP proved to be a fine attitude con­
trol system. There was no excessive jet 
firings which was of some concern to me. 
I wasn't sure with the lighter weight 
-  
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 vehicle just how thege autopilots would 
perform t but they were very, very good. 
37. CDR burn and parameters: We maneu­
vered to the attitude and again checked 
the attitudes as I mentioned earlier. At 
minus 3.5 seconds, we got AUTO ullage. 
The burn started. It was just a big jolt 
-- a very short burn of 4 seconds. It was 
almost impossible to see whether or not it 
steered. It was a big jolt, a little 
noise, and a shutdown. The whole thing 
was over before we really had a chance to 
eValuate the steering. The noise wasn't 
enough to cause any concern. We could 
almost feel it more than we could hear it. 
It was certainly of no concern to the 
pilots as far as being able to communi­
cate with each other or to hear informa­
tion from the ground. I guess I should 
say that the dynamics were practically 
nonexistent in this short burn. We used 
a 4-jet ullage for the burn. 
The residuals at the end of the CDR burn 
were minus 2.4, plus 0.8, and plus 0.1. 
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and 502 read minus 1, plus 1, and O. 
MCDIVITT 	 38. Operation of PGNCS and AGS: I'd like 
to review the control systems again. I 
felt that the pulse modes, both PGNCS and 
AGS, were very good. modes. We used them 
predominantly through the orbit periods, 
the nonthrusting periods. The DAP opera­
tion was smooth with no overshoot. It 
appeared to be a very fine control sys­
tem, both for attitude holding, automatic 
maneuvers, and manually commanded RATE 
COMMAND. The AGS appeared to attitude-
hold properly, and I felt that the RATE 
COMMAND just had too much authority and 
could not be used without overcontrol. 
During our coasting phases between burns, 
I noticed no tendency of the LM to trim 
to any particular attitude, and there 
didn It appear to be any drag or any exter­
nal effects influencing our attitude. 
When we put it some place, it stayed there. 
I think that the rate needles in the LM 
certainly need improving. I think that 
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we could have saved a considerable amount 
of fuel if we had just known what our 
rates were. I doubt seriously if we ever 
get them to be comparable to the l-deg/ 
sec rate read-out that we have in the 
c~and module with its accurate gyros; 
but if we could, it would certainly be a 
worthwhile effort. 
38. Operation of RR, AGS, and PGNS for 
TPI: After the CSI maneuver, the P76 with 
the 1M DELTA-V's, and the time bias for 
" 
the burn time, P20 maneuvered the Gumdrop 
to what was supposed to have been a pre­
ferred tracking axis: There wa~ __no lig!lt 
visible in the sextant. This could have 
been due to several reasons, one of which 
could have been an improper P76. I checked 
the registers, and the P76 had been loaded 
properly. I called the 1M to check on the 
light. They no longer saw any flash off 
their quads; but we still could not be 
certain, so I left P20 running to maintain 
preferred tracking axis pointed at the 1M 
for the radar. Because CSI had been per­
-GeNFIDENTIAl 
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tracking period prior to CDH was in dark­
ness. I could, therefore, expect no oppor­
tunities to take any marks prior to CDH. 
A comparison of range and range rate at 
the horizontal crossing with the 1M was 
very good, indicating that the state vec­
tor was still being carried fairly well 
in the command module. I had about 
96.63 miles, and the 1M called 98 miles. 
I ran a number of checks through the sys­
tems, and everything seemed to be running 
well except the 1M light. I spent some 
time deciding what to do in case I could 
not see the 1M at daylight after the CDH 
burn. I guess the only solution would 
have been to pick up 2 more state vectors 
from the ground, which we had done in 
simulations; so I knew they were prepared 
to support that type of operation. I 
followed the normal preCDH procedures and 
targeted the CSM with the mirror image 
burn 1 minute after the 1M burn, adding 
the DELTA-V bias that we had calculated 
-  ./ 
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SCOTT 	 preflight. After the CDH burn I took the 
components that the 1M had burned and 
entered them into a P76 per normal pro­
cedure. 
McDIVITT 	 In the postCDH procedures, I checked the 
rendezvous radar to see what my range 
rate was. The range rate just postCDH 
was reading 107 ft/sec. As we went across 
the bottom of our track, approaching TPI, 
the range rate stayed at 107 for a long 
time and very gradually dropped off to 
about 105 shortly before TPI, which indi­
cated that we were almost perfectly coelip­
tic. We did the rendezvous radar lock-on. 
Once again, we were unable to do it visu­
ally, we had to do it with the AGC read­
ings that I mentioned earlier. They 
proved to be adequate, and I had great 
• 
confidence that ~e were indeed locked on 
the main lobe wnen we allowed the radar 
to start updating the computer state vec­
tor. We did our recycle at the right time 
and had a fairly long period of time 
across the bottom between CDH and TPI. 
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It gave us plenty of time to take marks 
and to update the AGS through the rendez­
vous radar, which we did at intervals. 
We had a pretty good feeling that the AGS 
had all the good information from the 
radar. As we came back in, I checked the 
AGC signal strength again, and at 52 miles, 
I read 2.39. On the way out at 45 miles, 
• 
I read 2.40; so I once again felt that 
the radar had not degraded because it was 
reading approximately the same at the same 
ranges. We were plotting our relative 
position on a polar plot beginning at 
about 45 miles and found that we were very 
close to the nominal line. We were get­
ting solutions from the CMF, who was able 
to see us again once we passed into the 
daylight. Also, we were getting solutions 
from the ground, and we had our own solu­
tions. We got the ground solutions well 
in advance of the TPI time. They called 
us back later and told us they weren't 
going to give us an updated one. The one 
we had was fine. All of the solutions 
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converged until they were practically on 
top of each other. I think this was the 
easiest decision of all to make 9 because 
there was practically no difference be­
tween any of-the solutions. 
32 • Operat ion of PGNCS and AGS for TPI: 
Looking back over the rendezvous, I 
think that the only item worthy of com­
ment at this point (rather than in the 
systems debriefing) is that the AGS per­
formance, as compared with the simula­
tions in the LMS, was a bit of a surprise 
in that the solutions to CSI, CDR, and 
TPI were not as definitive as one would 
be led to believe through the training. 
The 1MS tends to give a positive response 
to these programs or these computations; 
whereas" in actual flight, the AGS solu­
and the solution you get for a burn is 
highly dependent upon what you decide is 
the average of all those readings. In a 
burn where the solution is 40 ft/sec, the 
·~a1.excursions might go from 36 to 
43 ft/sec, depending upon when you look at 
the data. I think that this is something, 
­
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tors so that this behavior is expected. 
39. Targeting PGNCS and AGS for TPI: 
The time of the TPI burn in the three 
solutions that we ran, after four marks 
and just before the W-matrix reinitiali­
zation were as follows: we ended up with 
97:57:56 after the reinitialization, after 
10 more marks, we had 97:57:33; at 
16 marks, we had 97:57:41; and the final 
solution gave us 97:57:59. This compared 
with a nominal TPI time of 97:56:23, well 
within the limits that had been set pre­
flight. The final NOUN 81 components were 
plus 19.4, plus 0.04 and minus 9.7; or 
forward 21.7, right 0.5, and down 0.3. 
This compared with a chart solution of 
forward 20 and down 1, so the chart also 
came out very close to the PGNS solution. 
McDIVITT 	 Our final time out of the PGNS of 97:57:59 
compared very favorably with the CSM solu­
tion of 97:58:08, a difference of only 
9 seconds. The updating of the rendez­
vous radar into the AGS was physically.a 
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relatively easy task to do. I thought 
that it was slightly easier than it ap­
peared to be in the simulations; however, 
... 
the apparent effect of the updates in the 
real AGS did not appear to have the same 
power that was demonstrated with the radar 
updating in the LMS. The range and range 
rate did come in to what was displayed on 
the range and range rate tape; however, 
the AGS state vector began to degrade more 
repidly than what occurred in the LMS. 
The final solution out of the AGS, after 
2 series of radar inputs, was an elevation 
angle at TPI time of 23.46 degrees, a 
DELTA-Vat TPI of 20 ft/sec (which was al­
right), and a total TPI plus TPF of 49 ft/ 
sec. The DELTA-V, therefore, compared 
very well with the PGNS; however, the an­
gle disagreed by 4 degrees at that TPI 
time. In support of the TPI burn, the 

AGS was loaded with external DELTA-V in­

puts; but 404, 405, and 406 were also run 

to O. Because we by.rned along the Z-axis, 

rather than called the 500, 501, and 502 
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displays, 472 was used to support theMcDIVITT 
PGNS burn. 
40. Preparation for TPI and TPI burn 
performance: TPI was to be an RCS maneu­
ver. We had procedures for both plus X 
and plus Z thrusting. Plus X thrusting 
procedures would be used if we were run­
ning low on fuel. We had plenty of fuel, 
so I elected to do the thrusting in a 
plus-Z direction, which meant that we did 
not do an automatic maneuver. We were 
already at the burn attitude, so we just 
went to ATTITUDE HOLD -- PGNS ATTITUDE 
HOLD, VERB 77. I maneuvered so as to 
center the radar needles to be in the 
proper attitude. As we were doing this, 
we had the only anomaly that I noticed 
on the rendezvous radar all day long. We 
were at the right attitude. I hadn't 
changed it for quite some time. I was 
watching the AGC signal strength when, 
all of a sudden, it started dropping. 
It dropped from about 2.6 down to 1.6. 
My first impression was that the command 
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McDIVITT module was maneuvering, and we were not 
going to have the kind of transponder 
performance that we wanted. Then, it 
dawned on me that he wasn't maneuvering 
that much, because he was going to be 
~ointing the X-axis at us; and he prob­
ably had been pointing fairly close to 
that anyway. We stayed in the TPI atti­
tude for some time. The rendezvous radar 
signal strength began to increase again 
slowly. It gradually went back up to 
about 2.5 or 2.6, to whatever it had been 
prior to this incident. I have no ex­
planation for this whatsoever. We were 
not maneuvering, and I doubt seriously 
that the command module was maneuvering 
through any gross attitude at this time. 
This phenomena began sometime between 
about 6 or 7 minutes prior to TPI, it 
dropped down to a low of 1.6 around 4 or 
5 minutes prior to TPI, then it climbed 
back up slowly after that. In some dis­
cussions we've Just had, we discovered 
that the command module was not maneuver­
·CONFIDENTIAb­ .# 
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ing until after TPI minus 5, so I doubt 
seriously that this had any effect. As 
I m~ntioned, the burn was performed in 
PGNS ATTITUDE HOLD, VERB 77. We waited 
until we got the flashing 1685 and then 
burned the components to 0 without any 
problem. It is interesting that when 
burning in the three axes, as we did, 
that burning up and down with respect to 
the man does not affect them or did not 
affect me. Burning fore and aft did not 
affect me, or my positioning within the 
spacecraft. But when burning left and 
right, I had a sensation of a moving 
within the spacecraft. I didn't feel as 
firmly fixed in the left-right position 
as I did in the other two. It was a 
nominal ReS burn. 
42. PostTPI systems status: Because we 
had done the TPI burn in the plus Z direc­
tion, we did not have to search for and 
find the target and then lock the radar 
on it because it remained locked on 
throughout this time. We did have to 
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call P20, reinitialize the W-matrix, and 
start through. We got our radar data for 
our charts at 5 and 8 minutes. We hit 
the final COMP at 7 minutes to perform 
a maneuver at 10 minutes. All went ex­
~ctly as ~lanned. We did the thrusting 
at 10 minutes, keeping the Z-axis pointed 
at the command module; it was a little 
aft. We then reinitialized the W-matrix, 
called P35 the way we wanted, and copied 
the data for the charts at 17 and 20 min­
utes as normally planned. We did the 
proceed for the final computation at 
19 minutes for a 22-minute burn. We 
burned a little forward at this time. We 
left the radar locked on, got in a little 
bit closer, went to POO, called VERB 62, 
stopped updating the state vector with 
,. 
the radar, cross referenced the tape 
meters with the VERB 62, rendezvous radar 
self-test data, and came on in using that. 
In the meantime, I called program 47 to 
ge1t,,the thrusting information into the 
state vector. 
 
4.5.2 1M Rendezvous 
SCHWEICKART 
4-241
€ONFIDENTIAl 
44. RCS midcourse corrections: The 
PGNS solutions to the first midcourse 
correction were as follows: NOUN 81 was 
minus 1.0, minus 0.3, and plus 0.9 which 
amounted to an aft 1.4, left 0.4, and 
up 0.1. The chart solution there came 
out aft 6, and a zero up/down, so we 
were 4-1/2 ft/sec different from the 
chart. On the second midcourse, NOUN 81 
was plus 0.2, minus 0.9, and minus 1.8 
which converted to a forward 1.8, left 0.9, 
and the chart came up with a forward 1 ft/ 
sec. Following the second midcourse, the 
cameras were set up again in the 1M to re­
cord the final braking and station keep­
ing. The VERB 62 self test of the radar 
was called, and displays agreed very well 
with the tape all the way in. Following 
the final braking and station keeping and 
return to POO, VERB 83 was called and 
agreed very well with the actual condi­
tions. I believe that the velocity was 
less than 5 ft/sec, and it was sometime 
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after going into station keeping mode 
that we called it. I believe that the 
range was out to a mile or 2 miles at 
that point. 
45. Rendezvous: I also would like to 
comment on the restraint system in the 
LM. I had the feeling that the restraint 
system was trying to pull me into the 
forward left-hand corner of the LM, and 
because of this, I spent most of my time 
leaning to my right and to the rear. 
sort of felt that when we were in a level 
attitude, the front left corner of the 
LM was pitched down approximately 30 de­
grees. I felt as if I were standing on 
~---'''''''''-''--.., 
a hill the whole time. I believe that 
the restraint system is optimized to 
provide a restraint for looking through 
the window during the landing phase. Ob­
viously, it can't be optimized for land­
ing and for orbit operations at the same 
time, It wasn't impossible to work with 
it. It's just a comment on what it tends 
to do to a crewman. 
CONFIDENYt/\L­
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SCHWEICKART 	 The operation of the right-hand side of 
the vehicle, with respect to charts and 
graphs and handling of those during the 
rendezvous was that operation with the 
gloves and the helmet on was a difficult 
thing at best. I found that I could not 
plot points with any degree of accuracy on 
the polar plot or on any of the mid-
course charts without removing a glove. 
I ran most of the flight, with the ex­
ception of the burns, 	with both gloves 
off. However, I did 	leave the helmet 
on rather than continually put it on 
and remove it for the 	burns. The re­
straint system affected me the way it 
affected Jim. It did 	tend to pull me 
forward and to the right-hand side of 
the cockpit. I did not feel this was 
overly objectionable. 	but a reduction 
of the forces on the 	restraint system 
would seem to me to be highly desir­
able. For a large part of my opera­
tion on the right side, I tended to 
lean back against the Z27 bulkhead and 
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then forward so that I could operate 
on the data table. The restraint system 
did not interfere with this maneuver to 
any large extent. One other item that I 
think is worthy of mention here, as well 
as in the discussion of systems, is that 
the window heaters on the LM were consid­
erably overdesigned to the point that one 
became uncomfortable if he got his helmet 
or head too close to the window. The heat 
radiating off the windows was very strong. 
On the rendezvous~y, we requested f 
and received from MSFN approval to open 
the heater circuit breakers to keep this 
heat source from bothering us. I have a 
feeling that the temperature of the win­
dows might have affected the item that Jim 
mentioned earlier on the window shades 
where they did not tend to roll up in the 
small curl that they exhibited prior to 
flight when they were taken off the win­
dows. There is no question that the heat 
definitely_..arf-fe:cted the window shades. 
They tended to be wrinkled a bit, and at 
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some points during the flight~ with the 
helmets off~ you could actually smell the 
window shades because of the high temper­
ature that they reached when they were 
rolled up with the window heaters on. Dur­
ing the rendezvous~ there were several 
times when~ to see~ work with~ and handle 
the data properly~ I had to roll up the 
window shade on the right-hand side to 
keep the sun and the very bright earth 
from interfering. 
4T. Formation flying; attitude control: 
When the command module broke out into 
the sunlight~ it appeared as a little 
white silver blob and then sort of formed 
a crescent The sun was shining 
-------~--~--~---
from my right~ and I could see the right 
side of the spacecraft first. As I got 
in closer~ the sort of crescent became 
larger and larger until I could see the 
command module very well at approximately 
1500 feet. We had no trouble stopping. 
We just coasted right up in front and 
stopped at about 25 or 30 feet; and at the 
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McDIVITT time, we had something like 60 percent 
fuel remaining. 
48. Braking: We arrived at 6000 feet 
at just about 30 ft/sec, and this was 
our first braking gate. No braking was 
. needed. We coasted right on through. 
At 3000 	feet, we braked to 20 ft/sec, 
and I felt that it took just a little 
bit longer to take out the Delta-V in 
actual practice than it did in the sim­
ulator. We then braked to 10 ft/sec at 
1500 feet and 5 ft/sec at 500 feet. 
51. Docking: While we have demonstrated 
that you can dock with the LM as the ac­
tive vehicle, which was one of the DTO's 
that we were supposed to accomplish in 
this particular mission, I personally 
recommend that all the dockings be per­
formed command module active because of 
the much better visibility and the much 
better target that the command module 
has and because of the sort of standard 
configuration where you are thrusting in 
. the direction in which you are looking and 
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transformation before you hit the con­
trol handle everytime • I think that we 
have demonstrated a backup system here, 
and I personally feel that in the future 
all the dockings ought to be command mod­
ule active and the 1M used only as a last 
ditch kind of thing. 	 In the lunar orbit 
mode that we were supposed to be demon­
strating, I think. that when the command 
module has accomplished the docking, has 
the probe inside the 	drogue, and there 
has to be some thrusting, he can call 
thrust and have the LM do the thrus t ma­
neuvering and let that be its part of 
the docking maneuver. 
SCHWEICKART 	 53. Tunnel operations: After the dock­
ing, the tunnel was cleared out in a nomi­
nal manner. After the couch was reinstalled 
and on first inspection of the probe, the 
extend latch indicator was out, which in­
dicated that the extend latch had not (the 
hook had not) completely hooked onto the 
roller on the probe piston. It required 
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about four strokes of the preload handle 
to get the extend latch to engage com­
pletely. In removing the drogue, there 
were no additional marks apparent caused 
by the docking. The docking ring angle 
was minus 0.2 degree. All the latches had 
mated properly and were completely engaged. 
55. LM closeout and APS interconnect: In 
preparation for the transfer, all the LM 
data were transferred into the ISA. The 
PLSS LiOH cartridge was transferred into 
its container and then into the command 
module. The OPS t S were stowed on the 
floor as planned. The probe and drogue 
were stowed on the right-hand side, also 
as planned. The PLSS was stowed ~gainst 
the commander's side of the cockpit. How­
ever, rather than lying at an angle against 
the side wall, it was laying flat on the 
floor on the left-hand side to make room 
for a bag of garbage which was transferred 
to the temporary stowage bag from the com­
mand module. This was placed directly on 
top of the PLSS on the left-hand side. The 
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two helmet bags were stowed as far forward 
as possible, one to the left and one to the 
right of the OPS pallet. All of the planned 
transfer items were transferred from the LM 
to the CSM as planned. In the final 1M 
switch closeout for jettison, another 
change was made to the effect that the 
system A RCS was left on the line. Nor­
mally, as opposed to running the intercon­
nect on system A, the interconnect with the 
ascent fuel was run only on system B. The 
maneuver to the final attitude for ejection 
was done in the 1M again by using the ACA 
for yaw control and the TTCA for pitch 
and roll. This proved to be no particu­
lar problem as far as maneuvering was con­
cerned. When we arrived at the LM attitude 
for the burn, the CSM was informed and took 
over attitude holding at that point in nar­
row deadband. The LGC was configured to 
wide deadband ATTITUDE HOLD. At this time, 
the AGS was updated, aligned, and put into 
configuration to support the APS burn to 
completion. During the docked alignment, 
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the second star that was selected was oc­
cluded by the earth before we were able 
to take marks on it, and a third star had 
to be selected mark on. Unfortunately, 
the way the alignment program is set up, 
there was no way to get the mode 2 error 
needles for this star. As a result, there 
was no assistance for the--- maneuvering 
other than calling for pitch up/down or 
yaw left/right by the commander who was 
looking through the AOT. This did make 
attitude control more difficult during 
that alignment. After the final switch 
closeout, the upper hatch was closed on 
the 1M, and I reentered the command mod­
ule in preparation for the LM jettison. 
56. Preparation for LM jettison and 1M 
Jettison: In preparation for the AGS 
burn to depletion, we received from the 
ground a P30 update which was inserted. 
Prior to pressing on with the checklist, 
we did a docked alignment, active from the 
1M side. For this alignment, we used LM 
attitude control for yaw. For pitch and 
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roll control, we used the horizontal 
thrusters with the TTCA to keep from fir­
ing the vertical thrusters toward the CSM. 
This made the rates of the vehicle during 
alignment a bit higher than was experi­
enced using pulse mode with the LM alone. 
However, the star angle difference came 
out to be all zeros again, and the torqu­
ing angles hopefully are recorded on a 
tape somewhere. I don't happen to have 
them here now, but as I recall they are 
all quite low. At no time during the 
alignments that were performed in the LM 
did the radar antenna tend to drift into 
the field of view. A special procedure 
was sent up from the ground to investigate 
theAGS warning light which was on all 
through the rendezvous day. That proce­
dure was executed but the light came on 
again during activation of the LM AGS. 
It was tentatively concluded that the 
problem was a caution and warning problem 
as opposed to an AGS problem. 
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4.6.2 Preparation for SPS Burn 6 
SCOTT 	 For burn 6, we loaded the DAP for the 
ullage, probably about 10 minutes before 
the burn, and proceeded into the burn. 
At 18 seconds prior to initiation of 
ullage, we got no thrust. 
We did not perform the burn at that time 
because of the lack of ullage but did 
perform it orr-t-b:e-next revolution after 
rechecking and reloading the DAP. 
We don't understand exactly what happened, 
but the numbers were loaded into R2 to 
enable all four quads, and for some 
reason it just didn't get in. We had 
two other occasions in which we suspected 
some anomaly with entries into the DAP 
or into the DSKY for configuration. One 
occasion was on the last night when we 
powered the DAP down by inserting a zero 
in the first digit of register 1 of NOUN 
46 for no DAP, and then after the DAP 
load of VERB 46 to enable no DAP. Appar­
ently, VERB 46 which was confirmed by all 
three of us was not accepted by the DAP, 
eel>~FIDENTIAL 
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and the DAP continued to run. We were 
notified by the ground that it was on 
and did another VERB 46 which did, in 
fact, put it to sleep. 
SPS Burn 	6 (Retrograde) 
It was a minimlUIl impulse burn of 1.4­
second and 38.8 ft/sec which was very 
close to the minimum impulse type burn 
that you would expect during a CSM ren­
dezvous. It was a good solid boot in 
the back, and it was off about as fast 
as it came on. The residuals were rel­
atively small -- 1.2 in X, minus 0.3 in 
Y, and minus 0.3 in Z. DELTA-V was in 
c 
minus 13.0. as minus 13.0. 
The alignment on day nlUIlber 6 was nominal, 
and we prepared for burn nlUIlber 6 which' 
was a minimum impulse burn. At the time, 
we were attempting to save propellant by 
utilizing 	various configurations of the 
SCS and the DAP. In the process, it was 
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SCOTT necessary to reload quads and the DAP 
for ATTITUDE HOLD in maneuvering and dif­
ferent quad configurations for ullage. 
4.6.6 High Gain Antenna Tracking 
SCOTT 	 .Another~~ent anomaly occured after the 
conclusion of the tracking of the ascent 
stage in the last day. The P20 that was 
used to track the ascent stage was turned 
off with VERB 56, which should have 
stopped the Wmatrix. Approximately 3 
hours later, we got a master alarm on the 
computer which turned out to be a W matrix 
overflow and indicated that Wmatrix had 
been running for the whole time or since 
we had concluded the tracking. Another 
VERB 56 turned the Wmatrix off, and we 
had no further problem with it that night. 
4.6.6 High Gain Antenna Tracking 
SCHWEICKART 	 The CSM high gain antenna test was run 
at approximately 193 hours into the 
mission and was modified quite extensively 
from what we had in the procedures book. 
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We were to establish a PTC mode of attitude 
control prior to coming up on Carnarvon 
AOS; the high gain antenna was to be 
switched on, manually slewed to a pitch 
of minus 45 and a yaw of plus 90, and 
then placed in the reacquire mode. The 
behavior of the antenna was to be ob­
served at Carnarvon LOS and again at 
Hawaii AOS and LOS. We were supposed 
to observe the signal strength and, more 
particularly, the behavior of the antenna 
as regards the reacquisition mode. " We 
got started late in setting up the PTC, 
and as a result, we were well into the 
Carnarvon pass by the time we had every­
thing configured. This apparently did 
not effect the test in any way as there 
was no observation to be made at Carnarvon 
AOS. When we first locked on at Carnarvon 
after having things set up, the antenna 
slewed from the REACQ angles to a yaw of 
approximately 360 and a pitch of minus 60. 
As we passed over Carnarvon and proceeded 
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 with the barbecue mode, those angles 
changed very gradually from 360 to 270 in 
yaw and from minus 60 to plus 30 in pitch 
with essentially constant signal strength 
well up on the upper end of the meter. 
At Carnarvon LOS, the yaw angle jumped 
from 270 to 235 and the pitch angle from 
plus 30 to plus 45. This happened just 
after the S-band became noisy and the 
signal strength dropped down near zero. 
'l'here appeared to be no tendency for the 
antenna to return to the REACQ angles 
that had been set in. After arriving 
at these angles of 235 and plus 45, the 
antenna stayed there with no drift 
whatever until we began to pick up Hawaii. 
On the first sign of signal strength at 
Hawaii, the antenna appeared to slew right 
back to the REACQ angles. However, at 
just about the time that it arrived at 
the REACQ angles, there w~s enough signal 
"" 
strength, and it went/i'i~ht past the 
REACQ angles and locked on to Hawaii. 
--CONFIDENTIAt 
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approximately 1 minute and seconds 
prior to the predicted Hawaii LOS, at 
which time it broke lock on Hawaii and 
slewed immediately to the REACQ angles. 
Our assumption at the time was that the 
reason we broke lock 1 minute and 15 sec­
onds early was because the PTC had taken 
us into such an attitude that the space­
craft was between Hawaii and the high 
gain antenna. I am sure that this can 
be verified by the downlink data. In 
summary, it appeared to us as though 
the antenna worked properly at Hawaii LOS 
but not at Carnarvon. 
4.6.8 Necessity of Additional IMU Alignments 
SCOTT 	 The normal alignments, and P52, were 
performed by us the standard checklist. 
P51 took an average of approximately 10 
minutes, depending on the availability 
of stars. Once stars were available, 
it took little time to identify two stars 
to make the P51. P52 took approximately 
CONFIDE~<JTIAI:-
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SCOTT 3 to 4 minutes, again depending on the 
availability of stars. If the spacecraft 
was in a position where stars were avail­
able, it took 3., to 4 minutes. Our stand~ 
-...... , .......... 

ard technique to verlfy._the alignment
" 
was to proceed on the fine align check 
and either allow auto optics to select 
a third star or manually to insert a 
third star and have auto optics drive to 
confirm that the third star was, in fact, 
selected properly. Prior to each major 
maneuver, we performed an attitude check 
relative to the stars by calli~g VERB 16, 
NOUN , positioning the optics manually 
on the PAD star that had been passed 
from the ground, and comparing shaft and 
trunnion with the PAD values. Most of 
the time, these values were within 
2 to 3 degrees. We performed a P52 by 
using the celestial body vector option 
on Jupiter, and auto optics performed as 
advertised once we got the proper vectors 
loaded into the NOUN 88 value. The tables 
that we carried onboard required inter-
C:ONFIDENTIAb 
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SCOTT 	 polation to get the proper one-half unit 
vectors to load NOUN 88. 
It was noted during the process of taking 
marks that in using auto optics, NOUN 88 
must be loaded prior to the auto optics 
driving on the mark. Subsequent to the 
mark, the NOUN 88 values have been writ­
ten over, are no longer available, and 
have to be reloaded. A recommendation 
is that the subsequent programs retain 
the NOUN 88 preload prior to the auto 
optics in drive. 
In marking on the planet, which in this 
case was Jupiter, it was noted that 
Jupiter filled the inside of the center 
of the reticle, which made it slightly 
more difficult to position the planet in 
the exact center. The star-angle differ­
ence between Jupiter and a star was 0.04. 
Normally, the star-angle differences had 
been working out to 0.01 or less. This 
could be because of the interpolation of 
the unit vectors or the lack of accuracy 
toNFIDENTIAl 
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reticle. 
The values for the half-unit vectors used 
for Jupiter were minus 0.49425, minus 
0.02730, and plus 0.00310. The GET was 
144:16:43. 
At approximately 187 hours, we performed 
a P53 and P54 by using the COAS to align 
the platform. The calibration of the 
COAS was from the rendevzous day, and 
the COAS had been removed from the left 
window several times. When the COAS was 
in the right window, it didn't appear 
to be aligned properly. P53 was per­
formed according to the checklist by 
using the values 359.74 and 57.167 for 
the COAS calibration. With the use of 
stars number 11 and number 12, the star-
angle difference was 0.07. The technique 
was to position the star relatively close 
to the center of the COAS reticle and 
allow it to drift tarough while the right 
hand was placed on the inner button. The 
inner button was pressed when the star . 
-eef>~FIDENTIAl 
4-261CO~~FIDENtIAl 
SCOTT 	 was in the center of the reticle, which 
was a relatively easy task. P54 was per­
formed according to the checklist using 
stars number 11 and 15. The star-angle 
difference was 0:03; and the gyro torqu­
ing angles were minus 0.080, minus 0.13, 
and plus 0.183. To evaluate the accuracy 
of the alignment, the platform was aligned 
by using P52 with the sextant. The star­
angle difference there was 0.01; and the 
gyro torquing angles were plus 0.013, plus 
0.060, and minus 0.084, which indicated 
that the COAS had done a good job in 
aligning the platform. This occurred 
about 4-1/2 minutes after the COAS/P54. 
A quick check was made to determine the 
drift rates with a sextant alignment; the 
star-angle difference 	of 0.01 produced 
torquing angles of plus 0.003, minus 
0.025, and plus 0.002 	after 5 minutes. 
To compare the telescope capabilities, 
we performed an alignment with the tel­
escope which was concluded about 6 min­
-  
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SCOTT utes later and which produced a star-angle 
difference of 0.05. This was primarily 
because the sun was coming up and the 
second star was Menkent which faded at 
about the time the mark was made. It 
was difficult to place Menkent in the 
center of ~he telescope, which wasn't 
really a fair trial of'~telescope; 
but the gyro torquing angles were minus 
0.070, plus 0.169, and minus 0.133. I 
performed another telescope alignment 
approximately 1 hour later after doing 
a P52 of the sextant and got a star-angle 
difference of 0.02 and gyro torquing 
angles of 0.000, minus 0.059, and minus 
0.003. This was at 188:39:00, which indi­
cates that the telescope does have a good 
capability for accurate alignments (prob­
·---af>.1¥_better than the COAS as indicated by 
~- .....~ 
the gyro torquing angles). This second 
telescope alignment was performed after 
torquing the platform from a sextant 
alignment to ensure that we had a good 
platform right at the beginning. A back­
-  
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IMU powered up to evaluate the procedures 
and capability of utilizing the telescope 
in a fixed position to align the GDC; this 
occurred at 197:45:00. The South Star set 
was used, and the ground had provided some 
IMU angles for comparison after the com­
pletion of the GDC alignment and maneuvered 
to the 180/180/0 attitude. The alignment 
angles put into the attitude set dials 
prior to the GDC align were 246, 315, and 
051. The spacecraft was aligned on the 
stars Atria and Acrux, the GDC aligned 
button was pushed, and then the spacecraft 
was maneuvered to 180/180/0. The follow­
ing values were read out of VERB 6 NOUN 
20 on the DSKY to get an IMU comparison: 
180.36, 236.10, and 359.78. Had the 
GDC align been perfect, these values 
should have been 180.4, 237.5, and 000.5, 
which indicated that the GDC alignment 
was very close. It might be noted that 
the IMU and the GDC were not aligned at 
this point since we were utilizing a 
r EONFIDENTIAl 
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previously defined REFSMMAT in the lMU. 
'rhe technique used to perform this align­
ment was somewhat different from the 
.'
technique described in the checklist 
primarily because the checklist technique 
.does not utilize the reticle in the 
telescope as it was designed for backup 
alignments. The checklist calls for a 
telescope shaft of 180, trunnion of 7.5, 
and the utilization of the 50-degree mark 
on the telescope reticle. The telescope 
reticle has a point at zero degrees which 
is designed to enable the user to place 
a star in the center of a small cross at 
that point. At the 50-degree point on 
the reticle, there is IH) such mark and no 
indicator to provide a vertical alignment 
along the vertical reticle line. To use 
• 
the small cross at the zero-degree point, 
it is necesc1ary to leave the telescope shaft 
at zero and move the trunnion to minus 7.5 
or 82.5 on a DSKY read-out. This not 
only takes less time in movement of the 
CONFIDE~TIAL 
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telescope reticle but also provides a 
better point on the reticle to align a 
star to. Because of the drift in the 
shaft and trunnion, it was necessary to 
have another crewmember maintain the 
telescope shaft and trunnion at the 
proper values during the maneuvering of 
the spacecraft in GDC align. 
To point the s065 cameras directly vertical 
with an orbit rate drive in the spacecraft, 
we utilized the pitch orbit rate maneuver 
technique as described in the checklist. 
The pads that we had set up preflight did 
not provide us with the numbers necessary 
to load into the CMC for the ORB rate 
drive. Other than that, the pad was ade­
quate. Again, the numbers on the charts 
that we carried on board had to be inter­
polated for the rate drives that we exper­
ienced in each particular orbit. The load­
ing of the computer went according to the 
checklist with no problems, and it was 
noted that the ORB rate drive would start 
.ooNFIDENTIA~ 
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SCOTT 	 from 5 to 20 seconds after the ENTER button 
was pressed to initiate the drive because 
of the position of the spacecraft within 
the deadband at the time. The 	drive was 
smooth and very few jet firings were ob­
served. The rates could be observed on 	 • 
the pitch needle and they were 	exactly 
the same as or, as nearly as we could de­
termine, comparable to the values that 
were preset into the DAP. 
4.6.9 	 Landmark Tracking 
We performed landmark tracking a number 
of times. Overall, it proved to be 
successful; however, it was significantly 
more difficult in earth orbit than it will 
be in lunar orbit, primarly because of the 
rates at which the spacecraft goes across 
the ground. Our general technique was 
the yaw roll procedure with P22 and several 
alterations to P22 to enable it to per­
form in earth orbit. The first comment 
might be made on the landmark tracking 
update form. We found that, in addition 
-  
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to the time at which this landmark would 
come over the horizon, we needed the time 
of closest approach to enable the crewmen 
flying the spacecraft to position the 
spacecraft properly for the pass over the 
site. 
We used the standard in-plane alignment for 
all the landmark tracking, even though the 
spacecraft ended up being pointed per­
pendicular to the plane of the orbit. 
After we received the pad messages, we 
determined whether the landmarks were 
going to be to the left of the track or 
the right of the track. I'll discuss 
only one direction. If the landmark were 
going to be to the left of the track, I 
would align one of the balls with the 
orbit rate torquing on it, yaw the space­
craft around to the left, and position 
the X-axis so that I was just outside of 
the red circle on the FDAI which indicated 
gimbal lock. Then I would bank the space­
craft so that the telescope would be 
-EONRDENTIAl-­
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McDIVITT looking in the direction in which the 
spacecraft was actually traveling. It took 
oonstant looking after the spacecraft 
because the spacecraft tended to trim 
back into the plane of the orbit. There­
fore, after I had maneuvered around into 
a position where I was pitched down 
approximately 20 degrees, I would be 
banked to the left approximately 60 degrees. 
I would hold the spacecraft in this at­
titude until Dave said that the optics 
had tracked up to the horizon and then 
started tracking down on the part of the 
land mass that he could actually see. 
As Dave had mentioned earlier, the PAD 
was changed from the initial PAD times, 
when we received only the time when the 
i 
landmark would appear on the hori zon, to 
\ 
include the time when it would be directly 
underneath us or when we would have our 
point of closest approach. I set the 
digital event time up so that it counted 
down to this moment of closest approach 
and then called the times to Dave and 
CO~~FIDENTIAt 
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McDIVITT tried to establish a slow roll rate so 
that, when we arrived at the time of 
closest approach, the spacecraft would be 
essentially wing's level pointed directly 
out of plane, to the left and pitched 
down approximately 20 degrees. As the 
target passed underneath us, I would 
continue to roll around so that we could 
track it out the rear. The roll rate 
had to change as the target approached 
us when it was out near the horizon. It 
was very low, and as it passed underneath 
us, it required about 0.6 deg/sec if we had 
the time of closest approach correct and 
had maneuvered properly. The time of 
closest approach was very critical, and 
if we were off by approximately 30 seconds, 
so that I still had the spacecraft rolled 
to the left waiting for the time of closest 
approach and the target actually passed 
underneath us, it required a very high 
rate (almost more than 1 deg/sec) to 
keep the optics off the stops. It took 
a little bit of coordination between the 
-EONFIDENTIAt \ 
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McDIVITT man in the optics and the man guiding 
the spacecraft to make sure that the roll 
rates were such that the optics drive 
modes did not have to be continuallY 

changed. It was possible to make two 

landmarks, and I think we could have made 

three landmarks across the dayside pass. 

It required approximately 10 minutes to 

do one landmark tracking -- approximately 

7 minutes prior to the time of the land­

mark and approximately 3 minutes after the 

point of closest approach to get set up 

for the next one. I did all of these 

landmark trackings with only six jets 

operating, two for pitch, two for yaw, 

and two for roll. Even though I had only 
two for roll, I still had plenty of roll 

control. I do believe that some of the 

attitude excursions that occurred in pitch 

and yaw were the r~ult of ~iring only 

one jet in roll, because as the c.g. moved 

back and forth, we were contributing some 

pitch or yaw by firing the roll thrusters. 

C0NFIDENTIAt 
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McDIVITT 	 I did not have any trouble at all estab­
lishing the roll rates and maintaining
, 
the ones that I wanted with only one 
thruster firing in each direction. I 
used minimum impulse throughout the entire 
time. In placing the spacecraft out of 
plane, it was necessary for us to pitch 
down rather than pitch up because some 
of the landmarks were fairly close to 
track; but we did pick up some landmarks 
as far out as 78 miles, I believe. We 
were still able to handle landmarks 
directly underneath us and out to a range 
of approximately 80 miles by pitching the 
spacecraft down 20 degrees. We never seem­
ed to have any problem with the landmarks 
being too far out. I think that if they 
go out at distances greater than that, it 
may be necessary to pitch up above the 
gimbal-lock point rather than down below 
it. 
SCOTT 	 The program flow worked as advertised 
with two exceptions. In one exception, 
EONFIDENTIAl 
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SCOTT 	 we found that we had a 121 alarm which 
indicated that the roll rate was too high 
in that the ICDU's were allowed only 
0.6 deg/sec. We disabled that by going 
into erasable and found that the state 
vector was not being updated properly 
because of the lack of a proper W-matrix, 
since the programs had not been set up 
to do the landmark tracking preflight. 
Therefore, by going into erasable with the 
W-matrix load, we were able to provide 
ourselves with the proper W-matrix to 
update based on landmark tracking. The 
P22 AUTO optics worked very well; however, 
it never seemed to point the optics closer 
than approximately 3~ miles of the landmark. 
Tracking was relativ~y easy when the space­
craft roll rate was proper. The resolve 
medium control mode was used, and the 
sextant was used after acquisition with 
the telescope. The desirability of having 
at least 15 seconds between marks was 
difficult to achieve because of the short 
duration of the pass where marks could 
CGNFIDENTIAl­
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SCOTT be made with a sextant. Normally, there 
was only 45 seconds to a minute during 
which the landmark was properly identified 
and marks could be made. Therefore, to 
get five marks on a known landmark, the 
time duration between marks will probably 
have to be shorter. The maps seemed to 
work well, except for earth orbit where 
the high rates and rapid approach to the 
target become a significant factor. It 
is apparent that we need an acquisition 
or run-on map of a larger ground coverage 
to enable us to identify points prior to 
reaching the landmark. 
Another major problem throughout the 
landmark exercises was the amount of 
cloud cover that we had this time of the 
year. Not only was it difficult to 
identify the landmark, but sometimes we 
just couldn't find it at all. If the day 
had been clear, the probability of identi­
fying the landmark earlier and providing 
a longer pass would have been much higher; 
4-274 CONFIDENTIAt 
SCOTT --a;nd-I am sure-that the tracking would have 
worked much better. On the first few 
landmark-tracking exercises, we still had 
( 
the telescope problem; and after switching 
out of AUTO optics, the telescope hung up 
and the manual tracking with the telescope 
was impossible, although the sextant was 
still available and worked all right. 
However, it was difficult to acquire the 
target with the small sextant field of 
view. The final procedure that the ground 
came up with for evaluating the state 
vector updates seemed to work rather well; 
and it might be considered for future use 
in evaluating landmark tracking. The 
procedure was to update a good state 
vector in the 1M state vector storage, 
to use the old degraded state vector in 
the command module storage and update 
that, and then compare the two with the 
VERB 83. There were eight separate 
landmark exercises during the flight with 
- --"-­
a different target for each. 
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SCOTT 	 SPS 7 was another nominal type burn. It 
was 25 seconds long~ which was consider­
ably longer than the OT. It was a good, 
smooth burn with constant acceleration 
and no chugs and with residuals of minus 
1.3, plus 1.0, and minus 0.2. DELTA-V 
c 
was minus 17.5. During the period for 
SPS 6 and 7, we had no fUrther difficulty 
with the optics. All the alignments were r 
nominal. 
One comment which might be made relative 
to both SPS 6 and 7 is that everything 
should be securely tied down in the space­
craft prior to a burn of this accelera­
tion. The burn feels like a much higher 
level than Ig because of the previous 
zero g state. Also, it is significantly 
greater than the docked maneuvers in 
which the masses are much greater. At. 
this time, the vehicle weighed about 
27 000 pounds. 
-  
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4.6.16 Additional Exp~Fiments or DTO's 
8CHWEICKART The 8065 experiment worked very well. The 
mounting of the Hasselblads was precise 
and easy to perform. The electric Hassel­
( 
blads worked in sequence as advertised. 
The only anomaly incurred throughout the 
8065 procedures was that, on the first run, 
the platform alignment was retrograde be­
cause of the previous burn and we had the 
complement of the values loaded in the DAP 
for the ORB rate drive which started driv­
ing the wrong way. However, this was cor­
rected on subsequent passes. The exact 
times of each picture are recorded in the 
Procedures Book under 8065. 
4.6.16 Additional Experiments or DTO'8 
McDIVITT The ground sent us a set of gimbal angles 
to fly to at the time of appearance of the 
Pegasus satellite. The two times that we 
did this, we were able to see the other 
satellite go by right on time. Both times 
we used the diastemitor in the left-hand 
window because it provided an 8-power 
magnification. The field of view is only 
'  
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about 2 degrees; in each case, the target 
went right through the 2-degree circle on 
the diastemitor, and we were able to ident­
ify it without any problem at all. It was 
also visible through the right-hand window 
with the naked eye on both of these occa­
sions. I think that the really significant 
thing is that in each case the target was 
exactly where it was supposed to be and 
was going in the direction it was supposed 
to be at exactly the time it was supposed 
to be there. It gave you a really warm 
feeling that everybody knew where every­
body was. 
At 222 hours, we had the opportunity to 
track the ascent stage with the sextant 
based on a state vector update from the 
ground. At this time, the ascent stage 
was in an orbit 3742 by 128. The ground 
passed in an initial roll angle for the 
spacecraft, and P20 was utilized with an 
automatic maneuver according to the check­
list to position the spacecraft in pitch 
~CONFIDENTIAt 
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SCHWEICKART and yaw for initial acquisition. The 
W-matrix as utilized during the rendezvous 
was used. The initial range and time passed 
by the ground for acquisition was approxi­
mately 1000 miles at 222:35:30. The closest 
approach was estimated to be 652 miles at 
an R dot of 32 ft/sec. The platform was 
aligned at 222:19:30, and the spacecraft 
was maneuvered and AUTO optics was initiated 
shortly thereafter. The first sighting 
occurred at 222:25:55, approximately 10 
minutes prior to 1000-nautical-mile range. 
We have not received the data yet as to 
how far that was. It was a very small 
illuminated dot which appeared occasionally 
from about half the distance out on the 
right-hand line of the sextant reticle. 
This first sighting was verified by both 
the CMF and the CDR. The image did not
-_.-­
"'--.. ~sible in the sextant long enough
-. 
to initiate a series of marks until 
222:39:40. At this time, it became clearly 
visible as a point source of light. Marks 
were made for 6 minutes at I-minute inter-
EOI'~FIDE~~TIAL 
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vals (a total of 6 marks); and at 222:45:40, 
the target disappeared as it went below 
the horizon. It might be mentioned 
that the sextant does have two lines of 
sight, and we look through both of them 
simultaneously. This caused the double 
image of clouds, although there was only 
a single image of the target. The target 
appeared periodically for several seconds 
until 222:51:43, which was the last visual 
sighting. However, during this period, 
it was not visible long enough to switch 
to a manual drive and to take an accurate 
mark. The AUTO optics tracked very well 
throughout the exercise. The initial 
pointing was to within 0.2 degree, and 
throughout the exercise, AUTO optics 
would point to within 0.2 to 0.3 degree of 
the target. The mark incorporation updated 
the state vector so that the DAP maneuvered 
the spacecraft sharply to a new attitude 
and continued a rate drive adequate to 
maintain track on the target. These pulses 
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4.6.20 Final Stowage 
McDIVITT 
were approximately 0.5 deg/sec in rates 
and much sharper than any of the P20 
maneuvers during the rendezvous, which 
were all low rate and very smooth. The 
entire exercise was a rather impressive 
demonstration of the computer optics DAP 
capability to track a target based on 
ground-provided state vectors, and again 
it gave u~ confidence that everybody knew 
where everybody else was. The W-matrix 
was checked just to see what its value 
was approximately an hour later at 
223:30. At that time, we did not know 
that it was still running. However, the 
values were plus 00328 and plus 00087. 
This size is probably because the W-matrix 
apparently had been running from the time 
that we terminated the exercise. 
For reentry, we stowed McDivitt's and 
Scott's suits in the L-shaped bag under­
neath the center seat. We didn't put 
anything in the top compartment. We took 
CONFIDE~~TIA~' 
McDIVITT 
4-281-CO~JFIDENTIAl 
Schweickart's suit and laid it across the 
LEB, right next to the lithium hydroxide 
canisters, and tied it down (with two of 
the helmets inside of the suit and one of 
the helmets underneath the legs) with the 
PBI cord that we had available. We then 
used the sleep restrainer underneath the 
right-hand couch for stowing the temporary 
stowage bags, which were full of garbage. 
The rest of the spacecraft was stowed 
pretty much as it was during launch. The 
lithium hydroxide canister from the LM 
was in A-l, and the 1M data that we 
brought back with us were in A-8. We 
had filled the first food compartment 
(which, I believe, is B-1) with garbage. 
The two left-hand-side food compartments 
were full of loose food that we hadn't 
eaten. We took some things out of A-5 
(rope, heel restraints, and things like 
that) and stowed the tools, the tool kit, 
and some of the odds and ends that we had 
left over in A-5. We sort of used it as 
-£ONFIDENTIAI: 
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McDIVITT 	 a last place to put things. We ended up 
with the flight plan in the L-shaped bag 
because we didn't have any other place to 
put it. 
Okay, to summarize, the stowage for re­
entry was nominal except for where we 
put the suits, the helmets, and the data 
that we brought back from the LM. 
4.6.21 	 Systems Verification 
SCliWEICKART Starting with El-l, vehicle PREP, we 
followed the checklist all the way. The 
only places that we deviated from it were 
those things which were updated by CAPCOMM 
earlier in the morning concerning the con­
figuration of the command module rings. 
They wanted RING 1 on MAIN A, RING 2 on 
MAIN B, and the A&C roll on MAIN B. The 
SPS heaters engaging circuit breakers 
MAIN A and B open because of the problem 
we had had with the PUG system. There 
were a few other relatively minor things 
such as a change in the DAP; but aside 
from those things, which were called up 
'EONFIDENTIAl 
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as updates to the flight plan, we went 
through the checklist as advertised. 
We initiated the cabin cold soak, as I 
recall, about 3 hours before the deorbit 
ignition. Up until that time, we had 
been running with the cabin fans off, 
and the cabin temperature was indicating 
close to 68 or 67. Then we turned the 
fan on, and the true cabin temperature 
which was indicated to be close to 72 
or 73. As the cold soak progressed, I 
think just before the deorbit burn, we 
were back down around 67 or 66 degrees 
in the cabin. At that time, it was an 
honest temperature. The only thing that 
surprised us was that, when just prior to 
the final preparations I looked at the 
waste water quantity, it was down to 
55 percent. I called it to Dave's and 
Jim's attention, too. Then we realized 
that it was going into the secondary water 
boiler. We were boiling because of the 
cold soak. That was something which I 
"CON FID ENflAi 
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had not really thought about ahead of 
time, the waste quantity is called out to 
be 90 percent, or greater than 85 percent, 
depending on where you look on the check­
list; and there we were, sitting between 
50 and 55 percent at the time of the 
deorbit burn. Therefore, that was a bit 
of a surprise. Aside from that, the 
systems verifications went right down the 
line. 
I guess I should have summarized before 
we started discussing reentry just where 
we were and how we started our configuration. 
On the night before the retro, we had 
done most of our final stowage. We had 
placed the suits and worked out the whole 
stowage system so that, when we got up 
in the morning, we had very little to do. 
We had the suits tied down and stowed 
away. 
We awoke at approximately 233:30 for a 
retrofire that was to take place at 
240:30. We had 7 hours of time to pre­
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pare for the deorbit. We had plenty of 
time and were always 2 or 3 hours ahead 
of any sort of a timeline checklist. We 
worked our way down to the T minus I hour 
point at about 3 hours prior to the actual 
retro time. 
I'd like to go back very briefly to 
systems verification. I noticed in my 
checklist that there were a couple of 
things that did not follow the checklist. 
We added a few steps under the Systems 
Checks in the vehicle PREP. One was 
to attach the X-X strut lockout Lanyards 
so that Dave could unlock the X-X struts 
before splashdown while on the main 
chute. That was not in the checklist. 
Also, there was nothing called out to 
don the Mae West, and we penciled that 
in. Ive also penciled in to check the 
y-y strut to make sure that it was locked. 
That wann't in the checklist. Also, even 
though we carried heel restraints, there 
was notr.j ng in the checklist which called 
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out donning the heel restraints, so we 
wrote that in. 
Two other things that were not in the 
checklist were verification of the hatch 
configuration relative to the nunrp handle 
. being in neutral, and ensuring that the 
shear pin and the counter balance are 
installed. 
On the EPS checks, the DC volt-amperage 
check, it turned out that BAT B was below 
what was called out in the checklist. 
The checklist called out 34 to 38 and 
less than 3 amps. A check of the two 
BAT BUSES and BAT C indicated that BAT 
BUS B was down at 33.8, which really 
wasn't surprising. I think that the 
checklist is probably in error there. 
We ought to have more tolerance on the 
low end. 
When we made the command module RCS 
checks, the helium pressure limit 
(checklist was 4000 to 4450) system 1 
---Jread 3920 and number 2 read 3810. I have 
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a feeling again that the system was prob­
ably okay. It was just a little bit of 
overoptimism on the part of the check­
list as to what the lower limit ought 
to be. We were also low after 
pressurization by just about the same 
DELTA that we were off before activating 
the system. 
After the CM RCS pressurization, the 
helium pressure was 3225 in CM 1 and 
3215 in CM 2, whereas the checklist 
called 3300 to 3750. 
On the EMS deorbit check, I had a note 
here that the scroll was not tracing 
during the test. Jim will comment more 
on that. In regard to the caution and 
warning system operational check that 
calls for the caution and warning power 
to be turned off and then to verify that 
you have a caution and warning power 
light on, the caution and warning light 
did not come on. Again, I don't know 
whether this was an anomaly. It never 
'  
CONFIDEt~TIA~ 

SCHWEICKART 	 did come on all through the flight when 
the caution and warning power was turned 
off. In the simulator, it comes on; and 
my understanding of the system was that 
it should have. Aside from those com­
ments, everything followed the checklist 
right down the line. 
i+. 6.22 Final Entry Preparat ions 
SCOTT 	 The power-up on the platform on the first 
alignment was performed at 235 or in the 
dark period beginning at 235:18. We tried 
to allow three nightsides to make sure 
that we had the platform aligned properly. 
We had a good check on our attitude 
because we had problems with the telescope, 
and we wanted to ensure that we could do 
a backup alignment of some sort if the 
telescope didn't work when we powered it • 
up on entry morning. 
The first alignment was done to a nominal 
at a rough deorbit burn time that we'd 
gotten the day before in order to get the 
platform in plane and do a fine align on 
'EONFIDErsJTI~ 
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nominal time of T align was 240:30:08. 
The time of the first alignment, fine 
align, was 235:34. Then, on the next 
nightside pass, I did an alignment to the 
desired REFSMMAT that had been sent up 
from the ground; and that was at 238:31:30. 
Then we maneuvered to the burn attitude to 
get a star check at the attitude and run 
through the complete spacecraft alignment 
checks to ensure that the spacecraft was 
at the proper attitude one revolution 
prior to the deorbit burn. The last 
alignment was performed at 237:05:30; and 
we maneuvered to the burn attitude. 
The star for the deorbit burn was Sirius. 
It was about 2 degrees from the center of 
the sextant, and the spacecraft was off 
about a degree. It looked pretty good, 
and we got the ground update on the 
DSKY. We were sure that we were at the 
proper attitude at more than a full rev­
olution before the deorbit. 
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The alignments on the last day worked 
very well. The telescope did not hang 
up at all, and everything seemed to be 
working nominally. There was a slight 
bit of slope in the deadband in the cen~ 
ter of the sextant, which had been oc­
curring the last several days, but it 
was not enough to prevent getting a good 
mark. The spacecr~?t had just a little 
bit of rate to put you on the edge of 
the deadband. 
One thing that is worthy of note here 
has been commented on by previous crews: 
when you arm the command module RCS 
propellant system, you can hear the 
fluids flowing through the line to the 
thrusters, and it's quite obvious that 
you've armed at least one of the systems. 
By checking the gages, you can tell 
whether you've armed one or both of them. 
In the command module RCS checkout, it 
was very obvious that we were firing 
command module RCS engines rather than 
-EO~~FIDENiiAt 
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service module RCS engines. When we 
went back to service module, you could 
be convinced quite easily that you had 
switched back to the service module. 
As a matter of fact, you could hear the 
transfer click when you threw it from 
command module to service module. 
I'd like to go back and correct the 
alignment times of the platform. The 
initial P51, P52 to the nominal was 
235:34:00. We did a realign to that 
nominal initial alignment at 238:31:30. 
Then we received the desired REFSMMAT 
from the ground and did the initial P52 
to the desired REFSMMAT at 237:05:30. 
On the nightside when we did the star 
check, we did a final realign P52 to the 
desired REFSMMAT at approximately 238:28. 
At that point, we maneuvered directly to 
the burn attitude and did the star check. 
All four alignments were with a star 
angle difference of zero. 
--CONFIDENTIAt 
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We found that there was no need to pre­
heat the CM RCS injectors because of the 
temperatures that existed at the time we 
checked them. All of them were just 
about off-scale high. The temperatures 
had been almost off-scale high through­
_9ut the flight for all six, so it never 
did appear that we'd ever need to pre­
heat the CM RCS. 
When we performed the first EMS test, we 
did the DELTA-V test, and it worked al­
right. Everything on the EMS had been 
working fine up until this point. As a 
matter of fact, I thought it did an out­
standing job. We had no glitches 
whatsoever in it. However, when we did 
the scroll test (we had many ground 
checkout patterns in the spacecraft scroll 
that were still available to us), I just 
moved to the first scroll pattern and we 
did an EMS chec~; and it checked perfectly. 
Then we moved the thing down to the first 
(  
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flight check pattern. It was supposed to 
be scribing across the top of the scroll. 
All of a sudden, the line disappeared and 
went from test pattern 3 or 4, whatever 
it was, to the first flight test pattern. 
It didn't scribe most of the way down. 
Therefore, I thought I'd better do another 
check. I put in one of the flight test 
patterns and did another check, and it 
scribed partially during this particular 
time. It alerted us to the fact that we 
may not have an EMS during the reentry. 
When we finished that test, we ran it 
down to the B-zero for reentry~ which 
was 25996. During its trip down there~ 
it didn't scribe across the top of the 
scroll either. Therefore, I pretty much 
concluded that the EMS as an entry moni­
toring device was going to be semiuseless. 
It looked like the drive and everything 
on the tape worked properly, and I could 
expect the scroll to scribe across. 
just couldn't expect the stylus to scrape 
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the emulsion off the tape, which meant 
that by roughly looking at the g meter 
and then trying to correlate it with 
, 
the little black mark on the bottom of 
the EMS, I would be able to approximate 
myself on the scroll. It was very crude, 
and I found that during reentry this is 
indeed what happened. 
As we started the reentry, the EMS failed 
to scribe. To the best of my knowledge, 
it did not scribe at any time during the 
entry until after the drogues came out, 
at which time the vibrations caused it 
to start scribing across the face of the 
EMS. At no time during the useful portion 
of the flight did the scribe ever scribe. 
The range counted down properly and 
seemed to agree with the DSKY at all times. 
In general, the EMS DELTA-V counter worked 
very well throughout the flight. On the 
final day, we ran two sets of DELTA-V 
tests - both the drift test and the 
standard DELTA-V test. On the first one, 
€ONFIDENTIAl 
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SCOTT 	 we had 0.3 foot per second and 100 sec­
onds on the drift. The DELTA-V test 
counted down to minus 20.5. The second 
one was 0.2 foot per second and 100 sec­
onds and minus 20.5 or 20.7. 
+.6.24 Maneuvering to Deorbit Attitude 
SCOTT We maneuvered to deorbit attitude manu­
ally to 180, 180, and O. Then I did a 
VERB 49 to that particular position to 
the thing there for the star check. 
lie did these tasks quickly. Then we 
called p40 to make sure that it was 
calling for the same and it was 
within tenths of degrees. 
As we went across that nightside pass, 
prior to the retrofire, I knew we were 
going to retrofire just a few minutes 
into the sunlight. This meant that the 
horizon probably was 	 going to be in that 
never-never land where there really isn't 
anything that you can 	see. Sure enough, 
as we came across the 	horizon 1-1/2 hours 
before retro, I made 	 all of the retro 
cONFIDENTIAt 
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do - the T minus 12, 8, and 5. You 
coulQ see the T minus 12 check where the 
fl 
horizon is supposed to be -- essentially 
at zero, zero, zero. I still had the 
.. 
night hdrizon out there; but by the time 
we got down to around 8 minutes, the sun 
was beginning to shine through the left-
hand side window -- window number 1, and 
the horizon was beginning to disappear. 
As we approached the retrofire time, 
there was absolutely no horizon. So, 
we were unable to make any horizon checks 
except that we had turned all the lights 
down in the spacecraft 1-1/2 hours before 
the retro and checked the attitudes as 
we went through; they looked pretty good. 
We knew we were within a few degrees; 
certainly good enough to get us out of 
orbit. But it just happened to be at 
that one time when it was impossible to 
make all those nifty little checks that 
we had worked out in the data priority 
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Dave makes a point here that he could 
see the horizon through the center hatch 
windo\.J" better than I could through the 
rendezvous window. However, we did not 
have any lines scribed on the center 
hatch window. We would have had to go 
back and do a line scribing session on 
the horizon in the daylight, and we did 
not feel that we wanted to do that. But 
I had great confidence that we were in 
the deorbit attitude, which later proved 
to be correct. 
The deorbit burn was a typical light­
weight command and service module SPS 
burn. When it comes on, it hits you in 
the back like a sledge hammer. It was 
about 12 seconds long, and sure enough 
the thing counted right on down and shut 
off. The DELTA-V counters and the DSKY 
residuals were nominal. I will have Dave 
give you those. I think he has them writ­
ten down. 
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The residuals at the end of the burn were 
in X, Y, and Z -- 1.6, plus 1.1, and minus 
2.3, respectively. Jim nulled them out 
to zero. The EMS DELTA-V counter was mi­
nus 18.2 at shutdown. The apogee and 
-
.. 
perigee were 240.0 by minus 2.0; the burn 
time was within one-half second of the 
predicted value. 
I have just one short comment on the de-
orbit burn. At TIG minus 30 seconds, we 
had received an update to go tape recorder 
to record HIGH BIT RATE in forward, first 
and then UP TELEMETRY command to RESET 
and back to NORMAL. Everything was al­
ready in configuration except for the 
telemetry bit rate switch which was in 
LOW. I moved that to HIGH and then hit 
the UP TELEMETRY to reset NORMAL, and 
the talkback stayed barber pole on the 
tape, which puzzled me for a few moments. 
However, I had to give it up because the 
burn was coming up, and we were counting 
down. The next time I looked back at it, 
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let it go and never asked. I was never 
sure whether there was 	 a time delay which 
prevented it from going gray immediately 
or whether the ground 	had picked up the 
fact 'that the tape recorder did not start 
and sent up a command. I don I t know 
exactly what happened 	there. 
4.6.26 CM/SM Separation 
McDIVITT 	 We followed the checklist, and it was 
probably the best simulation we have 
ever had, as Dave said after we got down 
on the carrier. Everything went according 
to the checklist. There wasn't any problem. 
We yawed right to 45 degrees, got everything 
set up, and boomed off the service module 
whi,ch went off with a big bang. There 
wasn't any doubt about the fact that it was 
gone. We set the switches up single ring -­
number I on MAIN A, maneuvered back around 
to the zero yaw attitude, rolled over and 
pitched up to put the horizon on the window 
at the right spot (-32.5 degrees), and 
 
4-300 
McDIVITT 
€ONfIDENTIAl 

tracked around. That part of the checklist 
and that part of the maneuver went just the 
way it was supposed to go. I used single 
pulse, maintaining the .5 degree 
attitude line near the horizon until we got 
down near 0.05g. As we approached 0.05g 
I tightened up the control of the attitude 
and put the line right on the window as 
was supposed-fodo~--The~ttitUde errors 
were down to practically zero at 0.05g. 
Dave points out that, as we went around, 
the G&N needles were driving us to a point 
that did indeed put the .5 degree line on 
the horizon and that we had a real good 
confirmation that the G&N was steering us 
in the proper attitudes through this por­
tion of pre-reentry. 
One thing that might be worth pointing out 
is that the single ring pulse is a real 
nice control system; it is snappy. You 
can really hear the thrusters banging, 
and it gives you real fine control of the 
spacecraft. It is not an over-control 
situation, but you do not have to wait 
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McDIVITT 	 there very long for it and it will bring 
you right where you want to go. 
I guess we should point out that the com­
mand module RCS thrusters are much more 
audible than are the service module RCS 
thrusters. Sometimes I had difficulty 
telling whether or not the service module 
engines were firing, but I never had any 
trouble with the command module. 
4.6.27 Passive Thermal 	Control 
SCHWEICKART 	 The passive thermal control procedure des­
cribed in the checklist was evaluated at 
the end of the flight with a number of 
different deadbands. It seemed to work 
very well. The roll rates were as indi­
cated by the checklist, and the mode was 
smooth with very little jet activity. The 
roll rate was 0.1 deg/sec, and the initial 
deadband was 10 degrees. Subsequent to 
that, we changed the deadband to 
20 degrees and 25 degrees. At two points 
during the procedure, we turned off the 
PTC. One point was when we initiated 
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POO at 221:05:00. It was turned off 
and reinitiated at 221:16:00 with a 
20-degree deadband. Again, it was turned 
off at 221:18:30 and reinitiated at 
221:21:30, and finally the PTC was term­
,fnated at' 222:10:10. The sequence of 
establishing the PTC and loading the 
deadband was to follow checklist page 3-17, 
initiate the roll rate, and then go into 
ADDRESS 3255 and set the deadband in 
sequence without changing the CMC control 
mode after the initiation of the roll. 
We did a couple of other little tracking 
experiments which were not very significant 
for our flight but, I think, might be 
Significant for future flights. 
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4.7 Reentry 
4.7.1 Reentry Parameters 
SCOTT The first thing that was noticeable as we 
approached the 0.05g point was the time 
of freefall out of VERB 82 of the computer. 
It was approximately 27 seconds early. 
The ground had given us 15 plus 27 for 
RET 0.05g. The TFF w~s almost constantly 
27 seconds early, putting us there at 15, 
until we were approximately 2 minutes prior 
to the 0.05g time; then it started to con­
verge. At the ground pass of RET 0.05g, 
which was then 15:25, we arrived within 
3 seconds of the O.05g indication on the 
DSKY. The comparison of the two was very 
good when we actually arrived at 0.05g. 
P6lworked properly and was properly load­
ed. NOUN 61 had the correct latitude and 
longitude when it was initially called. 
NOUN 60 was plus 0.81 on the gIs, plus 
25896 on the velocity, and minus 1.73 
GAMMA. NOUN 63 was plus 12688 for the 
range and plus 25982 for the velocity 
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The postburn number that the ground had 
passed up was 325.6, and the display at 
0.2g was 311.2. So, we were well within 
the 100-nautical-mile tolerance. At that 
time, we accepted the G&N as go. 
,The next 'monitoring parameter on the G&N 
was the bank angle command which was sup­
posed to occur between minus 6 and 0 miles 
down-range error. It did, in fact, occur 
exactly as it should. We got a minus 
6 miles and then got a bank angle command 
immediately thereafter on the next cycle 
which was another indication that the G&N 
was in good shape. 
When we handed over the control of the 
spacecraft to the CMC at 0.05g, it per­
formed just the way I had seen it do in 
simulations; and just the way I had ex­
pected it to do. There wasn't a single 
anomaly. 
The only interesting thing is that once 
you have handed over control to the CMC 
and it starts making maneuvers, you then 
lose some of your backup reentry schemes 
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which did not compare too well with the 
ground values, particularly in range. 
The ground had passed 1201 miles for the 
range to go. This was approximately 67 
miles difference, which surprised me a 
little. I thought that COLOSSUS had 
been corrected to have the proper range 
to go value come up in that display. 
Then postburn update for the range to go 
was 1209, so it was still approximately 
60 miles off. 
P62 and p63 worked nominally; and, as I 
mentioned, we dropped into p64 within 
3 seconds of the ground predicted time. 
The entry monitor system range started 
counting and was well within the tolerances 
of 40 miles plus or minus 10 seconds. As 
a matter of fact, I think it was something 
like 45 after we hit 0.05g, and Jim ini­
tialized it manually at the 0.05g time. 
The 0.2g display of NOUN 66, which was our 
down-range error comparison to accept or 
reject the G&N, was well within tolerance. 
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and so forth) because the G&N starts 
steering you one way and then another way. 
It is steering without regard to the bank 
in one direction --bank in the other dir­
ection scheme. Because my EMS had failed 
.r --­
to start scribing, I was sort of without 
~
a real good backup, except for the fact 
that I could read my g meter. I tried to 
take that value of g and run up the non­
existent line from the scribe on the bottom 
to a point on the EMS and to extimate my 
range potential. This was very, very crude, 
especially when we were up at high ranges 
high range potentials (600 or 800 miles). 
It was almost impossible to tell within 
200 miles what my range potential was; but, 
of course, it is not too critical up there. 
It became a little easier to use when I got 
down around 200 or 300 miles. because the 
difference between the lines is considerably 
greater. I could estimate probably 
within 100-mile range potential at this 
point; but, it was still a very, very 
eONFIDENTIA-b-­
4-307 

crude scheme. Once we 	 were committed toMcDIVITT 
the G&N (although we were all very well 
assured that the thing was 
properly), failure midstream would have 
been a very poor place to have one be­
cause-our ranging capability was really 
crude. 
4.7.3 Ionization 
McDIVITT 	 We could see the ionization sheet start 
at about O.Olg or so. It was nominal~ 
and we took a picture of it on the way 
down. 
4.7.4 Sounds, Sensations, and Observations 
McDIVITT 	 The Sounds, Sensations, and Observations 
were as I had expected. The spacecraft 
did not exhibit any really abnormal con­
ditions on the way down. The rates ran 
about 1 deg/sec all the way down, even 
when we were doing some of the weird 
gyrations that the thing goes through when 
it banks from 80 degrees to 80 degrees 
left; and it goes in a big arc instead 
of a roll. I could actually feel these 
4-308 
McDIVITT 	 weird motions. At no time did I ever 
feel that the G&N was going to lose con­
trol of the thing, either in rate damping 
or in attitude control mode. 
4.7.4 Sounds, Sensations and Observations 
SCHWEICKART 	 I recalled that I had a very distinct 
impression at drogue deploy of a pulse 
of hot smelly gas in the cabin. It was 
a very sharp onset, almost as if part of 
the exhaust gas had blown right into the 
cabin. I would guess that it was part 
of the thrusters from the apex cover or 
the motors themselves going off. But, 
it was a very distinct heat pulse; and 
it had a rather pungent odor to it. I 
noticed even at MAX g that, although it 
felt like about 8 or 10 g' s, I could 
reach up and manipulate the S-band on 
the antenna switch. I was doing that 
all the way down; so I was aware by 
moving around that I was not really up 
at 8 or 10. But, as far as the way it 
felt on the body, it was up in the high 
numbers·getting close to 10. as far as 
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McDIVITT 
4.7.8 	 Drogue Chute Deployment 
McDIVITT 
I was concerned. 
We flew all the way down in G&N attitude 
control mode. I had the rates scale set 
to 55. There was no problem. 
When we got on down towards drogue chute 
time, everybody was estimating the drogue 
chute time. We had about a thousand dif­
ferent checks, and they all came out very 
well. There seems to be some discussion 
here among the three of us when we aren't 
on the tape about the significance of the 
steam pressure duct as an altimeter. It 
came out within about 17 seconds, which 
I personally feel is probably a pretty 
good check. There are a lot of other 
checks that I have on the left side which 
the other guys don't have. One is the 
way the g's are falling off; another 
is looking at the range to go off the EMS 
and also off the DSKY. I could tell 
roughly that I was getting to the point 
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where I should be getting the chutes out. 
I could not use these things as altimeters, 
but there is a leeway of a few minutes 
there. I think that one must be aware of 
the fact that he is getting down to the 
point where something should be done. The 
thing that has to be done is to place the 
ELS logic to ON and the ELS to AUTO, which 
then establishes another set of barostats 
that would also have to fail before one 
gets into trouble. So it seems like, in 
my opinion, the check was adequate in 
that it gave us the clue that we should 
arm up these systems. A couple of seconds 
either way does not seem to be that signif­
icant, but we will let the other people 
express their opinion here. 
In simulation, we had established a tech­
nique of correlation between the DSKY and 
the steam pressure gage to get a hack on 
the time at which the altimeter should 
come off the peg. Rather consistently 
in the simulations at 5000 ft/sec on the 
DSKY, you could expect to standby to watch 
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the steam pressure gage; and at 4000 ft/secSCOTT 
on the DSKY, it would come off the peg. 
This was an indication. I would normally 
call this to Rusty so he could be watch­
ing the steam pressure gage; and in simu­
lations, it would be within several seconds 
of 4000 ft/sec indicated which normally 
was at approximately 65k. I think we may 
have been putting too much emphasis on 
this as a check, or else we have a bias 
somewhere or some uncertainty that we 
are not exactly sure of. 
SCHWEICKART About a week before the flight, we coor­
dinated with EECOM to get the most accu­
rate numbers that we could for the time 
from steam duct pressure increase, coming 
through 90k, to altimeter off the peg at 
55k -- also, to 40k and to drogue deploy. 
The times for our mission and entry param­
eters were 61 seconds to altimeter off the 
peg. As it turned out, in fact, when Dave 
gave me the mark from the DSKY as to when 
I should expect the steam pressure to be­
gin rtsingJ_nothing happened on the steam 
--  
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pressure for another 15 or 20 seconds. 
When the steam pressure started to rise, 
it had been hovering down around the 0.12 
to 0.13 area; as it started fluctuating 
and went up positively to 0.15, I started 
my watch. When my watch read about 44 
seconds, Jim said the altimeter was coming 
off the peg. That figures out to about 
16 to 17 seconds ahead of the time-early 
on the times that were given to us by the 
EECOM. Whether this is a random error or 
whether it is a bias in the computations 
that we are making is a question in our 
minds; and depending upon how you weigh 
this as a backup system, we either should 
give it up or try to pin it down a little 
more accurately. 
The comparison of EMS range to go and 
DSKY range to go was pretty good all the 
way.down to within about 30 miles. 
During the reentry, the maximum g-level 
that I saw was about 3.2 and typical of 
reentries. I guess, when we got up to 
EONFIDENTIAL 
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O.2g, everybody felt like they had anMcDIVITT 
elephant standing on their chest. Our 
sensations seemed to indicate to each of 
us that we had many more g' s than what 
the g-meter said, but I believe this is 
typical of most reentries. During the 
reentry, we could see the ionization 
sheet start at approximately O.Olg; and 
it was considerably different from what 
I recalled it being in the Gemini mission. 
It was almost exclusively orange color; 
and it just varied in intensity, from 
what I could see of it. In the Gemini 
mission, the ionization had more red and 
green and other various colors. We took 
some pictures of it during reentry. The 
camera was started at approximately 
O.02g and was still running after main­
.""'­
chute deployment, although we are not 
really sure if it took pictures all the 
way down. The drogue-chute deployment 
was performed automatically with the 
barometric sensors. The apex cover went 
off with a bang and the drogues came 
--  
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4.7.9 Main Chute Deployment 
McDIVITT 
out; they operated the way they should. 
There was considerable debris. It was 
my impression that the longer we were 
on drogue the more we oscillated, 
although the oscillations were not bad 
at all. . It looked as though we had a 
DELTA angle between the centerline of 
the spacecraft and the centerline of 
the drogues that built up to probably 
plus or minus 20 or 30 degrees. 
The mains were deployed automatically 
and "/ere deployed properly. When the 
mains deployed, it looked as though we 
only had two chutes. The one on the 
left side came out, and we could see 
that it was one chute. The one on the 
right side looked as though it was just 
a single chute, and I am not sure where 
the third chute was. To me, it looked 
as though it was almost up inside of the 
chute on the right. When they came to 
the reef position when they started 
£ONFIDENTIAt 
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with air, the third chute sort 
of magically came out of the second 
chute on the right side. We had a 
single chute on the left and two chutes 
very close together on the right in the 
reef .condition. Then when they disreefed, 
they opened up; and we had the typical 
three-chute blossom. It looked very 
normal. Prior to the time we dumped 
our fuel, I noticed that there were a 
couple of the small squares torn out of 
the chute which was on the left-hand 
side at the time. I could notice that 
one small square was gone. Then after 
we dumped the propellant I noticed that 
the chute which was over my head then 
had three small panels torn out of it. 
I am not sure whether that was a result 
of the fuel dump or whether the chutes 
had rotated. I personally think that 
the chutes had rotated and I was looking 
at a different chute or a different part 
of the same chute that previously had 
been over my head. There was not any 
-EONFIDENTIAl 
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major damage to the chutes. As I said, 
I saw one small square panel out on one 
chute and three small square panels out 
on another one chute, or possibly the 
same one. Once the main chutes were out, 
the spacecraft stopped oscillating and 
rode down very smoothly. There is not 
much else to comment on the chutes. 
I was on the right-hand side looking out 
the window at the deployment. I did not 
pay any particular attention to the 
drogues; but when the mains came out, I 
also had the impression that we had two 
at first. From my view on the right, it 
appeared that the third chute was obscured 
by the two outside chutes. It was up 
between them. Then, I had the same 
impression as Jim when they began to 
fill with air, before the disreefing. 
As the two outside chutes began to fill, 
I saw the third chute come out from 
between them. It was almost as though 
it were on longer shrouds than the two 
outside ones and was just sort of wedged. 
CONFIDENTIAt 
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4.7.10 	 Communications 
SCHWEICKART 
up between them so it could not be seen. 
I do not think there was any anomaly at 
all associated with it. I did not notice 
any holes in the chute, I was so happy 
to see those big things that I did not 
really get down to the nit-picking 
details. 
At the time the G&N switched to NOUN-67 
at the 1000-ft/sec point, relative veloc­
ity, our indicated latitude and longitude 
were plus 2326 and minus 6801; the desired 
latitude and longitude loaded into P61 
was plus 2325 and minus 6800. The range 
to go at that time was minus 1.1 miles; 
so we had. at least by the DSKY, reason­
able confidence that we were close to 
the landing point. 
For communications during the entry, they 
had recommended sticking with antenna C, 
as was called out on the checklist. 
Antenna C seemed to work pretty well 
except that we were beginning to lose 
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lock after the blackout was supposedly 
over. The signal strength was fluctuating 
around the half-way point, which is about 
the point where we began getting a signif­
icant amount of noise on the S-band; I 
, switched'back and forth through all four 
antennas, but none of them really seemed 
to lock up very strong. Antenna A and C 
seem to work the best, but none of them 
put the signal strength up to the upper 
end. We really did not a good strong 
S-band lockup, as I recall, until after 
we were on the drogues. At about the 
time we got the drogues out, one of the 
antennas -- and I must admit that I'm 
not sure which one it was -- locked on 
good and strong, and I left it there. 
Dave gave his latitude and longitude on 
the S-band at that point, and we did 
get communications with Houston at that 
point. 
I called Houston once but got no answer; 
I gave the latitude and longitude in 
Houston one 
SCOTT 
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more time and got a response; so I gave 
them the latitude and longitude but 
received no reply. That was the last 
~--"-~--
time I heard from Houston. 
~------------------------
When we were doing the command module 
RCS fuel and oxidizer dump, we got the 
great big red cloud at the end of the 
dump. It went swirling up through the 
chutes very gracefully and then we went 
ahead and did the purge. We eliminated 
the big cloud. It's quite obvious when 
the dump finishes, because the noise 
frqm the thrusters firing just ceases 
very abruptly. 
The cabin 	stayed coolon the way down. 
/ 
We picked up some odors I guess, slightly 
before we got on the water, the typical 
odor that you get from the burning heat-
shield. We didn't install the vents 
because we didn't feel that we needed 
any. We never turned off the suit loop. 
We had it blowing all the time. We had 
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5.0 LANDING AND RECOVERY 
5.1 Touchdown Impact 
McDIVITT 	 We came down, and I called off the alti­
tudes as we approached zero. We hit, I 
guess, at approximately minus 100 feet, 
-~-----------------------------\ 
just as we were told we probably would. 
------------------------~----------~-
5.3 Postlanding Checklist 
McDIVITT 	 When we hit, we had a strong desire not 
to turn upside down; and we had our 
procedures sharply tuned. Rusty punched 
in two circuit breakers, I popped off 
the main chute release, and we ~tayed 
right side up. We went through the post-
landing checklist without any difficulty. 
5.4 Temperature and Humidity 
McDIVITT 	 The temperature was fine. The humidity 
was good. The only thing I did not like 
was the smell which is never very pleasant. 
5.5 Communications 
McDIVITT 	 We established communications with the 
recovery forces while we were still on 
the chutes and had no problem with them. 
-CONFIDENTIAb
, 
5-2 
SCHWEICKART 
5.6 	 Spacecraft Status 
McDIVITT 
5.7 	 Battery Power 
McDIVITT 
5.8 	 Postlanding ECS 
McDIVITT 
EONFIDENTfM· 
One additional thing, before we leave the 
recovery, 	was the communications with the 
swimmers 	on the swimmer umbilical. There 
was no adequate communications with the 
swimmers. I think that all of us felt that 
\. 
we heard the swimmers trying to communi­
cate with us, but it was unintelligible;

.---	 -......:..... 
and there was no evidence that the swim­
mers had any success in hearing either. 

They looked through the windows, and we 

were giving thumbs up, okays, and things 

of that kind with hand signals; but it 

didn't appear that we were getting out to 

them any better than they were getting in 

to us. 

Spacecraft status was !good; there wasn't 
anything 	abnormal at ~ll about it. 
We had battery power. 
We activated the postlanding ECS system. 
-EONFIDENftAL 
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5.9 	 Ventilation 
McDIVITr We got the ventilation going. 
5.10 	 Seasickness 
McDIVITT Nobody got seasick. 
5.11 Internal Temperature 
McDIVITT 	 There were not any internal temperature 
changes. 
5.12 Stable I 
McDIVITT 	 We stayed in stable I. We did not plan 
to put the float bags out until 10 minutes 
after we had landed so that the structure 
would cool down. By then, the swimmers 
were in the water and had the sea collar 
around it; and we decided not to deploy 
the uprighting system because we were 
liable to hit the swimmers with it. 
5.13 Couch Position 
McDIVITT 	 We left the couches in the position that 
we had landed in except for the center 
couch. We lowered the seat pan of the 
center couch so that Dave could get down 
into the lower equipment bay. 
£ONFIDENTIAb 
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5.14 Initial Sitting 	or Standing 
McDIVITT 	 We found no problem with standing or 
sitting except that we were a lot heavier 
than we had been 30 or 40 minutes before­
hand. 
5.15 	 Internal Pressure 
McDIVITT I felt no internal pressures. 
5.16 Recovery Operations 
McDIVITT 	 Recovery operations were interesting, 
and they were documented on film and 
television tape for the whole world to 
see. 
5.17 	 Grappling Hook Deployment 
McDIVITT We did not deploy the grappling hook. 
5.18 Spacecraft Power 	Down and Procedures 
McDIVITT 	 We powered the spacecraft down according 
to procedures. 
, 
\ 
\ 
SCHWEICKART We did follow the checklist through to \ 
\ 
the point where one would power down for 
conservation of battery life in case he 
was going to be on the water for a long 
while. But, there was nothing in the 
C$NFIDENTIAl, 
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postlanding checklist which said anything 
about completely powering down when you 
leave the spacecraft to get out into the 
raft. As a result, we sort of played 
that one by ear and just pulled all the 
breakers off the flight and postlanding 
bus. Rather than leaving BAT BUS A and 
B tied to the flight and post-landing 
bus, we pulled those and decided that 
was the quickest way. But, it seems to 
me that it' would be worth while to add 
another section to the postlanding check­
list as a final power down or perhaps 
to add something in the training which 
says don't power down. For example, it 
was not immediately clear to me whether 
or not we should have left the VHF beacon 
on, although, in this particular case, 
they happened to request it off because 
they thought that it might have been 
interfering with the swimmer communica­
tions. But it was not clear whether or 
not we should have left that small amount 
of power on the flight and postlanding bus 
...cONFIDE~~TIAL 
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when we got out the door, or whether we 
should have pulled the breakers. So, by 
using our heads for what that was worth, 
we pulled the breakers and powered down 
completely. 
We egressed the spacecraft after inflating 
our Mae West, got in the liferaft, and 
were picked up by the helicopter in a 
Billy Pugh net. It was a little excit­
ing at times, but I don't think we need 
to comment on that here. It is well
­
5.20 Survival Equipment 
McDIVITT We did deploy the sea-dye marker, as we 
were supposed to, to get the telephone 
out; although I was never able to hear 
the swimmers talking to me except in a 
very, very low background. 
5.21 Crew Pickup 
SCHWEICKART On the crew pickup, it was obvious that 
the helicopter crew was having consider­
ably more trouble in positioning the 
EONFIDENTIAt " 
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SCHWEICKART Billy Pugh net than what we had seen in 
the Gulf during our training with a 
Coast Guard helicopter. It was not until 
24 hours or more later that I remembered 
one difference in the geometry of the 
situation, which mayor may not be sig~if-
icant; but it was the only thing I could 
think of which gave any possibility of 
a difference. By the way, the water was 
at least as rough or rougher in the Gulf 
than it was in the actual recovery; so, 
that was not a factor. But, in the Gulf, 
after we all got into the raft, we stood 
off from the spacecraft at the end of a 
line. When the helicopter picked us up 
in the Gulf, we were probably 30 feet, 
I guess, away from the command module; 
whereas in the actual recovery, we were 
still lashed to the flotation collar 
right up next to the spacecraft. I am 
sure that had some effect as far as down-
wash was concerned and the behavior or 
lateral motion of the Billy Pugh net. 
Now, whether that was the full answer, 
"'CONFIDENlIAL 
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SCHWEICKART 	 I don't know; but that is the only thing 
I could think of that was an actual 
difference in the procedures used. 
"\ 
C0NFIDENTIAb' 
6-1'CONFIDENTIAt 
6.0 COMMAND MODULE 	 SYSTEMS OPERATION 
McDIVITT 	 If the behavior of the system was as we 
had expected, we won't discuss it at all. 
6.1 Guidance and Navigation 
SCOTT 	 To lump the G&N systems together at the 
beginning, it should be noted that we 
powered down and then powered up the IMU, 
the CMC, and the optics completely for the 
first 5 days. Then the IMU was powered 
down and powered up again for the last 5 
days with the CMC and optics remaining in 
OPERATE each of the last 5 days. No prob­
lems were encountered at any time in the 
power-up or power-down procedure. The 
CMC was left powered up during the last 5 
days to provide a constant power level for 
the fuel cells, and the optics were left 
powered up the last 5 days to prevent any 
further difficulty with the telescope drive. 
6.1.2 Optical Subsystems 
SCOTT The eyepieces on both the telescope and 
the sextant tended to rotate and come off, 
and we had to retain them with tape through­
'COt~FIDENTIAb 
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SCOTT out the flight. 
In addition to the eye pieces, the focus 
was a problem and tended to change based 
on the vibrational rotation of the eye­
pieces. The tape was also necessary to 
maintain a constant focus. 
The sextant reticle was not clear and it 
hadn't changed since the chamber. It was 
fuzzy and had a halo around the outside. 
We complained about this prior to the 
flight, and when we got in the flight, 
it was exac:.lli.. as we had seen in the 
chamber. The reticle was fuzzy and not 
clear. There was no place to stow the 
optics covers for the eyepieces, and we 
just stowed them back in the optics stowage 
point. Occasionally, they would drift 
out and would have to be located again. 
The star chart and VERB/NOUN list on the 
GNC panel worked very well once we got 
the VERB/NOUN list out. That took about 
5 days because it was firmly in place for 
launch and there w~s no easy way of pulling 
../ 
/ 
-G01'~FIDENTIAl 
6-3~ONFIDENTIAl 
SCOTT 	 it out at zero g. The tolerances on the 
VERB/NOUN list or the size of the list must 
have been somewhat larger than the star 
charts because it was jammed in its mount, 
and we had to use a screwdriver to pry it 
out. The two star charts worked very well. 
They were easily installed and removed 
and were excellent aids in identifying 
the stars. The long eye-relief eyepieces 
worked well; however, they required far 
too many turns of the screws to mount, 
which would be a very difficult task in 
a hard suit if the eyepieces were needed. 
The quick disconnects on the eyepieces 
were excellent and were used anywhere from 
two to ten times a day. Each time that 
we completed an alignment, we would restow 
the two eyepieces to prevent damage, 
particularly when we were suiting and 
unsuiting or going through the tunnel. 
The prism split and the telescope was 
most annoying throughout the flight, 
particularly during the rendezvous when 
CONFIDE~~TIAb 
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SCOTT 
 the reflection from the sun or the earth 
was picked up. The target was obliterated 
completely from the center of the telescope, 
and it occurred on alignment probably about 
20 to 30 percent o~ime. This prism 
split appears as a band across the horizontal 
line of the telescope reticle and covers 
about one-third of the field of view. It 
varies from a light brown stripe to almost 
a complete white brilliant band, depending 
on the intensity of the reflection. The eye 
guards on the eyepieces were small and dark 
and come off easily. Once they came off, 
they were difficult to find; and it's recom­
mended that some better method of attaching 
them be discovered. Towards the end of the 
flight, the sextant deadband appeared to 
grow in that, if the spacecraft rates 
were very low or almost zero du~ing align­
-------ment, it was difficult to position the star 
• 
in the exact center of the reticle because 

it would slide from one side of the dead-

band to the other. It was determined that 

with low spacecraft rates it was far easier 

-EONFIDENTIAb 
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SCOTT to mark on the star in the center of the 
sextant reticle. 
For daylight alignments, it might be use­
ful to provide a sextant field-of-view 
outline of stars relative to the navigation 
stars because it was noted that a number 
of the navigational stars have character­
istic features and prominent secondary 
stars near them in the sextant field of 
view and can be identified very easily 
in daytime if the sextant is pointed auto­
matically. As an example, Regor and Acrux 
are very easily identifiable in daytime 
because of the nearby stars. 
The sun filters worked very well except 
that the sun filter for the sextant, which 
was used on the long eye-relief eyepiece, 
was far too loose and had to be held on 
manually. The filter for the long eye 
relief on the telescope seemed to work 
fairly well. During the evaluation of the 
sun filters, we looked at the sun through 
the sextant and were able to count approxi-
CO~~FIDENTIAt 
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SCOTT mately 15 sunspots, most of them located 
in the first quadrant. This was at about 
114 hours in the flight. 
The major anomaly during the flight relative 
to the optics was the hangup of the telescope 
drive. This has been mentioned previously 
in the debriefing, but it occurred on the 
second day when Jim noticed that the mechan­
ical drive read-out on the talkback had hung 
up in sh~ie~at 64 degrees. There was no 
apparent hangup in the electrical drive at 
that time. On the third day on the first 
alignment, the telescope hung up at approxi­
mately 64 degrees with the electrical drive. 
It was necessary to take tool E and manually 
drive the telescope and shaft away from the 
point of hangup and then reposition the 
mechanical drive for electrical drive to 
enable it to work electrically. However, on 
a number of subsequent occasions the tele­
scope hung up again, and each time the 
procedure was to detach the eyepiece and 
mechanically release it from the point of 
- ­
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SCOTT 	 hangup. In this process, a rubber grommet 
came out of the mechanical drive tool fit­
ting. We still have the rubber grommet. 
Whether it was an extra or the grommet 
that was supposed to be there was difficult 
to determine at the time. Actually, we 
have only three-fourths of it; the other 
quarter is missing. Later in the flight, 
the telescope hung up at other angles. 
Sometimes, we had one hangup at approximately 
15 degrees and another at 37 degrees as 
determined by the OCDU read-out on the DSKY. 
The first indications were that it was 
hanging up at multiples of 64 degrees, 
but apparently that was not a continuing 
situation. Finally, after a number of 
exercises with the telescope and after 
leaving the optics power on, it performed 
without any problems; and this continued 
throughout the last 5 days of the flight. 
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6.1.3 Computer Subsystem 
SCOTT 	 The only problem that we had with the com­
puter throughout the flight was the appar­
ent nonacceptance of an instruction or the 
lack of the proper input by the crew. The 
first occasion was prior to SPS 6 when the 
DAP was loaded, or the DAP was changed 
from two-quad operation to a four-quad 
operation. The second occasion was on the 
last day -- on the last'~ght when the no­
DAP configuration was loaded and activated 
by a VERB 46, which apparently was not 'a:c­
cepted or didn't get in. The third occa­
sion was the completion of the ascent-stage 
tracking when P20 was terminated by a 
VERB 56 and the W-matrix continued to run un­
til CMC light and a W-matrix overflow alarm 
occurred. A subsequent VERB 56 was entered 
and did terminate the W-matrix. The rest 
of the computer subsystem worked very well. 
6.1.4 G&N Controls 	and Displays 
McDIVITT 	 Prior to flight, we had a few changes in 
the techniques with which we were going to 
use the entry monitoring system; but they 
e01'<JfIDENfIA-b 
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weren't major, and we followed the new 
procedures. The EMS in the orbit mode 
worked extremely well. The drift on the 
accelerometer was very small. Throughout 
the flight, we tested it, and it varied 
somewhere between 0.2 and 0.4 ft/sec per 
100 seconds. Whenever we did a DELTA-V 
test, the DELTA-V test was about as good 
as it could be and always came within a 
couple of tenths of a ft/sec of the mid­
dle of the band. In each case, I always 
felt that we had probably the best entry 
monitoring system that had flown to date, 
and certainly better than anything that 
we had ever seen in any of our simulations. 
However, when we got around to doing the 
entry and really were going to use it for 
entry monitoring, we ran through a ground­
test pattern to see how the thing was going 
to work. Then we were going to go through 
the flight check-test pattern. On the 
ground-test pattern, it worked exactly as 
it was supposed to work. At the comple­
tion of the test, I had concluded that the 
C0NFIDENTtAL 
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McDIVITT test was successful; and at the time, I 
sort of decided not to even bother to run 
through the flight test-check pattern. As 
we started slewing the EMS down towards 
the 37 OOO-f~/sec line, I noticed that the 
scribe stopped scribing across the top of 
the film; therefore, I elected to do one 
more EMS test on the flight test-check 
pattern close to the beginning of the 
entry scroll. When we performed the check, 
it scribed reasonably well, and I figured 
that maybe we had just had a slippery piece 
of film between the two test patterns. 
However, when we slewed down to t~~ry 
" interface velocity of 25 996, it failed 
again to scribe across the film. Through­
out the entire entry, the EMS scribe failed 
to scribe a line on the film until we were 
down very low. I believe that it was at 
a drogue deploy that we finally got the 
thing to start scribing; it looked as if 
it needed a good bang to get the stylus 
back down through the emulsion. It didn't 
render the EMS completely unusable because, 
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by looking at the other accelerometer, I 
could estimate what the g's were, estimate 
a position on the EMS, and approximate my 
range potential to the nearest 100 miles, 
at least. It certainly made it a diffi­
cult task, and the EMS will have to be 
fixed before we proceed to any more lunar 
reentries. 
The FDAI's operated as they should through­
out the flight. I might comment on the 
FDAI I-deg/sec rates scale. I think that 
this is an extremely useful scale to per­
form as a rate gyro. As the scale made the 
maneuvering of the very large full-up ve­
hicle (eM/SM/1M) a very precise task, I 
think that we saved a considerable amount 
of fuel by having this excellent display 
available to us. 
The rest of the G&N controls and displays 
operated nominally except for the rotational 
hand controller. It operated fine electri­
, but the mechanical interface between 
the controller and the seat was one of the 
sloppiest that we had seen. I think that 
'-€ONFIDENTll\L 
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McDIVITT 	 it was even worse than the one that we 
had in our simulator which we were required 
to fly by stabilizing the controller with 
our knees. It didn't make it an impossible 
task to fly the spacecraft, but it certainly 
wasn't as desirable as a good tight-fitting 
mechanical interface between the hand con­
troller and the seat. 
6.1.6 CMC SPS TVC 
McDIVITT 	 I have one little comment on the CMC/SPS 
TVC relative to burn number~5, where we 
had about a 40-second burn and picked up 
large cross-axis residuals. We had ex­
pected this from preflight simulations 
and, I think, maybe as a result of some 
auto pilot improvements, we may be able 
to tighten up the loop a little bit and 
improve this cross-axis steering. 
6.2 Stabilization and Control System 
.,
SCOTT 	 One additional comment to the SCS was 
that the MASTER ALARM light that came on 
every time the BMAG's were powered down. 
-e:9NFIDENTIAl 
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SCOTT and we always wanted to maneuver the space­
craft at very low rates to save fuel. We 
did a lot of preplanning to get to the right 
attitude at the right time and to start the 
maneuver as much as 45 minutes or 1 hour 
beforehand. I did find that when the space­
craft was in full-up configuration (full 
command module, full LM), it was sometimes 
better to go to the ACCELERATION COMMAND 
to get a reasonably sized rate. 
In SCS ATTITUDE HOLD, we got into some 
limit cycles. I think that the classic 
one was just prior to retrofire when we 
were as light as we ever became and when 
all the thrusters were enabled. We got 
into a classis example of limit cycling, 
banging back and forth at a fairly high 
frequency in roll. We turned the LIMIT 
CYCLE switch ON, and it damped the rates 
right down to zero. From that moment, 
we had very few jet firings that I would 
consider to be the nominal for that par­
ticular ATTITUDE HOLD mode. 
 
6-14  
SCOTT 	 We had a power-up and power-down checklist 
that we used for the SCS. It went very 
well. For the first 5 days after that, 
we only powered the SCS electronics down 
at night and back up in the daytime. Each 
time we went to bed at night, we disabled 
the hand controllers in a direct mode and 
the hand controllers in a normal mode. 
We turned off all 16 switches for the AUTO 
RCS SELECT and we turned off the transla­
tion controller, so that we always had a 
good feeling that the flight control system 
____-"C 
~~ .. _.w was powered down 	 and that I wasn It going 
to have to spend too much time worrying 
about a stuck-on thruster while I was 
sleeping. 
On the control modes preflight, we went 
through a number of exercises to try to 
determine which DAP configuration would 
be the most efficient and which SCS con­
figuration would be the most efficient. 
During flight, we did use the adjacent-
quad procedure in the DAP for attitude 
holding and it seemed to be very efficient. 
eONFIDENliAl 
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SCOTT There were few jet firings, and for ma­
neuvers, even though it hadn't been recom­
mended for maneuvers, it seemed to work 
very welL Normally, maneuvers should 
have had a couple on each axis to be most 
efficient; but at the times we made ma­
neuvers, both with the 1M on and the LM 
off (with only adjacent quads enabled), 
the maneuvers seemed to be smooth and 
efficient. When we switched from a MAX 
deadband to a MIN deadband on the DAP, 
such as after a VERB 49 maneuver to a 
burn attitude in a subsequent entry into 
p40, and unless we were in the center of the 
the deadband or near the center, we would 
have a very sharp maneuver from whatever 
part of the deadband we were in to the 
center of the deadband, which was not ef­
ficient in fuel usage. The LIMIT CYCLE 
was also very good with the 1M on. This 
was illustrated during the EVA attitude 
holding in which we did a complete SCS 
hold with the BMAG's uncaged, and MAX 
deadband low rate, six jet in that we 
6-16 eO~~FIDENTIAl 
SCOTT turned quads A and B off electrically and 
turned D roll off and the LIMIT CYCLE ON. 
The holding seemed to be very smooth and 
very efficient. 
6.2.1 Control 
SCOTT I 
----~~ 
found that the MINIMUM IMPULSE was the 
most used motor control for the spacecraft. 
We used this because it was a fuel saver. 
6.2.2 Thrust Vector Control 
SCOTT The MTVC on SPS number 3 was as expected 
with the exception of the difficulty in 
stopping the error needle movement. It 
was easy to fly and easy to hold the 
error needles in a position, but the 
needles didn't appear to stay in a fixed 
position as long as they had in the simu­
lations. 
cONFIDENTIA'=' 
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6.3 Service Propulsion System 
SCOTT The SPS helium tank pressure indicator 
onboard went to zero at lift-off and 
remained zero throughout the flight, and 
the ground data were okay. 
6.3.8 PUGS 
SCHWEICKART The propellant utilization gaging system 
appeared to behave in what could only be 
described as a very erratic manner as 
long as it was powered up. On SPS 1, just 
at the end of the burn, the SPS PU 
sensor caution warning light was illu­
minated and the oxidizer unbalance read 
full scale DECREASE, which was what caused 
the light to illuminate. This system was 
used for the next several SPS burns and 
behaved very erratically. The system was 
switched from NORMAL to AUXILIARY after 
the light lit up on SPS 2. The auxiliary 
-EeNFIDENTIM 
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 system also behaved in an erratic manner 
with the oxidizer unbalance fluctuating 
in an erratic manner between full-scale 
HIGH or full-scale INCREASE to full-scale 
DECREASE. Following SPS 3, the ground 
recommended disabling the SPS PU sensor. 
At a subsequent point in the flight, a 
special test procedure was sent up and 
carried out with the read-outs for the 
test appearing to be normal, except that 
the oxidizer and fUel quantity displays 
were not balanced and never returned to 
a balanced condition. However, the 
test 1 and test 2 slewing of the system 
appeared to work in a completely normal 
manner. The PUGS was again activated 
for SPS burn 7 and the PUGS mode switch 
at this point was in PRIMARY. Once 
again in this burn we obtained ,the SPS 
PU sensor caution and warning light. It 
was then deactivated for the last time 
and it was not used during the deorbit 
burn. 
CONFIDENTIAb­
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6.4 Reaction Control System 
SCOTT 
This was a burn that took place after 
we had a 6.5-minute negative accelera­
tion on the service module. There was 
some concern about some very terri~le 
things happening within the propellant 
retention tanks and within the engine 
as we started the engine again ~ and we 
went through this burn. I'd just like 
to s~ that the burn was perfectly nom­
inal. I did not see any change in the 
chamber pressure. We did not experience 
any chugs, bumps, or thumps. The engine 
burned, on this burn, as it had on all 
the previous burns. I guess it should 
be pointed out that we used 18-second~ 
four-jet ullage prior to this maneuver; 
but that was the only thing that was not 
standard in the whole maneuver. 
We noted at lift-off that C quad was less 
than 100 percent in propellant quantity. 
It remained the low-indicated quad 
throughout. When it came time to switch 
EONFIDENTIAL 
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to the secondary propellant system, the 
values passed up from the ground for 
the switchover were 44 percent indicated, 
and 170 psi. The quantity went down to 
40 and the pressure never went less than 
about 172 psi which indicated that the 
secondary propellant valve had already 
been opened at some point. Because 
these switches are spring loaded, it 
seems like it might be a good idea to 
guard these particular switches if you 
wanted to be certain that you did have 
switchover at the proper time, or that 
the secondary switching was available. 
On the propellant isolation valves, 
prior to transposition and docking or 
the separation ~rom the S-IVB, they all 
indicated gray. Subsequent to the sep­
aration and the turnaround, in discover­
---~rngwe had no left translation, we found 
that the primary and secondary quad C 
isolation valves were closed as indicated 
by barber pole talkbacks and that the 
secondary quad D isolation valves were 
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6.4.2 CM RCS 
SCOTT 
CONFIDENTIAb 
closed as indicated by a barber pole 
talkback. We are reasonably certain this 
did not occur because of any manual con­
tact with the switches, and this may 
also be an indication that the quad C 
secondary propellant valve had opened 
prior to the point in the flight when 
we expected the quad C primary system 
to deplete to the pOint where we were 
to open it manually. After discovering 
the barber poles during transposition 
and docking, the switches were activated 
to open the isolation valves and all 
performed normally. 
During the descent on the mains at the 
conclusion of the CM RCS dump, a large 
red cloud engulfed the spacecraft. The 
CM RCS injectors remained at a relatively 
high temperature throughout the flight 
and I believe we never got less than 
4.8 volts indicated on the systems test 
meter. 
-ceNFIDENTIA~ 
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6.5 Electrical Power System 
SCOTT The condenser exhaust temperature on fuel 
cell 2 exceeded the caution and warning 
limits early in the flight. They remained 
high throughout the daytime activities 
when we were powered up, and went down 
during the night when we were powered 
down after the 02 purges. Finally, after 
two long H2 purges, after day 5, the en­
tire fuel cell seemed to get well and 
operate normally throughout the rest of 
the flight. During this later portion 
of the flight, we kept the power level 
relatively constant throughout the day 
and night cycle. 
SCHWEICKART 	 On one of the first fuel cell purge 
cycles, the 02 f+ow on fuel cell 2 in­
creased to a much greater extent than 
nominal. The fuel cell 2 warning light 
came on. It was noticed that the DELTA 
in the 02 flow, for the purge on fuel 
cell 2, was indeterminately high ­
indeterminate because the gage was pegged 
at the top of the meter. We couldn't 
GONFIDENTIA~ 
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SCHWEICKART 	 determine how high the flow was, but this 
phenomenon exhibited itself through sev­
eral cycles on the O2 purge valve.How­
ever, on all subsequent purges, the purge 
flow was completely normal. So this re­
mains as an unknown. 
6.5.10 Cryogenic System 
SCOTT 	 The primary problem was in the H2 . We 
spent a considerable amount of the flight 
time changing switch configurations and 
adjusting the pressure on the H2 tanks, 
purging, and a number of assorted tech­
niques, to try to maintain the H2 tank 
pressures within the limits. And one 
problem was that the normal operating 
range of H2 tank 1 was below the caution 
and warning limit which provided a num­
ber of periods with the caution and warn­
ing light on. This necessitated going 
to an acknowledge situation and a cau­
tion and warning panel which further 
complicated malfunction detection. 
Another associated problem was the occa­
on of sleep cycles to 
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SCOTT 	 adjust or turn off a caution and warning 
light. The first time we got a cryo light 
on the H2 was 40 minutes into the flight. 
We had one off and on for the rest of the 
flight. The entire operation of switch­
ing heaters from AUTO to ON and fans from 
AUTO to ON for the H2 systems 'should be 
automatic. 
6.6 Environmental Control System 
SCOTT 	 Early in the flight, it was noted that 
the surge tank pressure was low, and upon 
checking the turn-on valve it was found 
that it had to be turned approximately 
30 degrees past the ON position to fill 
the surge tank. In other words, the 
looseness and the sloppiness in the valve 
turn-on resulted in our thinking that the 
surge tank had been filling or was on, 
and it actually was not. 
6.6.2 Cabin Atmosphere 
SCOTT We found that it was necessary to locate 
the hoses properly to provide adequate 
circulation throughout the cabin and 
EONFIDENTIAl ./ 
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McDIVITT 
maintain an even cabin temperature. The 
screens on the hoses worked very well. 
There was no need to detect any glycol, 
but we did have a quantity of water on 
the floor after the SPS burns number 5 
and number 7. There was a considerable 
amount of water on the center of the 
floor. The source was the ECU. We never 
had the opportunity to open up the panels 
and get in the ECU to find out the exact 
point at which the water collected. It 
looked like the amount of water was 
4 ounces or so. 
I looked at the ECS plumbing lines, 
probably five or six times during the 
flight. They were alwa;ys wet, not all 
of them, but the ones that were cold 
were wet. There was only one time that 
there was an excessive amount of water 
on any of them. I think that was probably 
on the da;y before RETRO. There was a 
great big gob of water on one of the 
lines. I took the little vacuum cleaner 
and sucked it off and looked at the rest 
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of the lines, which had little droplets 
too small to· vacuum up. 
The cabin seemed to have considerably 
more particles after we had opened the 
hatch and gone into the 1M on each of the 
1M days. After the EVA, the cabin had 
cleaned out considerably. But still, on 
getting into the LM, we had more floating 
particles. After the 1M was gone, the 
cabin seemed to clean up much better and 
we had a lot less lint and fewer particles 
on the screens. Toward the end of the 
flight, the amount of debris picked up on 
the hose screens seemed to increase al­
though the amount of debris on the suit 
circuit return valve screens seemed to 
decrease. But overall, the cabin got 
cleaner as the flight went on. Odor re­
moval seemed to work well and tHe cabin 
seemed to clear out in 5 minutes. One 
other item in the ECS was the cabin fan 
failure which occurred at approximately 
153 hours in the flight. We had cabin 
fan nuDi:ber 2 on, and the cabin temperature 
EONFIDENTIAl-­
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SCOTT 	 had risen to 75 degrees. We turned 2 off 
and 1 on, and apparently cabin fan num­
ber 1 did not work. Jim reached in and 
felt that the housing around the fan was 
hot. After about 3 minutes, we turned 
fan 1 off and pulled the circuit breakers. 
We did not use it any more during the 
flight. On visual inspection of the fan, 
we saw a piece of Velcro webbing in the 
fan blades. It looked like it was a 
. piece missing off the DSKY table in the 
1M. It looks like the particles that got 
into the fan must have entered through 
the front, the exit point of the fan. It 
is recommended that perhaps a screen be 
placed over the exit hole to prevent 
pieces from drifting in. 
6.6.3 Water Supply System 
SCOTT 	 Associated with the waste tank servicing 
valve was the necessity to gather a number 
of parts and pieces to dump the waste tank, 
which was a time-consuming, inefficient, 
process, particularly because of the 
eONFIDE~~TIAl 
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storage locations of all these pieces 
and different boxes throughout the space­
craft. It was noted at about 175 hours 
that the captive wire on the waste tank 
servicing port cap came off the cap. It 
remained attached to the pan~l and got 
in the w~ of the cap when the cap was 
replaced. On chlorine injection, it is 
recommended that the chlorine be put in 
the water system at night prior to the 
sleep period to enable it to mix with 
the water so you don't have a slug of 
chlorine when you try to drink it. Even 
when this was done at night a number of 
hours later, we did get a high concentra­
tion of chlorine from several squirts 
out of the water" systems. 
I'd like to discuss the food preparation 
and the drinking water together. Early 
in the flight we were drinking water out 
of the water gun and it was coming through 
with a large amount of gas in it. As 
soon as I had had a good drink of water, 
I could begin to feel my stomach rumble. 
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It felt like I was blowing up like a 
balloon. We used the water gun for a 
while at the beginning of the flight 
because we did not alwS¥s have time to 
fill a bag full of water and try to sep­
arate the gas out that wa:y. During the 
early parts of the flight, I think we 
were all bothered by the gas in our 
stomachs. Throughout the flight when 
we were preparing food, we got great 
gobs of gas into the water bags. On a 
number of occasions I managed to fill a 
food bag with hot water so that it was 
a fairly hard cylinder with only two 
squirts from the food pTeparation gun. 
Normally, if you're putting just pure 
water into the thing, you can get 7 or 
8 squirts at least. It was an indication 
of the amount of gas we were getting in. 
Sometimes the bags were at least half 
filled with gas. For the last 4 or 
5 da:ys of the flight, we attempted to 
drink only from drinking bags. We found 
that this, in some wa:y, alleviated the 
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the gas pr.oblem, although it was a far 
cry from what I would consider to be 
even a semidesirable situation. 
Prior to launch, we were alternately hot 
and very humid. I shouldn't· say hot, I 
guess very humid, warm, or cold in the 
suits. This was a repeat of what had 
happened during countdown demonstration 
tests except that we started using the 
suit heat exchanger bypass valve earlier, 
and did not get quite as cold as we had 
during CDDT. It turned out that the 
CDDT changer bypass valve could not be 
modulated in small increments. It was 
required that we modulate the valve in 
20-second increments which I believe 
was changing the valve from full open 
to full close. We were at one extreme 
or the other extreme and never really 
at a comfortable position on this par­
ticular valve. Once we got into orbit, 
we found that the modulation was not 
required when we had it in full flow 
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and we remained comfortable the rest of 
the time. 
We had one anomaly with the ECS radiator 
flow control. One night, it automatically 
switched to secondary proportioning valve. 
Subsequent manual operation to the pri­
mary resulted in no further problems. 
After going manually to number 1, we 
later switched to AUTO and it quit run­
ning properly for the rest of the flight. 
The suit inlet temperatures during flight 
and those experienced during operation 
on the ground were quite similar, but 
the sensation in the suit was extremely 
different. I should also point out here 
that the CDR and the CMP had a different 
sensation than the LMP, whose hoses were 
considerably longer. It is probable 
that the heat exchange from the hose to 
the cabin over this long run would tend 
to modifY the flow tha,t his suit actually 
received. Prior to HErRO, we cold soaked 
the cabin and actually detected the 
<tG1>~FIDENTLA,l 
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decrease in the cabin temperature, al­
though it was not a drastic decrease. 
It went down probably 5 or 6 degrees. 
Is a grounding strap really needed on 
the LiOH canister? It requires a lot of 
extra work. 
The cabin air return valve had a sticky 
handle. It was very difficult to open 
and close. I guess ·we knew this prior 
to flight and it never improved any dur­
ing flight. 
Prior to the lift-off, I had some of our 
people check to ensure that the lithiUm 
hydroxide canisters were labeled properly, 
so we would not get them mixed up in 
flight. I was assured that each canister 
was labeled. In orbit, we started to 
perform our first lithium hydroxide can­
ister change following the instructions 
in the flight plan which were quite spe­ , 
cific in telling us which box to open and 
which one to pullout. We went down to 
the box which contained the requisite 
number of lithium hydroxide canister. 
GO~FIDENTIAl / 
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After opening the box, we found that the 
lithium hydroxide canisters were not 
individually marked. They all had a 
bunch of useless numbers, like part num­
bers, drawing numbers, and things like 
that that were absolutely ?f no operational 
use to us. It turned out that each and 
every LiOR canister looked like every 
other LiOR canister. Now, this is fine 
if one has plenty of time to start paint­
ing canisters in orbit. We were extremely 
busy during the first part of the flight 
and had to take an additional amount of 
time to get.the tape out and label the 
canisters as to which time it was used, 
when it was changed and stowed. Now it 
turned out that some of these canisters 
had to be reused at the end of the flight. 
Therefore, after we used the canister we 
couldn't afford to get it mixed up. When 
we placed it back into the suit loop, into 
the LiOR canister holder, we had to tear 
the tape off (because it was a foreign 
object) and try to stow the tape someplace 
-€OMFIDENTIAt 
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where it could be found later 	to put itMcDIVITT 
back on. It seems to me like there should 
be painted numbers on the LiOR canisters, 
as well as a decal or something so that 
we could mark when they had been changed, 
and what the PC02 was when it came out. 
This would c~rtainly be worthwhile. It 
could really cause a problem if we had 
put a used LiOR canister in one of these 
things and had the PC0 quantity warning2 
light come on during an EVA or a rendez­
vous. We would have had to go change 
the LiOR canister in a less than desir­
able situation. We could have had 
pretty bad results from a simple little 
mission like this. 
6.6.6 	 Gaging System 
The gaging systems worked properly.McDIVITT 
6.6.7 	 Waste Management System 
McDIVITT The waste management system left a little 
bit to be desired. The roll-on cuffs 
that we were supplied with in the space­
craft ~ of a number of different sizes. 
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In some cases they didn't match the ones 
that we were launched with in the suit 
in other cases were too large or too 
small. It seemed like a little coordina­
tion between the people that placed the 
roll-on cuffs in the spacecraft would 
certainly. alleviate some of our problems. 
It turned out that some people use only 
the UCD's because they had the cuffs that 
would fit. Other people use only UCTA's 
because they had the cuffs that only 
would fit. Therefore, we ended up with 
a management job on the waste management 
system that didn't necessarily need to be. 
As to operation of the plumbing portion 
of the system, it was certainly adequate 
and we had no. operational or draining 
difficulty with the bladders. Of some 
interest is the fact that whenever we 
had a urine dump we could see the dump 
matter being deposited on the different 
windows and on top of the LM. After some 
time most of this dissipated; however, 
the left-hand (number 1) window began to 
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accumulate particles. At the end of the 
flight, it had considerably more particles 
on it than it did at the beginning. 11m 
sure that this was due to the urine dumps. 
Prior to flight, we had some discussion 
about the size of the hole in the long 
underwear as to whether it should have 
a drop seat, a long slit, a flap, or one 
of a number of other things. In an effort 
to keep down the changes, we agreed to go 
with whatever size hole we had in our 
underwear. I must, at this time, say 
that they were indeed too small. The 
slit should have been another 6 or 
8 inches longer than it was. I ripped 
mine early in, the flight just to provide 
a reasonable size hole there and after 
that it seemed to operate properly. 
Some of the people feel that the removal 
of the underwear is the best attack to 
the problem. 
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6.7 Telecommunications 
6.7.2 Individual Audio Center Controls 
6.7.6 
SCOTT 
S-Band 
SCOTT 
6.7.7 Tape Recorders 
SCHWEICKART 
Audio center number 10 panel is very 
inconvenient to operate. 
On the S-Band volume amplifier, we had 
to switch to the secondary power amplifier 
during one of the rest periods at night. 
Everything appeared to work normally from 
that time on. The rendezvous radar trans­
ponder worked properly. The dump check 
was within limits and I got one data point 
at 97:19:00 during the rendezvous; the' 
voltage was 2.3 and the range was approxi­
mately 50 nautical miles. 
There was a moment of hesitancy just 
prior to the deorbit burn when operation 
of the tape recorder reverted to manual 
control. According to the checklist as 
updated by the ground, I was to place 
the tape recorder to FORWARD, HIGH BIT 
EONFIDENTIM­
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6.1.12 	 vox Circuitry 
SCOTT 
RATE in RECORD and then position the UP 
TELEMETRY 	 command reset switch to RESET 
and then back to NORMAL at which time 
the recorder should have begun operation. 
Although these procedures were followed, 
the tape 	recorder talkback remained bar­
ber pole. 	 There was no time to trouble­
shoot it because the average g was already 
on and we 	 were down to the point.of ullag­
ing for the deorbit burn. The next ti;ne~-
I looked back at the talkback was during 
or very shortly after the burn and at 
that time 	it was indicating gray. I do 
not know whether it was commanded ON by 
MSFN or whether there was a time delay 
associated 	with starting the tape re­
corder. 
I'd like to comment that the ground did 
a good job 	handling the tape recorders. 
With exception of the deorbit burn that 
was all handled by ground RTC's. 
The VOX circuitry worked very well except 
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for the time delay after the termination 
of the voice. Because of the long time 
delay, confusion resulted during the EVA 
portion of the flight. Because the CDR 
in the 1M was not aware of the long delay 
time, the transmissions became confusing. 
It's recommended that perhaps the delay 
time be reduced to something comparable 
with the 1M. 
It is recommended that the ARIA aircraft 
be in a standby basis as they were during 
the later portion of the flight and be 
used only when requested. Several times 
when they were automatically up and trans­
mitting, the noise was so loud that the 
rest of the communications between the 
two spacecraft was completely distorted. 
This made it very difficult to square 
away the COMM situation. This occurred 
even when the spacecraft was operating 
solo. 
€ONFIDENTIAt­
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6.8 Mechanical 
SCOTT 
6.8.1 	 Probe 
SCOTT 
Most of this has been discussed within 
the context of the operational flow. 
The only anomaly noted was on the probe; 
the extended latch was not completely 
over the roller at the completion of the 
1M docking and had to be closed with the 
preload handle. Prior to the 1M separa­
tion and rendezvous, latches number 1 
and 8 appeared to malfunction until they 
had been cycled. This is discussed in 
the rendezvous portion. It might be 
noted that the stowage of the probe, the 
drogue, and the hatch in the command 
module during intravehicular transfer 
worked out very well using the locations 
in the LEB. The probe was placed under 
the right couch seat pan, the drogue was 
placed on top of the probe and seat pan 
combination and held down with the probe 
retention straps. 
EONFIDENllAt 
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The side hatch worked very well with the 
exception of the counter balance arm 
connection roller. The piece on the 
hatch to which the counter balance is 
attached with a pit pin rolls along the 
hatch connection on two rollers. It is 
supposed to be captive and is not exactly 
optimum because one of the two rollers 
came out during the EVA. They slipped 
over the bar which is supposed to retain 
it in a captive position. And the hatch 
gearbox shear pin indicators are unaccept­
able and should be re-marked to enable 
a more direct interpretation of the posi­
tion of the shear pin. 
On the overall operation of the side 
hatch, if the gear box fails, there 
should be more information and descrip­
tions on backup hatch-closing techniques 
and procedures relative to the gear­
linkage disconnect and lockup. Also the 
use of the Jack screws could be improved. 
E9NFIDENTIAl 
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LUNAR MODULE SYSTEMS OPERATIONS 
The LM inertial subsystem operated as 
expected. I think the only thing deserv­
ing of comment was that the IMU docked 
alignment (which had been developed to 
relieve the requirement for maneuvering 
the docked combination to obtain an atti­
tude reference for the 1M) worked as it 
had during the simulations. I think that 
the GYRO torquing angles, which were ob­
tained with active alignment following the 
undocking on the rendezvous day, were good 
evidence that the docked alignment itself 
was very accurate. Following the last 
docked IMU alignment, and following sepa­
ation and undocking, an active 1M align­
ment was performed and the resultant gyro 
torquing angles were minus 0.09, minus 
0.076, and plus .111 degrees. The star angle 
difference on this alignment was five 
zero's. These gyro torquing angles were 
obtained during about 2.5 hours between 
eONFIDENTIAt­
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the last docked realignment and the active 
1M alignment after undocking. I guess 
th~ primary point in bringing this up is 
that the docked IMU alignment procedures, 
in coordination with the ground updating 
of the gyro torquing angles, appeared to 
work very well. In fact, quite a bit bet­
ter than we had anticipated prior to 
flight. I think this is a very powerful 
tool which ought to be employed in future 
missions for freeing the timeline from 
the constraint of having to do an align­
ment at night, and maneuvering the docked 
vehicles.· .This alignment can be done very 
rapidly and has no constraints other than 
that the command module platform be up 
and aligned, and that the 1M platform also 
be up. The other obvious advantage of 
this type of alignment is that there is 
essentially zero fuel required to obtain 
r 
a very good alignment of the 1M platform. 
The only requirement preflight, to obtain 
this type of accuracy in the docked align­
ment, is that the relative geometry between 
SCHWEICKART 
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the two navigation bases be very well 
known. There have been techniques devel­
oped which would permit these measurements 
to be made at the manufacturing plants 
prior to the shipping of the vehicles to 
the Cape. However, these do involve some 
minimal time in the flow of the vehicles. 
In our opinion, this required time is well 
spent; however, this is a very controversial 
item. 
I'd like to comment a little on spacecraft 
attitude control system here. We used 
PGNS in PULSE, ATTITUDE HOLD and AUTO. In 
each one of these modes the digital auto 
pilot performed up to my greatest expecta­
tions. There was no unnecessary limit 
cycling and I think that it's an excellent 
control system. The only reason I'm men­
tioning it here is I'm sure there was a 
lot of interest in finding out how it per­
formed. Rather than just skip it and say 
it's nominal, I want definitely to say 
that I think it was a good control system. 
t:ONFIDENTIAL 
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items that looked, preflight, like it 
might be very interesting -- was the dock­
ed DPS burn without any RCS engines fir­
ing. This was much better than we had 
expected. The attitude excursions were 
down to a couple of degrees and the resid­
uals were very low. It performed again -­
as good, or better than -- I had expected, 
probably better than I had expected. All 
the other thrust vector control operations 
were good. The attitude excursions were 
usually less than a couple of degrees, 
and certainly within the realm of what 
one would expect with the RCS engines, 
throttlable DPS, or the fixed APS. 
On the optical subsystem we found that, 
much to our surprise, we could actually 
see some stars in the daylight. The first 
alignment was made with the sun still 
shining on the 1M. We took ten marks, 
five X and five Y marks on Sirius in the 
daylight. I was not only able to see 
Sirius, but could also see Canis Major and 
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identif,y it as the constellation with the 
bright star. We have made an AUTO maneuver 
to the star. We were able to do this be­
cause of the previously mentioned docked 
IMU alignment. 
The dimmer control worked fine. I used 
the technique of dimming the reticle as 
the star approached the X and Y lines to 
ensure that the star was under the line 
and being blanked out by the line at the 
time I took the mark. The technique of 
dimming the reticle, and then brightening 
it up is a technique that worked very well 
for me. I might add that we only used 
the AOT in the forward detent for align­
ments, and it worked very well. The cor­
relation between left and right, and up 
and down as viewed through the optics 
(and what one really had to do to make 
that happen) was very good. The field of 
view was what it was supposed to be ­
60 degrees. When we placed the radar to 
the 283-degree shaft position, it was out 
of the field of view in the AOT. We pulled 
CONFIE)ENTIAt­
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the circuit breakers and left it in this 
position and even though the spacecraft 
was maneuvering around, the radar stayed 
out of the field of view and was no factor 
whatsoever in alignments. 
.. 
There did not appear to be any parallax 
in the AOT. In attempting to focus the 
AOT, I did have some difficulty focusing 
the stars and the reticle all together. 
Throughout the simulations, we had had 
trouble trying to get the image of the 
crosshair and the image of the star in 
the same place. I found that even in 
flight we had trouble -- I had trouble 
with positioning my eye so that I could see 
everything. Quite often, I would see the 
reticle and not stars, or the stars and 
not the reticle. I should add here, that 
I was not using the rubber eyepiece and 
that I had plenty of room to move my 
head. Itm sure that this was the reason. 
But it did become aggravating at times. 
It is also worthy to note, I guess, that 
we can see through the telescope with 
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our helmets on. When the radar was stowed, 
we could look through the telescope and 
see that it was stowed right in front of 
us. We also used the AOT to watch the 
radar come from the stowed position around 
to mode 1. One thing that I did find to 
be quite aggravating was that the reticle 
and the stars did not appear to be focused 
at the same point and that I could, in 
moving my head around, get the reticle in 
focus and the stars out of focus, or vice 
versa. 
I found that in the time-critical situa­
tions we had -where we were trying to 
get these alignments in, just an absolute 
minimum amount of time -- that I could 
get the star near the cross of the reticle; 
I also found if I moved my head just the 
very slightest amount that one of the two 
of them would disappear or would become 
dim or out of focus. While I'm sure we 
are not going to change the design of the 
AOT, I think it's certainly worthwhile for 
the people who are going to use it to be 
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1-8 
McDIVITT 
-eONFIDENftAt 
aware of this. I found it to be quite 
similar to the way the optics operated 
in the LMS. To clarify I should also 
., 
mention here that I think that in no way 
is it unusable. It is just that it takes 
a little bit longer to use them than I 
wanted to spend during the mission. It 
was a rather aggravating situation, espe­
cially on one occasion where we got a very 
nice star crossing on the Y line, and it 
turned out that Just as the thing crossed, 
I lost sight of -- I believe the star -­
because I managed to move ~ head a little. 
While I was doing these star sightings, I 
was not restrained to the floor; and I 
was holding on to the AOT guard, the pipe, 
the guard built out of the aluminum pipes 
that goes around it, and the control box. 
I had no difficulty whatsoever floating 
there and actually making the marks. In 
simulations we found that when I did this, 
I got in his way. We would end up folding 
up the table that went in front of the 
DSKY. Let's say we had some interference, 
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but that we had expected it because we 
ran across it in the simulations. What 
Rusty did (and I did not see him doing 
it) was fold up the table on top of the 
DSKY, when we got the flashing VERB 54 
(which indicated to start taking marks) 
and then he unfolded the table when we 
were ready to do our maneuver to the next 
star. One thing that might be worth men­
tioning here, and it's just an opinion; 
there has been much discussion about 
whether or not one could make a star AOT 
alignment on the lunar surface. We didn't, 
obviously, have the kind of environment 
that one would have on the lunar surface; 
but we did make the first alignment on 
Sirius, as I mentioned earlier, with the 
sun over our shoulder, the way you would 
expect it to be on the lunar surface. 
However, there were no objects in front 
of us to reflect light back into the AOT. 
The guard that we had around the AOT cer­
tainly kept the light from the sun, which 
was behind us, out of the AOT and there 
.  ­
7-10 
McDIVITT 
EONFIDENTiAL­
wasn't anything in front of us to reflect 
back. So I did see the star in the day­
light and whether or not I could have 
seen it on the ground would, I think, 
depend entirely upon what the lunar re­
flectance into the AOT itself would be. 
I might also add here that here were a 
couple of pie~e~ of debris on the AOT. 
I could see two blaCK. spots on it, one of 
them quite close to the center, and I 
think the other one was off to one side. 
They did not interfere in any way with 
the alignments. When we were looking 
down on top of the 1M from the command 
module, we could see all kinds of white 
spots allover it. As the flight wore 
on there were a whole bunch of white par­
ticles that had collected on the left-hand 
(number 1) window on the command module. 
MY personal opinion is that these parti­
cles came from urine and water dumps 
that we were making, and I wouldn't be 
a bit .surprised if the debris on top 
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of the AOT were a result of one of these 
dumps. 
When we unlocked the rendezvous radar 
and slewed it around to the front, we 
were able to monitor it with the AOT; 
it tracked right on around and operated 
just the way we had seen it in the simul­
ations and in the tests on the ground. 
We were able to slew it left, right, up, 
down, and all the ways that it was sup­
posed to operate. It operated properly 
under LGC control. We had mentioned 
earlier the problem that we had with the 
rendezvous radar self-test. When it was 
in the stowed position, we were unable 
to indicate a range input to the computer, 
except on one occasion, and we did the 
test a number of times. However, once 
we got the thing unstowed and operated 
it in a normal mode, we found that it 
operated very well. 
In watching the AGC during the rendezvous, 
I was pleasantly surprised to find that 
the actual signal strength, when compared 
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posed to demonstrate the signal strength­
versus-range data), was a little bit above 
it all the way through. I've got some 
numbers here that would be of some interest, 
I believe. At 45 miles, I read an AGe of 
2.4; at 85 miles I read an AGe of 2.19; 
at 98 miles, which was our maximum range, 
I read an AGe of 2.17; and at 52 miles, 
I read an AGe of 2.39, which correlates 
very closely with the 2.4 at 45 miles. 
In all instances, I was able to' determine 
from the AGe signal strength that I in­
deed had a main lobe lock-on. I did about 
half the lock-on verification optically 
and the other h~lf using the signal 
strength. When we compared the shaft 
and trunnion readouts through the DSKY, 
and the display of the shaft and trunnion 
error needles, we found that they were 
in very close agreement. 
When we also compared the range and range 
rate from the tape meter with that read 
-  
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out in the DSKY, we found that they were 
in very close agreement. 
In tracking, we used the pulse mode most 
of the time and were generally able to 
track and keep the vehicle within 10 de­
grees of the proper attitude and generally 
within 4 or 5 degrees of the zero on the 
Z-axis. Acquisition time was nominal; 
there was nothing abnormal about that. 
One thing that was of some interest: when 
I did a couple of manual slews towards 
lockon, I noticed that we really had three 
lobes that I could see. We were at moder­
ate range then. We had the main lobe, 
which was quite prominent, and then we had 
the first side lobe; then I noticed another 
side lobe. I didn't slew it out to see if 
we had other side lobes outside of that. 
I believe the slew was in the plane of 
the orbit so that I would be slewing up 
and down while I was pointed at the tar­
get. I should say that we never really 
have seen anymore than the second side 
lobe in any of our simulations. It wasn't 
a factor; it was just an interesting 
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McDIVITT point. This was in the LMS simula­
tions. I think I would like to sum 
up the operation of the radar here 
and say that it performed almost perfectly. 
There was only one anomaly that I noticed 
through the whole thing and I'd like to 
expand on that a little bit right at 
this time. I was using the AGe signal 
strength as a "howgozit" all the way. 
I checked it, probably every 30 seconds, 
for the 6 or 8 hours we were separated. 
It behaved just exactly as I had expected 
it to behave, except just prior to TPI. 
I'm not exactly sure of the time. I'm 
sure if we go back and look at the data 
we can get this from the downlink; but 
at approximately 6 minutes or so, the 
signal strength started decreasing from 
about 2.5 (or 2.6, or whatever it was) 
at that range of approximately 35 or 
40 miles. It very gradually went down 
" " '~o 1. 6 and then very gradually came back 
up again. The command module at this 
time was not making any maneuvers. It 
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was probably pointed right at the 1M, 
at least until the TPI minus 5-minute 
point. The 1M was not maneuvering be­
cause we were going to do Z-axis thrust­
ing (which meant that we were going to 
thrust with the Z-axis pointed right at 
the spacecraft), and because we were 
already in that attitude, I didn't have 
to make any maneuvers. So for some 
unknown reason, the signal strength went 
down very smoothly from around 2.5 to 1.6 
and then very smoothly back up to what­
ever it was. It took about 3 or 4 minutes 
for this transition to take place. At 
the time I thought, "Well, the command 
module was maneuvering and I malf break 
lock because he's going to be pointing 
the wrong direction"; but 10 minutes 
later it dawned on me that he really 
hadn't done any maneuvering, or cer­
tainly no gross maneuvering, and that 
we had had an anomaly at that time. 
It is also interesting to note here at 
the CDR maneuver because we had some 
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we maneuvered around to the burn atti­
tude, the radar stayed locked on. It 
stayed locked on, I believe, all the 
way through the burn. After we finished, 
we were doing the,postburn checklist and 
were just about to start maneuvering 
back to the tracking attitude, when the 
radar broke lock. (I think if weld been 
30 seconds quicker we'd h~ve been able 
to get around without the radar ever 
breaking lock, and would not have had to 
go through the lock-on again, although 
the lock-on was no problem.) We locked 
on and were able to verifY from the 
signal strength that we had indeed had 
a primary lobe lock-on. I might add 
that as we went through the zero-range­
rate point, both on the maxi football 
and at 98 miles, we got the red light 
flashing on and off and the range rate 
tape - just the way the book says it 
will do when we have low range rates. 
I don!t recall this light flashing on 
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and off at any other time during the 
mission, although it may have. The 
radar stayed locked on as we came into 
very close range of the command module. 
As a matter of fact, when we were in at 
about 25 feet or so, we tried to break 
lock by manually slewing the antenna. 
We slewed it to both up and down limits, 
and were unable to make it break lock. 
I was monitoring the radar temperature 
throughout the rendezvous and from the 
several points that I plotted on our 
onboard chart, it appeared that the 
antenna temperature at all times was on 
the order of 5 to 10 degrees below the 
expected temperature curve. 
The landing radar operated as expected; 
at no time during the various operations 
of the landing radar was there any 
tendancy to lock on to a spur, at least 
not one that could be detacted visually 
on the cross pointers and the altitude/ 
altitude rate tape. The landing radar 
antenna temperature during the docked 
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 DPS burn had been reported earlier. 
Prior to the burn, it started out at 
degrees, worked its way up to just 
about 100 degrees by the time the 
6-minute burn was completed, and peaked 
out after the burn at about 110 degrees. 
The computer subsystem operated in a 
completely nominal manner. At no time 
did we experience any unexpected or un­
explained program alarm or restarts. 
The onlY",Qther comment that might be 
worthwhile mentioning was that on 
powering up the LGC on the rendezvous 
day we had expected to find the compu­
ter in standby after closing the LGC 
DSKY breaker (because we had powered it 
down in standby on the systems day). 
This did not turn out to be the case. 
After pressing the LGC DSKY breaker to 
CLOSE, the computer was witnessed to be 
in p06 with a flashing VERB 37 on the 
DSKY. 
At no time in powering up or powering 
down the LGC was an LGC or CMC warning 
· ...  
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caution and warning. There were never 
any PGNS, caution and warning lights 
on during the flight with the exception 
of the VERB 35 DSKY light check. 
L 
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All G&N controls and displays operated 
in the manner expected. 
There were no anomalies on the rotation 
hand controllers or the TTCA's. The cold 
fire check which was run is an excellent 
check of all the switching and interface 
between the hand controllers and the com­
puter. The check was performed very rap­
idly and in a completely nominal manner. 
All of the AGS alignments were as expected. 
I had the impression at one point during 
the flight (and I cannot recall exactly 
where) that I did see the CDU glitch on 
attempting to align the AGS to the PGNS. 
When I compared the AGS and PGNS attitude 
display on my FDAI, there appeared to be 
about a I-degree difference between them. 
I repeated the 400 to plus 30 000 several 
• 
t 
times and it did not appear to remove this 
I-degree difference between the two dis­
plays. There was not time to investigate 
this further at that time and all 
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subsequent alignments were completely 
normal. I could not visually detect any 
difference between the AGS and PGNS total 
attitude. 
Inertial reference appeared to be com­
pletely nominal with the single exception 
of the 407 switch jumping to its state 
of plus 10 000 prior to the ullage maneu­
vers. This was a considerable bother 
if one wanted to compare the PGNS and AGS 
attitude errors coming up on a burn -­
because it required babysitting to insure 
that the 400 remained at plus all zeros 
prior to the burn. 
The only automatic or semiautomatic maneu­
vering done under AGS control was the 
phasing burn and the ATTITUDE HOLD just 
prior to the phasing burn. This ATTITUDE 
HOLD mode in a local vertical attitude 
appeared to work as expected. There did 
not appear to be excessive RCS activity 
in working up to that burn, and the 
powered-flight control appeared to be at 
least as good as we had witnessed in the 
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simulations. The residuals at the phasing 
burn were very good: minus 0.9, minus 
0.8, and minus 0.6 ft/sec at cut-off. 
(Those residuals were the PGNS residuals 
following the phasing burn.) As reported 
t 
earlier during the rendezvous debriefing, 
at no time during the rendezvous was there 
greater than 1 ft/sec left in 500, 501, 
or 502 after burning the PGNS residuals 
to zero. The largest residual seen on the 
AGS were those fOllowing the docked DPS 
burn and the largest there was 5 ft/sec 
in Y, and that was after a 1740-ft/sec 
burn. 
CSM acquisition was not employed under 
AGS control during the mission. 
Under AGS initialization, we received 
quite a surprise, when in trying to ini­
tialize the AGS the first time, 414 did 
not jump back to its initial state of 
plus all zeros following the PNGS trans­
fer of the vector. After a slight delay, 
we were advised by the ground that it was 
required that the PCM bit rate be in HIGH 
€ONFIDE~~lIAt 
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to update the AGS successfully. This was 
new information to us. To our knowledge, 
no one with whom we came in contact 
through our training cycle was ever aware 
of this, or at least never advised us of 
this situation. We had experienced a 
similar problem in updating the AGS prior 
to flight in the LMS, but this was never 
related to the position of the telemetry 
bit rate, and always appeared to be an 
LMS problem in the AGS simulation. We 
did not receive a K-factor update from 
the ground for the AGS; that is, on ini­
tializing the VERB 47 AGS zero time, we 
used 40 hours on the systems day and 
90 hours on the rendezvous day and did 
not receive any updating of that time. 
The AGS calibration worked essentially 
as we had simulated it on the ground. 
We found no difficulty, once the initial 
attitude was obtained by the CSM, in 
avoiding the CDU switching attitudes for 
the 5 minutes plus of the calibration. 
The accelerometer bias calibrations 
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appeared to be very, very consistent, with 
the only change being witnessed on the 
first calibration of the flight. There­
after, the accelerometers never changed 
their bias. The gyro compensation numbers 
t 
did vary up to 0.2 degree from one cali­
bration to another. There did not appear 
to by any aystematic shift in the gyro 
compensation. 
Rendezvous radar navigation into the AGS 
(as was m~tioned earlier) appeared not 
/'" ./"to work as well as we had w~tnessed this 
process in the simulations. The operation. 
as far as the crew activity was concerned, 
presented about the same degree of diffi­
culty in positioning the Z-axis of the 
spacecraft to update the AGS. This was 
not a difficult task. although it did 
require precise control using MINIMUM 
IMPULSE mode on the part of the commander. 
The effect, or the power, of the updates 
did not appear to be as pronounced in 
bringing the AGS range/range rate into 
accord with the PGNS or range/range rate 
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readout on the tape meter (as we had wit­
nessed on the ground). My own personal 
opinion on this, which doesn't have any 
sUbstantiation yet, is that this is pri­
marily due to the fact that the AGS model 
in the 1MB has a greater word length than 
the actual AGS, and that this gives a false 
impression of the granularity of the AGS 
displays. 
Engine ON/OFF commands under AGS control 
appeared to have worked at least as well, 
or better, than we had witnessed on ground 
simulations. The phasing burn was ini­
tiated with two-jet ullage and there was 
no hesitancy in the AGS startup. The 
initial thrust transient on startup of 
the phasing burn was fairly rapid. We 
did not see a delay of 4 or 5 seconds in 
the thrust buildup_ It appeared to come 
on with no more than a 2-second-buildup 
time to 10 percent. There was no ques­
tion of when the ullage, the manual ull­
age, should be released at ignition • 
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 As far as the DEDA was concerned, the only 
anomalies that were witnessed in handling 
the DEDA was the illumination of the 
OPERATOR ERROR light in conjunction with 
the pressing of the CLEAR button. This 
t 
did not seem to be associated with a weak 
depression of the CLEAR button, but seemed 
almost a random occurrence. On several 
occasions, it was necessary to depress 
the CLEAR button three or four times 
sequentially before the OPERATOR ERROR 
light would disappear and further opera­
tions on the DEDA could be performed. As 
I say, this appeared to be almost a ran­
dom occurrence, and I was never able to 
correlate it with any particular opera­
tions or mode of programming in the AGS. 
On the caution and warning alarms on the 
rendezvous d~ --- from the time the AGS 
was powered up until the jettison of the 
LM for the APS burn at depletion - the AGS 
warning light on panel I was illuminated. 
Following the rendezvous, a short test 
was made by powering down the AGS and 
.... CONFIDE~~TIAL 
SCHWEICKART 

7-27EONFIDENTI.A.L 
repowering it, after resetting the cau­
tion and warning to see when the light 
came on in the sequence. The caution 
and warning light came on when moving 
the AGS status switch from OFF to STANDBY 
and did not disappear or would not in 
any way extinguish after resetting the 
caution and warning system. 
The CSI, CDR, and TPI programs appeared 
to operate pretty much as expected. 
Although again the solution displays 
the DELTA-V solutions - did jump around~ 
fluctuate, to a much greater extent than 
was ever witnessed in the LMB. I had 
anticipated this, because I had run 
several simulations in the FEMB at Grum­
man using an actual AGS. In those sim­
ulations, I became aware that the actual 
AGS performance in displaying maneuver 
solutions was considerably inferior to 
the nice steady displays we saw on the 
LMB. 
The external DELTA-V programming appeared 
to work in a completely nominal manner. 
e0NFIDENTIAl 
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profile was as expected on all burns. 
The AGS was targeted with external 
DELTA-V from the NOUN 86 read-out from 
the PGNS thrusting program, with the 
tsingle exception of the phasing burn, 
for which the ground pad values for the 
AGS were" loaded. This was due to the 
fact that a throttle-up was performed. 
The NOUN 86 values were computed based 
on a 10-percent profile. 
On TPI and the midcourses, rather than 
using the external DELTA-V targeting 
(AGS registered 404, 405, and 406) the 
AGS were zeroed. Monitoring was per­
formed by reading out 472, 471, and 470. 
EONFIDENTIAt" 
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The descent engine worked very well, a 
nominal kind of performance throughout 
the mission, except for the first start 
after the 40-second SPS burn. This was 
a phasing maneuver, and we had some 
rough combustion. We had about 20 per­
cent, I should add. 
Ignition and tail-off were nominal for 
all the burns. On the one rough com­
bustion start, the engine went to 
10 percent in its normal slow (but not 
too slow) manner. It was neither a step 
input nor a dribbling start. It was a 
nice smooth start up to 10 percent. We 
were supposed to start the throttle up 
at 5 seconds after ignition signal. It 
was approximately 5 seconds when I 
started the throttling and as I throt­
tled from 10 towards 40 percent, we had 
a rumbling in the engine. 
The acoustical environment was such that 
the descent engine could be felt more 
than heard at all times, even running at 
eONFIDENTIAl 
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McDIVITT 100 percent. There was no real noise 
in the spacecraft, but when the rough 
combustion started, I could feel it 
rumbling and I'm not sure that I didn't 
actually hear it. I stopped the 
throttle-up at approximately 20 percent. 
The rumbling stopped, and then I 
throttled up to 40 percent. It was 
smooth from that point on. The rumbling 
was very similar to a compression start 
on a jet engine, the rumbling kind. 
The rest of the operation of the engines 
were quite nominal. The helium regula­
tors were shut off on a docked DPS burn 
10 seconds before the shutdown, and we 
operated in a blowdown condition from 
that point on. When we started the 
engine for the other DPS burns, we had 
asymetric pressures in the oxidizer 
and fuel. At the beginning of the 
phasing maneuver, the fuel/oxidizer 
ratio pressures were such that the fuel 
was low. It was 12 ps i below the 
oxidizer. The same pressure differential 
OON-RDENltAl. 
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McDIVITT 	 was present for the insertion burn. 
The docked DPS burn, where we used the 
trim gimbal as the control method 
rather than any of the ReS thrusters, 
was excellent. The attitude excursions 
during this particular engine burn were 
very small, on the order of 2 or 3 de­
grees. The rates were low. We had no 
trouble at all with the attitude ex-
curs ions as we figured we might have 
prior to flight. 
When we got down to the throttling 
regions, we were able to throttle from 
100 percent to 40, to 10, back up to 
40, down to 25, and to 40 without any 
noticeable rumbling, chugging, or any 
other propulsion abnormality. There 
was one little bit of steering abnor­
mality that we encountered. I guess it 
was a dynamic problem that we had about 
a minute or so before we started the 
throttling profile. We could feel a 
small pulsing occur; estimates vary 
from approximately 1 cps to approximately 
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3 cps, which exhibited itself on the 
roll rate needle. There was just a tad 
of motion on the yaw rate needle, which 
I can't explain exactly, because it 
shouldn't couple into that direction. 
The prominent thing was the roll rate 
needle. It also could be felt and 
seen in the command module side. 
The engine firing frequency that I saw 
in the rate needles was not matching 
that which I felt through my feet. 
Shutdowns were made both manually and 
automatically. In both cases, they 
operated as expected. We allowed the 
engine to do an automatic throttle-up 
on the docked DPS burn. The throttle-
up was at the appropriate time, and it 
was very smooth. Throttling rocket 
engine responses are quick, throttling 
is precise, and it's a very nice control J 
system for thrust commanding. 
During the insertion burn, we used the 
throttle position of 10 percent, and as 
expected, we had some ReS activity to 
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maintain the spacecraft in the proper 

attitude. We did use the ReS engines. 

We expected to use the RCS engines at 

this low throttle settin~. 

Regarding descent propulsion system op­

eration when we fired the start bottle, 

it pressurized the system to 230 to 

240 psi. At the start of the docked DPS 

burn, the pressure began to decrease, 

went on down to somewhere between 180 and 

190. I don1t have the exact number avail­
able here. It reached that point and 
started back up again. I hadn1t seen 
anything like this in the simulator be­
fore. I should have been expecting it. 
I knew the pressure would drop, but I 
didn1t expect it to drop quite so far. 
The first thing that went across my mind 
was that the MASTER ALARM switch, which 
I had placed back to OFF after the start, 
had been placed back to OFF before the 
pyros had fired. I started to reach over 
to turn it back on again, when the pres­
sure started back up. But it did go down 
eGNFI-9ENTIAl 
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a lot farther than I expected. It's in­
teresting to note here that it decreased 
until after the engine had throttled up 
to the full throttle point, which means 
that it was decreasing from something on 
the order of 30 seconds or so. 
The cyro pressure gage for the supercrit­
ical helium for the DPS engine was inter­
mittent throughout the flight and would 
read the proper pressure for a time and 
then go to zero, and then it would come 
back and read proper pressure again. You 
could never tell whether you were going to 
have the proper pressure or the zero read­
ing on it. 
The ascent engine was fired for one time 
for 4 seconds. The start was abrupt, 
+ 
the shutdown was abrupt and there was 
no noticeable rumbling or any undesir­
able occurrences. The noise level 
during that 4 seconds did not seem to 
be too high in the spacecraft. I felt 
that I could have communicated if I had 
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anything to say. It was a little short 
really to evaluate the overall perform­
ance of the engine from a pilot's stand­
point. The start was ~utomatic and the 
shutdown was automatic. 
After pressurizing the ascent system, 
our procedure called for cycling the 
interconnect valves to their already 
selected position to ensure that they 
maintained operation through the 
EONFIDENT-lAL 
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ascent feed valves number 1 were cycled 
to the open position, which is their 
normal position, I was able to feel 
and/or hear (it's difficult to say 
which) the Parker valve snap to the open 
position. This was not evidenced on 
the talkbacks, which remained barber 
pole. The Parker valves evidently had 
unseated themselves during the 
pressurization. 
1.3.2 Translation Control Modes 
McDIVITT 	 The translation control modes have been 
covered earlier in the PGNCS and AGS 
sections. We were notified on the 
systems day that we had a failed thrust 
chamber pressure switch on system B, 
quad 4, the upfiring thruster. This 
was not a factor at any time during the 
flight. 
7.4.1 Electrical Power Subsystem 
SCHWEICKART 	 The batteries behaved in flight as 
expected. The only deviation from 
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procedures is a recommendation from 
MSFN to shut off descent battery num­
ber 4 in the early part of the systems 
day. The ascent battery activation and 
checkout went as prescribed in the 
procedure that was developed immediately 
prior to lift-Off, which verified the 
ascent battery feed paths without ever 
placing both ascent batteries on anyone 
bus. 
The pyro batteries maintained 36.8 and 
37.5 volts all through the flight, from 

the first time they were read through 

all the uses with the EV system. All 

indicators associated with the electri­

cal power system operated as expected. 

There was no noticeable sticking of the 

talkbacks on the descent BATS as we had 

anticipated from the chamber run. The 

switching of inverters from 1 to 2 and 

back did not cause the illumination of 

the master alarm light. 

The power transfer from CSM to LM and 

'-  
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ingress to the 1M, the system could be 
verified on CSM power by observing that 
the caution lamp on panel 2 was not 
illuminated. Subsequent to transfer 
power to the 1M, which was manifested 
by momentary dimming of the lights, the 
caution-and-warning power lamp was 
illuminated on panel 2, which indicated 
that the system was being powered by 
the 1M. Exactly symmetrical behavior 
was observed on switching back 	to CSM 
power at the end of the day. All other 
aspects of the electrical power 	system 
in the 1M operated in 	a completely 
straightforward and expected manner. 
7.4.2 	 Explosive',Devices 
The explosive devices operated through­
out the entire flight as expected. In 
all cases, we were able to hear and/or 
feel the selected device go. The single 
exception was the second activation of 
the landing gear deploy. The procedure 
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employed in deploying the landing 

gear was to utilize EDS B for the gear 

deployment. Following utilization of 

EDS B, logic power A breaker was closed, 

B was opened, and a second cycle was 

made on the landing gear deploy switch 

so that the A system pyros would fire. 

In this particular case, there was no 

sound or feel to the second activation 

of the landing gear deploy switch. 

All the interior lighting was adequate 

with the exception of the lighting in 

the aft cabin area for stowage of the 

OPS on the back wall and for tunnel 

operations. There was acceptable but 

less than desirable lighting in the aft 

cabin. One simply had to hand hold 

the utility light or coordinate with 

the other crewmen to illuminate the 

area of interest. 

Concerning exterior lighting, the dock­

ing lights were not visible in any way 

--  
7-40 
SCHWEICKART 
SCOTT 

~ONfIDENTIAL 
from within the 1M and could not be 
verified. However, one of the docking 
lights and the running light on the 
minus Y extremity of the 1M could be 
seen from the command module. The 
tracking light was detectable from in­
side the 1M and from the command module 
while docked and appeared as a very 
weak flash off the forward quads on the 
1M. Following staging, the light 
failed. We were not able to see any re­
flection coming off the forward quads 
from the flashing light. We are un­
certain at this time whether the re­
flection we saw while docked was a 
direct illumination of the quad from 
the light or whether it was secondary 
reflection off the porch. We're unable 
.* 
to say whether, after staging, the 1M 
crew will be able to confirm operation 
of the tracking light. 
The 1M tracking light was visible 
throughout the rendezvous. As the 1M 
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sunrise, the light would blend very 
nicely with the transition to a re­
flected image. As.it went into dark­
ness, the reflected image would 
disappear and the light would super­
impose immediately. 
The docking lights are very dim, very 
difficult to see, and poorly positioned. 
If they were brighter and moved forward, 
so that they both could be seen at the 
same time, they would enhance the acqui­
sition of the 1M at night. 
The tracking light was easily visible 
at 50 miles, and I'm sure that it could 
be seen much farther out. It was a very 
bright object at 50 miles. In the d~­
time through the sextant, it was visible 
as a flash. 
One possible use for the docking lights, 
if they were moved forward so that both 
could be seen from a front view of the 
ascent stage, would be in determining 
visually range of the 1M in darkness. 
-  
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7.5.1 Oxygen and Cabin Pressure 
SCHWEICKART 	 The oxygen supply and the indicators on 
the main display panels operated in a 
completely normal manner, as did the 
ascent oxygen system. The PLSS oxygen 
operation was as expected. On recharge 
on the PLSS following the EVA, the 
pressure dropped in the PLSS tank. The 
pressure had been only on the order of 
100 psi, and the buildup after opening 
the PLSS fill valve was very rapid. 
The pressure immediately went up to 
900 psi, which was completely adequate 
for any contingency operations subse­
quent to that time. Therefore, the 
PLSS fill valve was closed immediately, 
and PLSS doffing was continued. 
The oxygen demand system worked as 
expected. The cabin pressure maintained 
itself at 5 to 5.1 psia all through the 
flight when under 1M control. Cabin 
dump and repress times were in accord 
with what we had seen from chamber op­
erations preflight. The forward dump 
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valve filter was used for the cabin dump 
prior to EVA to minimize the possibility 
of debris clogging the dump valve. The 
use of this filter extended the dump time 
considerably. I would estimate that from 
the time the 1M depressurization was 
initiated, the hatch opening time was 
on the order of 6 minutes. It appeared 
that the bleed rate below 0.5 psia was 
very slow. The commander was unable to 
break the seal on the hatch for quite 
some time following the indication of 
less than 0.5 psia on the cabin pressure 
indicator. 
The activation of the cabin repress 
valve for repressurization and during 
the regulator checks was as expected 
from both the IES experience at Grumman 
and the ch8ll1ber operations at KSC. 
There is no question whatever that the 
cabin repress valve is open and flowing. 
However, once the noise level has been 
experienced preflight, it's a very 
comforting, rather than an alarming 
-  
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 sound when employed inflight. 

The 1M oxygen hoses did not present 

any particular problem with their 

-.. 
interfacing with the suit. There was 
a good bit of interference with the 
restraint system. Especially on the 
right-hand side, at least two hands 
were required to reattach the restraint 
system to the wall of the spacecraft 
and to keep the hoses out from behind 
the restraint system. 
Caution-and-warning indications on the 
ECS were as expected. The primary stim­
ulus of caution-and-warning alarms in 
the ECS was during the regulator check. 
On review of the regulator check~ all 
of the warning lights which were called 
for appeared to come on as expected. 
The pressure regulation during this 
check was also as expected from the 
•
experience in the chamber at KSC; that 
is, both regulators in the egress mode
. 
were regulating on the order of 4 to 
4.1 psi. During this check, there was 
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no question at all'that the cabin fan 
also was going on and off in the various 
switching modes. Verification on that 
was audible. The noise environment 
caused by the cabin fans was quite high. 
I would put the noise level in the 1M 
cabin, particularly with the helmets 
off, at a marginally high level. The 
suit water separator check and the suit 
fan check call for the illumination of 
the H 0 SEP component light when2
switching separators and switching from 
one fan to another. Evidently, both 
separators spin up to a fairly high RPM, 
especially with the dry system; and the 
wait time required to get the H20 SEP 
light to illuminate was rather long. 
We waited at one pOint for more than 
3 minutes and had no indication of the 
light coming back on. However,. there 
was no doubt that the component light 
was working, because on powering up 
the system, the component light had 0 
been on before activating the suit fan. 
~ONFIDENTIAl 
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The cabin atmosphere itself was quite 
comfortable. There was no noticeable 
carbon dioxide abnormality. The indi­
cated CO level remained at zero for2 
a considerable length of time, and the 
highest reading that I remember at any 
point in the flight (just prior to 
changing the canister) was approximately 
2 millimeters of mercury. The humidity 
level in the suit loop and in the cabin 
was acceptable. I never noticed any 
tendency to fog on the inside of' 
helmets and never felt uncomfortably 
humid in the suit loop. 
The cabin atmosphere, after repress on 
the EVA da;y, was noticeably different 
only to the extent that the number of 
pieces of flotsam and Jetsam were 
grossly reduced. Most of it had found 
its wa;y out the open hatch during the 
EVA. The circulation within the cabin 
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and the noise level of the fans, as 
already mentioned, were very high and 
made operation and communications with 
the helmets removed very uncomfortable. 
At points, the intercom intelligibility 
was severely affected in operation with 
the helmets off because of the high 
noise level. The removal and the re­
placement of the CO2 canisters did pre­
sent some problem for a time. However, 
after a period of several minutes of 
tinkering, the primary cartridge canis­
ter cover was replaced. The design of 
this closure is very poor. The mark­
ings, although very apparent, do not 
materially assist in the replacement of 
the canister cover, and a great deal of 
time and effort generally are required 
to close that canister reliably. This 
is design rather poor, but at this point 
in the game, I don't believe it to be 
an unacceptable design. Hopefully, 
only one canister change will be re­
quired during a mission. I think that 
EGNFIDENTIAL 
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the system is reliable enough but ex­
tremely inconvenient. 
The cabin temperature control valve 
never was moved from the normal 
position, and the suit temperature 
selector never was moved out of full 
cold. Sublimation and the heat ex­
changer did present some problem in 
activation of the DFI, particularly 
on the systems day. It appeared to 
dump enough heat into the glycol loop 
so that the glycol temperature worked 
its wa:y above the caution-and-warning 
trip limit. On removal of power from 
the DFI, this temperature would work 
its wa:y back into the green band, and 
the glycol caution light would go out. 
This same behavior was not exhibited 
on the rendezvous da:y. There was no 
evidence of glycol in the cabin at any 
time. Floating particles were manifes­
ted in cons1derable numbers. Their 
removal was facilitated by the EVA. 
The only noticeable odors were caused 
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by the very high temperature of the 
windows with the window heater circuit 
breakers closed. The effect of these 
hot windows on the window shades when 
installed, and to some extent, even 
with the window shades rolled down, 
caus.ed an odor to be exuded from the 
window shades. It's a very difficult 
odor to describe except that there was 
no question that it was generated by 
high temperature on the Mylar window 
shades. 
The other odor that was noticed came 
just prior to jettison of the 1M during 
the final closeout on the rendezvous 
day. There was a sensation of some 
mechanical piece of equipment, either 
a bearing or a motor, getting quite hot. 
It was not the pungent odor that you 
get from a kind of generator. I would 
describe the odor as close to being 
hot metal. I was not able to locate 
the source of this odor, nor did I 
have the inclination or time to take 
EO~F~l 
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a lot of time to try to locate it. 
It was not what I would consider a 
normal odor. There was no irritation 
of the eyes, nose, or throat, with 
the exception of an occasional piece 
of lint getting into the eye. 
Early in the flight, it appeared that 
the side and the hatch window were going 
to steam up as they had on previous 
flights. There was a circular area in 
the middle of the window where conden­
sation began to appear. It looked like 
it was a function of the temperature on 
the windows. There were small circular 
areas of condensation that would appear 
and then disappear. Finally, in orbit, 
at the end of the flight, we still had a 
very clear hatch window and all the 
other windows were clear except for win­
dow number 1, which had a lot of partic­
ulate matter on the outside. I believe 
this vas deposited there from the urine 
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and waste-water dumps, the port being 
just about directly underneath that 
window. 
Prior to entry, the rendezvous window 
and the left-hand side (number 2) win­
dow had a very milky-white. coating on it. 
The density of the coating was much 
greater around the edge of the window. 
It wasn't much of a factor unless the 
sun was shining on the window; when it 
was, it was very difficult to see 
through. Rusty reports that he had just 
a very little bit of that milky-white 
film appearing on the upper portion of 
the number 4 window. 
,  
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The water supply in the 1M was quite good. 
The bacterial filter, which was employed 
throughout the flight, did not materially 
impede the flow of water through the gun. 
It was quite comfortable to put the gun 
in your mouth, open up the valve, and 
take swallow after swallow consecutively. 
The water itself tasted only very, very 
slightly of iodine, was· very refreshing 
in all respects, and was apparently with­
out any entrained gas. All other aspects 
of the water system were completely nom­
inal. 
The waste management system was not em­
ployed in the 1M. However, the one large 
bag was used in recharge of the PLSS. 
The water glycol system operated as ex­
pected with the exception of the glycol 
temperature light coming on during DFI 
activation and operation on the systems 
day. The glycol pump operation was com­
pletely normal. The caution and warning 
 in switching from one 
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glycol pump to another. The noise level 
of the glycol pumps was quite noticeable, 
but not nearly as objectionable as the 
cabin fans. On activation of the glycol 
pump on rendezvous day, the sound thereof 
suggested a small quantity of entrained 
gas at the glycol pump but this fluctua­
tion disappeared after a few seconds of 
operation. 
The sublimator dryout onboard appeared to 
follow very, very closely the expect-ed 
shape of the glycol temperature profile. 
However, the temperature at initiation 
and all through the dryout was on the 
orde~ of 8 to 10 degrees above that on 
the graphs which were carried aboard. 
On transferring from one glycol pump to 
another, I would guess that the tail-off 
on the pressure indicator took less than 
a second, as did the buildup on the other 
pump. AUTO transfer from one glycol pump 
to another operated no:rynally in the check 
of that system and was triggered at no 
other time than when it was called for. 
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Operation of the suit circuit was com­
peletely normal. The noise level due to 
the suit fans was noticeable but not ob­
jectionable. 
The comfort within the suit circuit was 
adequate. At one point during the opera­
tion of the ECS, manipulation of the suit 
gas diverter valve and the cabin gas re­
turn valve was apparently reversed in the 
checklist. This caused the suit loop to 
pull down around us to a slight extent. 
Then it chugged until we got the suit gas 
diverter valve into the cabin mode. This 
is not a malfunction of the system, but 
a criticism of the procedures. 
~CONFjDENTIAl 

CONRDENltA-b­ 7-55 
7.6 	 Telecommunications 
SCHWEICKART 
7.6.3 	 S-band 
SCHWEICKART 
The operation of all the communications 
gear on the 1M was satisfactory. 
There was, from time to time, unexplained 
noise and interference in both the VHF 
and S-band operation. This degraded per­
formance was never correlated with any 
other systems operation or geometry of the 
spacecraft, or ground/1M geometry. It 
did not in general appear as clean as the 
operation of the TELECOM in the command 
module. The high-gain S-band antenna 
was never moved from its stowed location 
throughout the flight. Down-voice backup 
on the S-band, as mentioned earlier, pre­
sented some degree of mystery in that, 
with down-voice backup employed, the 
INTERCOM BUS would be transmitted live 
by S-band. This apparently was not the 
case during the test and no explanation 
of that is presently available. 
'  
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7.6.4 VHF 
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7.6.5 Audio Center 
SCHWEICKART 
GONFIDENTIAL 

The PLSS EVA COMM worked very well, in 
fact, considerably better than we antici­
pated from preflight testing. While on 
the PLSS in the LM cabin, I was able to 
hear not only the VHF from the LM but 
also VHF from the command module, and on 
several occasions, VHF directly from 
MSFN. The converse was also true; the 
CSM was able to read communications from 
the PLSS directly radiating through the 
cabin. The CSM one-way relay, with the 
PLSS internal to the LM cabin, worked as 
designed and MSFN was able to read PLSS 
data prior to the EVA. 
Operation of the audio centers was again 
as expected with the exception of the 
LMP's audio center on the rendezvous day 
in which case the PTT capability had 
failed both on the ACA and also on the 
umbilical. Therefore, the VOX was em­
ployed in order for the LMP to transmit 
EONFIDENTIAt 
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7.6.6 Flight Recorder 
SCHWEICKART 
EONFIDE~~TIAL 
throughout the entire rendezvous day, 
which brings up another good point, and 
that is that the VOX operation on the 1M 
was excellent. The attack time and re­
lease time on the VOX is very, very sat­
isfactory. 
The onboard voice recorder apparently 
worked without any problem. The primary 
inconvenience or difficulty with a voice 
recorder is remembering to turn the re­
corder switch on and off in order to con­
serve tape. This proved to be a problem 
throughout all the simulations and the 
same inadvertent operation was witnessed 
during the flight, both in acts of omis­
sion and commission throughout the 1M 
operation. Subsequent to the flight, we 
listened to the quality of the voice on 
the recorder. It is apparent that the 
noise level due to the cabin fans, the 
suit fans, and the glycol pumps signifi­
cantly degrades the voice quality on the 
recorder when the recorder is left on 
€ONFIDENfIAl 
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7.7 Mechanical 
SCHWEICKART 
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continually and these other are 
in operation. During the EVA portion of 
the flight, the cabin fans were off and 
the background noise levels were very, 
very low. The quality of the voice was 
excellent during that time. However, 
when operating the recorder in the VOX 
mode, the whole tape was (during the EVA) 
filled with beep, beep, beeps, and the 
first word or two of every conversation 
was clipped. 
I would like to mention that the window 
heaters on all three windows were, in our 
opinion, overdesigned. The windows would 
get extremely hot to the point that the 
Beta cloth surrounding the windows and 
the window shades, the part touching the t 
windows, would so hot that they gave 
off objectionable odors. Also, when op­
erating near the front windows with the 
helmets off, the closest analogy that 
could be drawn would be that of standing 
quite near an open fire. The radiation 
CONFIDENflAt 
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from the windows was very noticeable on 
my face. Because of the high temperature 
that the windows reached, we asked and re­
ceived approval for deactivating the heat­
ers. Following the deactivation of the 
heaters, I did not notice any fogging or 
clouding of the windows. On first enter­
ing the 1M on the rendezvous day, there 
did appear to be some moisture condensed 
on the window, but shortly after stowing 
the window shade, that moisture evaporated 
by itself. The windows throughout the 
flight of the 1M appeared to be very clean. 
There was no noticeable fogging, milking, 
deposition of debris, or coatings on any 
of the windows. 
In looking through the docking window, 
there were some noticeable pieces of de­
bris as I had mentioned earlier. A washer 
between the inner and outer pane of the 
docking window floated back and forth 
across the field of view when I was try­
ing to do docking. It was not a factor 
in any case. 
7-60 
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There were a number of things in the LM 
that did not fit very well and proved to 
be a problem. The major one was the OPS 
pallet. It is supposed to fit on the aft 
wall of the spacecraft in a rack that has 
a large pin that goes through the rack 
and into the pallet. I could not get the 
pin to fit through the rack without the 
pallet in it. As I pushed it down, I 

couldn't get it flush so that I could 

turn it and lock it. The Beta cloth net­
ting in the area was in the way, but even­
when I pulled the Beta cloth netting away, 
I was still unable to get it to fit. Dur­
ing the systems day, the OPS pallet was 
found floating loose after the docked DPS 
burn. On the EVA day and on the rendez­
vous day, I put it back in the same area 
and put the pin in and took the Beta 
cloth nett-ing that was around it - around 
the handle - and draped it over the handle 
in such a way that it held the handle in 
and I was able to keep the pallet re­

strained to the back wall. There are 

McDIVITT 
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some snaps on the helmet bags that are 
there to stow the helmet on either the 
floor or on top of the ascent engine cover. 
The snaps pulled off, the little straps 
that fastened the helmet to the floor or 
the ascent engine cover, and while light­
weight, they were certainly marginal for 
operation. I ended up with one helmet 
bag with either no snaps or no tabs to 
snap it to the ascent engine cover, and 
the other helmet bag had only one snap 
that was usable. The ISA didn't fit as 
well on the stowage area on the left-hand 
side of the spacecraft in zero g as it did 
in one g. The little hooks kept sliding 
out of the hole before I could get the 
next hook fastened, taking an abnormally 
long time for installation. The Beta 
cloth, as I mentioned earlier, fitted 
around the OPS pallet and over the top of 
the PLSS batteries in the back, but did 
not fit on the snaps very well. I got it 
unsnapped from around the batteries and 
was unable to resnap it. This was no 
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for any loose equipment to slide back in­
to the aft equipment bay, and once back 
there, it would have been impossible to 
retrieve. So I spent some additional 
time stringing the Beta cloth netting back 
together and trying to snap it where I 
could get it snapped to provide some sort 
of a covering to keep unnecessary equip­
ment out of the aft equipment bay. 
I might comment on some of the things that 
were extremely useful, one of these being 
the data file and the cards. The data 
file provided us the information that we 
needed. The instrument panel cards that 
were placed on the instrument panel on 
top of the Velcro provided an excellent 
source of information during critical 
periods, such as the docked DPS or during 
the rendezvous. We found that they stayed 
on the instrument panel very well and were 
a great asset. It also turns out that 
the little PBI straps, snaps and strap 
combination, with the little pieces of 
McDIVITT 
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Velcro provided an excellent place to stow 
checklists, pencils, gloves, and like 
items. 
The restraint system appeared to be de­
signed more for the lunar-landing case 
than it was for an in-orbit case. The 
anchor points for the restraints tended 
to pull the crewmember on the left side 
towards the front so that I ended up lean­
ing to my rear and to my right at an angle 
of about 30 degrees from a perpendicular 
to the floor -- during 95 percent of the 
mission. The only time that I did not 
do this was during the docking and during 
some of the burns when I had to have my 
hands on the translation controller and 
rotational controller at the same time. 
The Velcro on the floor and the Velcro 
on the bottom of the boots worked reason­
ably well. It was not sufficient to hold 
one down for any lengthy period of time 
but for short periods on the order of 
15 seconds or so, it helped to hold you 
there. 
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8.0 MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS, FLIGHT EQUIPMENT, AND GFE 
8.1 Cabin Lighting System and Controls 
SCOTT 
McDIVITT 
We had three malfunctions of the CSM 
flood lights. In the LEE, the variable 
lighting on the right-hand X-X strut, as 
you faced the LEE, failed OFF. The right­
hand light on the left couch failed in 
the variable position. The left-hand 
light of the right couch got hot, got 
much hotter than the other lights and 
was turned off. This one was in the fixed 
position. This latter light got so hot 
we could actually smell it. 
The lighting underneath the couches was 
inadequate. Any time the coolant and 
control panel needed to be inspected, 
or a valve changed, it was necessary to 
obtain a flashlight and direct it to the 
point of interest. It is suggested that 
perhaps something like the lights used 
in the tunnel be provided in a strategic 
location to illuminate the points of 
interest under the couch. 
EONFIDENflAl 
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8.2 Clocks 
The clocks worked, at least as 	could beSCHWEICKART 
detected, without any failures or anoma­
lies. 
8.3 	 Event Timers and Controls 
This is also true of the event timersSCHWEICKART 
and the controls. One small change we 
noticed in flight on the event timer was 
that we would lose 1 second on initiating 
the event timer. That is, if the clock 
were set up to 59:59 in simulations in 
the 1MS, when the DSKY display reached 
59:59, we would hit the start switch at 
that time and 1 second later, the DET 
would drop to 59:58. However, in the 
flight configuration, the display of 
59:58 would come up immediately on start­
ing the clock and this took a little get­
ting used to. 
8.4 Crew Compartment Confi~uration 
',> 
SCHWEICKART ,The crew compartment configuration in the 
'" 
1M was not significantly different from 
what we had seen on crew compartment fit and 
EONFIDENflAl 
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8.6 	 Clothing 
SCOTT 
function. 	 The operation of the OPS pal­
let and transferring it from the floor to 
the aft-equipment bay and checking out 
the OPS's, in general, were slightly 
easier than we had expected from our train­
ing. The 	modified capture pins on the 
OPS were easily removed and replaced on 
the pallet which made the checkout of the 
OPS's quite simple. The mirrors in the 
LM were not employed at any time. 
On the command module side, the stowage 
areas were adequate; however, the config­
uration of the stowage could be improved 
so as to facilitate the use of the equip­
ment in flight. Many times we had to go 
to a number of different locations scat­
tered around the spacecraft to accumulate 
the equipment necessary for the particular 
function of interest. 
The exterior of the PGA's were extremely 
worn on all three suits. The CMP suit 
was worn mostly in the arms and the el-
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bows due to working in the tunnel. CDR's 

suit was worn primarily on the back of 

the shoulders, and the superinsulation 

could be seen poking out between the lay­

ers of Beta cloth. 

When I first operated in the tunnel and 

took the hatch out shortly after trans­

position and docking, I wore the protec­

tive visor over my helmet and I am sure 

that I did not damage my helmet then. 

I took very good care of it until I got 
over in the 1M and I had to thrash around 
in the back of the 1M with that OPS pal­
let that didn't fit and tried to it 
off the floor and back on the back walls, 
and then back down on the floor and move 
the helmet bags around and the PLSS and 
all these things. While I was doing this, 
I was bouncing around in the 1M quite a 
bit. I was able to protect the front of 
my helmet quite well and it did not end 
up with very many marks on it. As you 
could see, we had it available for exami­
.  
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nation. The top of my helmet was very 
badly scarred and I think that this was 
a factor in the rendezvous. There were 
some great big long, wide, quarter-inch 
wide or so, scrapes. I am not sure ex­
actly where I got these things. If I had 
to guess, I would say I got them somewhere 
in the back of the spacecraft when I was 
trying to operate with the pallet, al­
though I can't be sure of this. 
My lightweight headset failed after 2 days, 
I believe. I was no longer able to trans­
mit with it, but I was able to receive. 
From that time on, we operated with two 
lightweight headsets between ~he three of 
us. 
Due to the bunny hat, I got some sort of 
skin irritation which caused the skin on 
my forehead and cheeks to get red and dry 
out. As soon as I quit wearing the bun­
ny hat, after the first 5 days, it cleared 
up. 
When I launched with my UCTA, I had a 
€ONFIDENfiA.b 
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McDIVITT roll-on cuff that fit, and I thought that 
all the UCTA cuffs were the same size. 
However, after having used it the first 
and second day, I decided to replace the 
used one with a new one. I took the used 
one off and threw it away and put a new 
one on. After I had thrown the old one 
away, I found that the new one was con­
siderably larger than the one I had 
launched with. I went back into the 
locker that had all my roll-on cuffs in 
it and found out that all of lll.V UCTA cuffs 
were the same size and were way too large. 
Unfortunately, I did not have time to look 
around and find the old one because we 
were running late, as usual, and I elected 
to go with the one I had on, which proved 
to be semi-disastrous since the UCTA 
leaked allover the place for that day. 
Later, I was able to borrow one of the 
other cuffs and used that for the remain­
ing days that I had to wear the UCTA. My 
UCD, on the other hand, had a set of roll­
..  
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8.7 	 BIOMED Harness 
SCOTT 
on cuffs that fit properly. I used the 
UCD with excellent results; no leakage, 
and everything worked the way that it 
should have. 
My experience with the UCTA and UCD was 
exactly opposite to that of Jim. That 
is, my UCTA cuffs were very adequate and 
the UCD cuffs were too large. As a re­
sult, and 	since we had aboard the special 
fitting to 	dump the UCTA's through the 
waste management systems, I elected to 
use the UCTA throughout the flight. The 
mode of operation I employed was to uri­
nate into the UCTA and then dump it. 
never did use the UCD. 
Mine worked fine. 
The sensors on the BIOMED harness began 
to itch after about 5 days and were uncom­
fortable for the rest of the flight. The 
electrode paste on the CMP and the LMP 
dried out and had to be replaced. The 
CMP's dried out after about 5 or 5-1/2 
-EGNFIDENTIAl 
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8.9 	 Crew Couches 
SCOTT 
days. The LMP's dried out on about the 
9th day. 
The couch and everything worked as adver­
tised. The only problem encountered waS 
disconnecting the Y-Y beam or the center 
couch. The beam required a considerable 
amount of force to disconnect the first 
time it was disconnected. This probably 
could have been because of the forces 
during launch. Another problem we had 
was with the Y-Y struts. We had a great 
deal of difficulty locking and undocking 
the Y-Y struts. Finally, we were able 
to manipulate the struts with a lot of 
shaking of the whole couch and this 
occurred on both sides of the couch 
the plus and minus Y-Y struts. Once we 
got them locked, the couch was firmly 
locked in place. 
One more recommendation on the mechanics 
of the spacecraft -- on the lithium hy­
droxide canister door. A spring-retention 
EONFIDENTIAb~ 
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8.10 Restraints 
SCHWEICKART 
clip, or something, could be provided to 
prevent the necessity of using tool E 
everytime that it is opened. 
In the CSM side for an EV transfer, no 
restraints are really necessary. The 
hoses provide adequate tethering and you 
can move from the hatch to the couch and 
remain in the couch with no difficulty. 
I'd like to mention that the golden slip­
pers on the front porch of the LM func­
tioned as expected from training. These 
were employed in the training in the WIF 
and functioned ~n flight as expected. 
They permitted good control of body po­
sition with no tendency for the boots to 
slip out of the restraints. The hand­
rail which runs up the front of the 1M 
for EV transfer was completely adequate 
for the job. In fact, the contingency 
transfer requires less concern over body 
position control than did our EVA and 
yet I had no trouble whatever in main­
roNFIDENTIA~ 
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taining complete control of body position 
through the mobility provided in the EV 
gloves and the wrist joint of the suit. 
The use of the tether as a transfer de­
vice for transporting equipment in and 
out the front door of the 1M was judged 
to be quite good, with the exception of 
the case where it was employed with the 
sequence camera. In this case, the power 
cable for the sequence camera which is a 
telephone-type extension cable supplied 
enough force on the camera to cause it to 
continually contact the upper regions of 
the front hatch, thereby changing the po­
sitions of some of the controls on the 
camera and doing some slight damage to 
the camera in passing it in and out. In 
the case of the other equipment, there 
was no problem at all. 
I found out the amount of Velcro in the 
area of the main display console, the 
window, and other areas that could be 
reached when a person is in his seat was 
CONfIDENTIAt 
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8.11 	 Flight Data File 
SCHWEICKART 
inadequate. Many pieces were in places 
where they were completely inaccesible 
unless you had a flexible object that 
could bend around corners. I suggest 
that m~be some of the useless pieces of 
Velcro that are around the edges of the 
floor and side panels and other inaccess­
ible places be removed or certain~v 
relocated to more usable places. 
The MDC bars that were installed prior 
to the EVA were very useful throughout 
the rest of the flight~ except for the 
left one which covered a portion of the 
DSKY. The center and right ones were 
retained for the rest of the flight for 
protection against the switch panel. 
They also provided convenient locations 
for attaching data books. 
The flight data file in the 1M was quite 
adequate. On opening the flight data 
file~ there was no pronounced tendency 
EONFIDENTIAL" 
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SCHWEICKART 	 for the data to drift out into th~ cabin. 
It all behaved in a very satisfactory 
manner. We anticipated some problem with 
this from our preflight work. 
8.14 Thermal Control of Spacecraft 	 f 
SCOTT 	 We did cold soak starting about 3 hours 
prior to reentry and were comfortable 
throughout the reentry. 
8.15 Camera Equipment 
SCHWEICKART 	 The use of the camera equipment in the 
1M turned out to be no problem. The large 
windows made handheld Hasselblad pictures 
out the front windows quite simple; how­
ever, operation of the 16-mm camera was 
a little more difficult in that there were 
no predesigned attach points or brackets 
mounted in the 1M to facilitate this op­
eration. The utility light universal 
bracket was used in conjunction with the 
Maurer camera on the crash bar over the 
LMP's window in order to take photographs 
along the Z-axis, and this proved to be 
satisfactory. 
"\EONFIDE~ 
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SCOTT 	 We had a sequence camera problem during 
the EVA and the superwide-angle Hassel­
blad shutter timing was incorrect; both 
of those have been mentioned before. One 
small 65-frame Hasselblad magazine jammed 
and in the process of the magazine jamming, 
one of the standard Hasselblads got jammed . 
• 
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9.0 VISUAL SIGHTINGS 
9.1 Countdown 
SCHWEICKART 
9.2 	 Powered Flight 
SCHWEICKART 
MCDIVITT 
There were no visual sightings in the 
countdown, during powered flight. 
The only visual sighting I had was the 
boost protective cover of the LET. 
was able to see the LET over the boost 
protective cover while the engines were 
still running • •.• 
During the countdown I saw very little 
since I had such a small window. I saw 
a little cable out the window, when they 
swung the Swing arm back, it went away. 
During powered flight I saw nothing at 
lift-off except an Object that came from 
behind the instrument panel and bounced 
off my helmet and down into the lower 
equipment bay. I don't know what it was. 
Somewhere during the powered flight, with 
the boost-protective cover on, I could 
EONFIDENTIAl 
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9.3 	 Earth Orbit 
SCHWEICKART 
see some smoke wafting across the left­
hand rendezvous window between the glass 
in that window and the glass in the 
boost-protective cover window. Staging, 
ignition, S-IVB ECO, I didn't see any­
thing. I 	 was looking into the space­
craft almost all the way through the 
launch. . I glanced out once or twice and 
saw the horizon going by, but no impor­
tant sightings during powered flight. 
I saw very little during powered flight 
because I was watching the DSKY most of 
the time. I did take one look at the BPC 
window at the horizon and noticed quite 
a bit of debris in the spacecraft at 
first-stage cut-off. 
In earth orbit there were no manmade ob­
jects sighted, aside from the Pegasus 
satellite. I did see a few geographical 
landmarks, and a few clouds. I was dark-' 
adapted one night pass as well as possi­
ble. I drew a picture of the dimmed 
CO1'4F I D E~~T IAb­
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stars of Canis Major I could see. AfterSCHWEICKART 
correlating these with the Star Atlas it 
appears that the dimmest object that I 
saw was two stars very close to the sixth 
magnitude. Also one other star of the 
sixth magnitdue was located immediately 
----next~he open cluster M4l. 
The other celestial sighting of note was 
the airglow. We were well dark adapted. 
Dave Scott and I were looking at the air-
glow. We observed the normal band of dim 
light several degrees above the earth hori­
zon which appeared to be slightly reddish 
on the underside. Perhaps by constrast, 
it appeared slightly green on the upper-
side. We both noticed another more dimly 
lit white layer about twice as far or 
three times as far above the apparent air-
glow layer. It was a very, very tenuous 
layer and was just barely discernable. 
It was positively identified by all three 
crewmen. This was observed 5 to 15 min­
utes prior to sunrise. At about 5 minutes 
prior to sunrise this layer disappeared, 
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 SCHWEICKART or thinned out to the point where it could 
not be discerned; however, the lower air-
glow layer was still visible. The thick­
ness of this upper layer was perhaps one 
or two degrees in vertical extent. 
MCDIVITT The most important ones were the sight­
ings of Pegasus through the diastimeter 
and the sighting of the 1M ascent stage 
throught the st::~ani:;, which we have al­
ready discussed here in some detail. 
Some of the data uplinked to us from 
the ground for the time of closest ap­
proach to a landmark seemed to be somewhat 
in error. When we took s065 photos, we 
occasionally took pictures of things that 
didn't look like were the targets, al­
though they may have been. A couple of 
times we took pictures of the water after 
we crossed some beautiful landscapes. We 
were informed on one occasion that we 
were trying to get photos of oceanography. 
There were some times when we were doing 
landmark tracking when our time of closest 
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9.4 	 Reentry 
SCHWEICKART 
 
approach, which was a critical parameter 
in the roll rate that was being established, 
looked to be almost 30 or 45 seconds in 
error and significantly influenced the 
performance of the landmark tracking at 
that critical time. 
Rusty discussed the airglow that we saw 
through the windows. The airglow through 
the sextant during a sunrsie appeared red, 
a slight red band at the top of the air-
glow as the sun came up. 
During reentry there was a~6nsiderable 
/,J# 
spray of debris at 'eM/8M separation which 
was seen through all windows. The ioniza­
tion became visible as a nearly homogene­
ous reddish or pink glow surrounding the 
spacecraft at about O. Olg. This gradually 
localized to the pOint where there was an 
extremely bright orange trail behind the 
spacecraft from 0.2g on down through MAX 
g. I did not observe when it disappeared. 
The brightness of this ionization trail 
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was considerably stronger than the horizon 
which was covered with white sunlit clouds. 
The brightness was nearly strong enough 
to make the instruments difficult to see 
after looking out the window. 
The drogue and main parachutes came out 
as expected. On main parachute deployment, 
the third chute, or one of the three 
chutes appeared to be hidden between the 
two outer chutes until after disreefing. 
During reentry the color of the ioniza­
tion sheaths was significant. I found 
it to be much different than the one I 
saw during Gemini. This one was all 
orange and I never did see any other 
colors in it except orange. It varied 
from light orange to dark orange and 
bright orange to dark orange, but I never 
saw any other colors like red or green -­
the colors I saw in Gemini. It was much, 
much brighter than the ionization sheath 
experienced in Gemini. I looked out the 
side window one time during reentry and 
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I could see fairly large particles pass­
ing by the window at a reasonably high 
rate, going back joining in the ioniza­
tion sheath. I didn't spend too much 
time looking out the window, I was moni­
toring the reentry. When the drogues 
came out, there was a big bang and a bunch 
of debris. The two drogues went up and 
were easy to see. And when they went off, 
the mains looked to me like we had two 
mains rather than three. When they 
started to fill with air, the third one 
sort of popped out of the right-hand one. 
It was obvious then that we had three and 
they disreefed together. I saw three 
small squares mis-sing from one chute and 
one small square missing from another 
chute. When we finished dumping the 
command module RCS propellant we had a 
big red cloud come out and envelop the 
chutes and then pass by. 
I took a couple of looks through the 
hatch window during entry and also saw 
 
9-8 
SCOTT 
SCOTT 

-EONFIDEt"TIA-b 

the bright orange sheath. I had the im­
pression that it was much brighter than 
Gemini. I noticed that just prior to 
O.05g, when I looked out the left-hand 
side window there was a reddish-orange 
glow all around the spacecraft. I guess 
the ionization sheath started to appear 
somewhere around O.Olg or O.02g, and I did 
get a pretty good view of the main para­
chutes through the hatch window. 
After the chutes came out, I had a real 
chance to look at the windows. I noticed 
the windows were coated with something, 
and the coating was burned and cracked 
and had started to peel up. After we 
got down in the water, the coating was 
still there and it was as if the windows 
had been coated with some clear substance 
and the heat of reentry had caused this 
clear substance to crack and curl up and 
peel off the window in a number of places. 
9-9
 

9.5 Landing and Recovery Sightings 
SCHWEICKART 	 There were no particular visual sightings 
of note during landing and recovery. 
-EONFIDENTIAl~ 
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10.0 PREMISSION PLANNING 
The basic mission plan was established 
about 3 years ago and stayed essentially 
the same. 	 The basic mission plan was 
never changed, although is vascillated 
between two S-IB's and Saturn V and back 
to a couple of S-IB's and finally back to 
Saturn V. We had a double-bubble rendez­
vous in it 	one time, and then back out 
again. But the idea of EVA, systems A 
checkout of the 1M, rendezvous, separated 
rendezvous, the demonstration of the docked 
SPS engine firings, all those things were 
exactly the same as we initially started 
with. 
The flight plan evolved over the last year 
and was constrained by many things. The 
flight hardware, the availability of ground 
sights to 	support the inflight test and 
many things like that, that could really 
-  
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10.3 	 Spacecraft Changes 
MCDIVITT 
10.4 	 Mission Rules 
MCDIVITT 
enter into the flight planning details would 
take about 4 or 5 months. I think the basic 
concepts were those that had grown up over 
the previous three years, and when we go~ 
in flight we found that the basic flight 
•plan did not have to be changed drastically 
and we were able to follow it quite closely. 
The spacecraft changes were once again a 
matter of evolution. CSM 104 changed as 
a result of Spacecraft 101 and 103, and 
also many stowage exercises, EVA exer­
cises, rendezvous exercises. The LM-3 
changes were also dictated by many things, 
weight saving programs, different types 
of wiring, and schemes between LM-2, LM-3 
and LM-4. Here again the change process 

is beyond description. 

The mission rules for this particular mis­
sion were different than they had been on 
previous flights because we were faced 
with a problem of having one spacecraft 
eONfI9ENTIAj: 
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separated from the other one. If either 
on had a problem, the solution wasn't 
necessarily to reenter at the next best 
planned landing area, as we had to get 
the spacecrafts back together. It took 
a little evolution, but we finally ended 
up with a set of mission rules that had 
the same concept. When the spacecraft 
separated, we did everything possible to 
get it back together. With certain pieces 
of equipment inoperative, we would still 
go ahead and do our separations and ma­
neuvers. We tried to put priorities in 
the objectives. The highest one was 
the separation activities between the 
command module and the LM. I think the 
next one was the docked DPS burn to 
evalute the LM systems as best we could, 
since this seemed to be the pacing item 
in lunar landing, and we finally ended up 
with a consolidation of the mission rules 
all on one page of paper in a graph form 
we carried with us in flight. Fortunately, 
--eONFIDENTtAL 
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McDIVITT we were never faced with the problem of 
trying to intrepret the mission rules and 
apply them to an inflight situation. 
-CONFIDENftAt 
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11.0 MISSION CONTROL 
Before we get into any specific items, 
ltd like ~o say that Mission Control ac­
tually had to e~ve a whole new concept 
of being able to control. two spacecraft 
separated at the same time through sites 
that were S-band only equipped, VlIF', and 
S-band equipped. Some were equipped with 
voice and others with TM. Some of the 
sites had command capability. It was a 
real complex mission facing the ground 
control team. I think they did an ab­
solutely superb job sorting out all the 
out all the problem areas, and planning 
for the contingencies. Only through some 
very hard work, with long hours, were we 
able to sort out the ground and airborne 
situations so that we could run a reason­
able simulation. Through these simula­
tions, we were able to work out the tech­
niques that we actually used in flight. 
Without the ground simUlations prior to 
launch we would have been in absolute 
eONFIDENTIAlJ 
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MCDIVITT 
il.4 	 Flight Plan Changes 
MCDIVITT 
shambles in flight trying to control 
these vehicles and do the flight as we 
had planned. 
We had a marvelous rapport with the flight 
~---'------
controllers. We had discussed many times 
a bsic philosophy that we would use dur­
ing the flight. This philosophy was to 
pass as much information as the ground 
could possibly pass without interfering 
with the mission that was going on at the 
time. And they were able to sort out 
the good pertinent information from some 
of the less pertinent, although I must 
admit there was very little less perti­
nent information. 
We had an understanding that real-time 
flight-plan changes would be more than 
welcome. I should say that the ground 
control team at the end of the first 5 days 
were able to work out a flight plan for 
OONFIDENfIAl 
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us that kept us entertained, busy, andMcDIVITT 
gathering some extremely useful informa­
tion that wasn't even considered, as far 
as I-know, before the flight. 
CONFIDE~~TIAt 
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12.0 TRAINING 
.. 
We had assigned to us, at one time or 

another during our training for the flight, 

all three of the CMS's. 

The simulation of separation might tie 

in with the difference that was noted 

throughout the flight concerning the pyros. 

Every time we actuated pyros in flight, 

we got a very large bang; whereas the 

simulation was sort of a soft beep. A 

loud bang might be somewhat more realistic. 

On the visual, it is recommended that the 

proper star patterns around the navigation 

stars be put in the sextant field of view 

for alignments in navigation. For ren­

dezvous tracking, perhaps an image of the 

1M in the sextant relative to the range 

of the LM from the CSM and an image of 

the 1M in the telescope would be an 

improvement. This is not quite as sig­

nificant as the sextant. 

teNFIDENTIAl 
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SCOTT In flight, the telescope provided some­
what better light transmission than the 
one in the simulator in that, after proper 
dark adaptation, more stars could be seen 
through the telescope in flight than could 
be seen in a simulator. However, with 
2 to 3 minutes of dark adaptation, the 
inflight view was very comparable to. the 
simulator view as far as the number of 
stars available or visible. 
The following concerns the relative 
size of the 1M through the CSM windows, the 
telescope, and the sextant. The rendezvous 
timeline was laid out so that a visual 
tracking through the windows of the 1M 
occurred only just after the separation 
burn and just prior to the braking 
maneuver. At these times the 1M was 
visible in its complete form until it went 
into darkness at about 3 miles. The 
ascent stage of the 1M was visible after 
it appeared at sunrise, at somewhat less 
than 3 miles during the braking phase. 
12-3.  
SCOTT 	 Through the sextant, the foot pads on the 
descent stage were still visible at about 
50 miles; and the entire LM still made 
an image inside the sextant which was 
about the size of the double lines in 
the sextant reticle at 60 miles. During 
the terminal phase, as the LM appeared in 
sunlight after CDR at approximately 70 
miles, it was a definite very small image; 
but it was more than a"p.<;?int source in 
'''" the sextant. 	 "" 
''''-" 
Relative to the mission capability, the 
actual flight COMP cycles appeared to be 
somewhat slower than 	the simulator 
computer's COMP cycles. This was ex­
pected, based on evaluation of the CMS 
and the MIT hybrid prior to flight. 
Another capability that might be improved 
in the CMS is the simulation of bending 
and slosh. These were not available for 
docked burns - CSM-LM docked burna. On 
the Mission Evaluator, the bending and 
slosh were significant factors in eval­
uating the stroker and MTVC. These were 
- ­
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not available for simulation in the CMS. 
Relative to the availibility of the CMS, 
we decided that, for the complexity of 
the mission, it was not available enough 
to complete as much training as we would 
have liked --both in three-man operations, 
and one-man operations. There is a certain 
tradeoff between the time required to 
bring the simulator up to speed, and 
correct discrepancies versus the time 
available for crew training. 
We never did get to the point where the 
docking visual display was exactly right 
and where the COAS target alignment was 
exactly right. We continually had 
problems with that particular area. 
Also, we never had the capability to extract 
the 1M from the S-IVB. 
On the CMS, there were a couple of items 
that really needed a little more fidelity 
than I thought we had. I thought the 
lack of a 504 boost tape until shortly 
before launch was an unnecessary problem. 
We did a lot of simulations, using the 
CONFIDENTIAb­
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wrong time for the S-IC engine shut down; 
and everything was wrong as far as the times 
went. We did many, many, many simulations 
that way and very, very few with the 
correct times involved. 
I also felt that the EMS and the reentry 
displays could have been a little more 
high fidelity and a little bit more 
operational. We didn't have that many 
hours set aside for practicing reentry. 
If the equipment wasn't operating when we 
did practice them, there just wasn't any 
way of coming back and picking it up at 
a later date. 
As mentioned earlier, the availability 
of the simulators, especially in the last 
two months before the flight --or rather 
the lack of availability for certain times, 
put the major glitch into the training 
cycle. It caused the training program to 
be concentrated entirely op the prime 
crew for the last 3 or 4 weeks. Elimination 
of the training of the backup crew put us 
in a very poor posture, in case something 
-EONFIDE~~TIAl 
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CO~~FIDENTIAL 
had happened to the prime crew late in 

the ballgame. 

.... 
We had assigned to us, at one time or 

another during our training for the flight, 

both of the LMS 1 S 

In the LMS, I believe we could have had 

a little better fidelity in the docking and 

undocking presen~ations. We were never 
able to dock more than one day, I believe. 
The command module was always rotated so 
that we were docking with the COAS point­
ing into approximately the left-hand 
rendezvous window in the command module, 
rather than the right-hand rendezvous 
window. Considering the fact that we were 
operating in a very weird coordinate system-­
where the hand and the eye of the person 
doing the docking in the LM aren't nec­
essarily pointing in the same direction -­
there's a need for some training here so 
that the coordination between hand and 
eye is better. We get this only through 
pratice, and we really weren't able to get 
- ­
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McDIVITT 	 that kind of practice in the LMS. For­
unately we had a docking trainer here in 
Houston that we used. 
The right-hand visual display of the 
command and service module did not operate 
in LMS-2 until approximately 1 week before 
launch. The stowage of the LM was certainly 
adequate, and the availability of the LMS 
was very good. However, we had a few 
problems within the last two crucial 
months, but availability of the LMS prior 
to that time had been very good. 
One maj or draw back on the LMS was the 
lack of authentic systems failures. We 
would have been a little bit sharper on 
our systems failUres if the representation 
~--..,.-
of these in the LMS had been a higher 
fidelity. 
SCHWEICKART 	 I would consider the visual simulation 
quite good with the exception of the 
AOT operations in performing alignments. 
It approaches the unacceptable region -­
because the chip mirror in the AOT sim­
ulation is located in the-middle of the
• 
field of view and required very large 
€ONFIDENTIAb~ 
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excursions in yaw and pitch in order toSCHWEICKART 
get an adequate mark on a star for an 
alignment. The effect of this in pulse 
mode is to prolong the alignment proce­
dure to the point where it takes four or 
five times the actual time it took in 
flight. It also uses a considerable 
amount of fuel. This then severely dis­
torts the picture of the time line. 
12.3 	 CMS/1MSIntegreted Simulation 
McDIVITT We also managed to inegrate 1MS 2 and 
CMS 3. LMS 2 and CMS 2, and 1MS 1 and 
CMS 1. So, we spent a good part of our 
training time integrating the simulators 
and consequently lost a lot of valuable 
time working out the bugs in the simula­
tors. 
We finally wound up the last 2 months of 
the training phase with CMS 2 and 1MS 2 
integrated at the Cape. I think the simu­
lation program that we had was consider­
ably different than any of the previous 
~I'J~IDENTIAl 
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flights. It appeared to us that the most 
difficult portion of the mission, and 
the one that needed the most training, were 
those portions where we were doing the 
integrated spacecraft operation with the 
1M on the systems day, where the 1M space­
craft and the command module spacecraft 
had to work together. 
The rendezvous was another very important 
area where we had to have the two space­
craft work together and had many techniques 
that had never been tried before. We had 
to work these out, discard the unusable 
ones, go over the good ones, and modify 
them to make them even better. We had 
to work out the procedures that we finally 
ended up with in flight. So, we spent an 
abnormally large percentage of our train­
ing time, I believe, in the integrated 
operation rather than in practicing things 
like launches, reentries, and the other 
orbital oper~tions that were less new, 
although not necessarily less critical. 
As we approached the end of the training 
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cycle, it became apparent that some ofMcDIVITT 
the things we had in 	the flight plan, 
such as landmark tracking and S065, we 
would not be able to 	train for in the 
manner that I considered to be adequate 
for flight. On the other hand, they had 
considerably less priority than the ones 
we figured were safety flight items and 
certainly extremely important, we elected 
l 
to put these aside or to train only a 
very small amount on them. Fortunately , 
with good writeups and so forth, we were 
still able to conduct the orbital oper­
ations in an adequate manner. 
12.4 Simulated Network Simulations 
McDIVITT 	 As I had mentioned under mission control, 
our CMS/LMS/MCC-integrated simulations 
were an absolute requirement prerequisite 
for the flight. We were having a great 
deal of difficulty achieving any sort of 
success at all with these during our first 
month of integrated simulations -­
 ... 
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integrated with MCC. Finally, they became 
~aining item on launch. It 
became apparent that we might have to slip 
the launch date just because of lack of 
integrated simulations. However, about 
2-1/2 weeks before the launch, we were 
able to achieve a successful rendezvous 
simulation and a successful systems day 
simulation. These particular simulations 
demonstrated the techniques that we had 
hoped would work, but we were never able 
to really demonstrate this in practice. 
After that week of simulations, we were 
able to proceed on with the procedures 
that we had. At least we had the con­
fidence that we knew what we were going 
to do in flight. 
The simulated network simulations are far 
and above the best training that we got. 
The simulations are much more realistic 
than when welre operating by ourselves, 
because the information that we got from 
the ground was an integral part of what 
was happening in flight. We have to know 
-E9NFIDENTIAt ­
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what the ground input is or we are just 
fooling ourselves. When we were trying 
to run the rendezvous integrated simulations 
without the ground, it was only 20 percent 
effective, as if we had the ground. We 
were unable to make solution comparisons. 
We were unable to really find out what 
the problems would be in flight when op­
erating only between the command module 
and the LM. But, as soon as we integrated 
the Mission Control Center, we were able 
to really get to the heart of the problems, 
and work out the details, and solve them 
before flight. 
Launch, reentry, and other simUlations 
with MCC are also far and above the best 
of that kind of training we got. 
The DCPS was a good training device for 
looking at specific launch vehicle failures, 
to see how the total launch vehicle re­
sponded to these, and to get the quick 
training that was necessary to make a 
good judgment in case anything had gone 
eONFIDENTIAl:-­
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wrong during launch. I launched with the 
feeling that I understood all the launch 
problems that I could get into. I didn't 
feel that I would be doing any inadvertant 
aborts nor did I feel that I would be 
letting the launch vehicle go through any 
regime whereby we could not abort safely. 
We had one session in the DCPS with all 
three crewmembers suited. We found this 
to be an excellent training device, but 
not something that needed to be repeated 
many times. 
The LMPS was a good training device. 
When<we were working out the initial 
procedures for rendezvous, we were able 
to quickly reset and run through the 
procedures. As it says, it's a procedures 
trainer and that was exactly what we used 
it for. After we'd worked up the pro­
cedures, we went to the LMS and worked out 
the higher fidelity techniques on the LMS. 
--  
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The CMPS, was a good procedures trainer 
but only from the standpoint of initial 
procedures or familiarization. As far 
as an eValuation of capabilities of the 
rr 
computer or refinement of precise inflight 

time lines, it was not of high enough 

fidelity to do that. The computation 

cycle was not exactly the same as the 

actual CMC. In fact, the flow, relative 

to the GSOP, was not exactly precise. 

The solutions seemed to work out a little 

better than what we had experienced in 

the other simulators. In other words, it 

was easier to get a convergence of a 

solution in an acceptable burn •. But, it 

was valuable as a beginning trainer on 

computer programs. 

FMES 

The NR evaluator was a good tool to 

evaluate the precise timeline that could 

be expected during the rendezvous. This 

was particularly true because of the 

-COt~FIDENTIAl-
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SCOTT 	 difference in the COMP cycles in the CMS 
and the core rope simulator. Because of 
the criticality of the time1ine, from the 
command module standpoint during the ren­
dezvous, it proved invaluable for ensuring 
that adequate time was available to per­
form all the functions included in the 
chec~- trmeline. 
The NR hardware evaluator was used to 
evaluate the stroker tests in the MTVC. 
It proved to be a very good simulation of 
both tasks. One of the more valuable 
aspects of the hardware evaluator was 
its capability to fail pieces of h~rd­
ware during a long automatic or MTVC burn; 
and after successful corrections of the 
failure, they could take the failure out 
and insert another one without having to 
reset or to start the problem over. The 
mission evaluator was also valuable in 
software verification relative to crew 
procedures and time1ines for the COLOSSUS 
1A program. 
EONFIDENTIAL 
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 I thought that certain aspects of the 
FMES operation were more desirable than 
the LMS. In particular the AGS simulation 
also the 8-foot chamber runs in the CSD 
chamber. All were very useful in regards 
to familiarization with the EVA equipment. 
It also helped build confidence and famil­
iarity with the various pecularities of 
operation of the EMU. I thought these 
were very useful. 
CONfIDfNTIAl/ 
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I thought the water egress training in 
the tank and in the Gulf were good ex­
ercises; howe~er, I feel that this kind 
of training should be done early in the 
training cycle. I do not feel that it 
should be done in the last 3 or 4 months 
before the flight regardless of how impor­
tant some people think this is. It's an 
important type of training, but not the 
kind of training has to be done shortly 
before flight. If we did it 5 or 6 months 
before flight, we could concentrate on 
those things that require a really high 
degree of skill and cunning towards the 
end of the flight and not so much on the 
procedures and that kind of thing. Our 
crew has had a number of water egresses. 
I believe we've had some from old space­
craft 12, and we did some from 101. 
think we went through the water tank 
three or four times --at the pool at 
Ellington a couple of times, and in the 
Gulf a coup~e of times. I think that's 
'EONFIDENTIAl 
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McDIVITT perfectly adequate egress training, and 
I certainly don't think it ought to be 
held until late in the training program. 
The pad and mockup egresses that we did 
down at the Cape wer of some use; however, 
I think that in doing these things close 
to flight time (running through the fire 
training and so forth), we were really 
wasting valuable time. If this kind of 
training is required, it should be done 
a year before the flight. The use of a 
carbon dioxide fire extinguisher or a powder 
fire extinguisher doesn't change. Once 
we have done that kind of training, we 
should not have to do it again. It 
should be moved as far from flight time 
as possible, so that we can use this time 
for dev.eloping those techniques that 
really require some skill and cunning. 
The last two months, maybe even a little 
longer than that, should be devoted en­
tirely to CMS 1MS training, really de­
veloping the required techniques. 
All of the gross training, planetarium, 
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water egress, pad egress, wif, zero g, 
and those kind of things should be put 
early in the training program. All these 
should be moved as far from launch date 
as possible. There are some things, like 
the last minute systems briefings and 
maybe some software briefings, that have 
to be conducted towards the end. There 
just has to be some reasonable training 
period of 10 to 12 hours a day .that the 
pilots are subjected to rather than this 
16, 18, and 20 hours a day that we were 
faced with during the last 2-month period. 
This was an accumulation of a lot of little 
odds and ends, plus the lack of availibility 
of the simulators at the appropriate times. 
It created a hardship on the crew, having 
these long, long days without breaks. 
This should be avoided by moving what­
ever training that can be moved to as 
early as possible. 
CON F IDENTtA-t:-­
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12.10 Planetarium 
McDIVITT 	 Our planetar~um training consisted of, 
I think, three trips to the Griffith 
Planetarium oq about 6~month centers, 
with the last trip being approximately 
6 months or so before the flight. These 
trips, I think, were very worthwhile. 
, During our flight, we used a nUlllber of 
the south stars, and they are just not 
available flying around at night looking 
out of an airplane. We had a lot of 
other star training, using the star balls 
in the 1MB and the eMS; but I think that 
the get together of the crews and really 
taking ~ big picture look at the skies 
and getting the little helpful gouges 
that help one person identify the stars 
was certainly valuable. I don't think 
we should ever eliminate planetarium 
training. 
This also falls into the category of one 
of those things that yoU want to do may­
be 6 months or so before the flight. Every 
individual has a different way of finding 
OONFIDENTIAL 
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a certain star. By getting five, six, 
eight, or 10 people together and discussing 
each -~~~-;;-oi1t S---SQ~~ on ident if'ying a star, 
.....""-.-­
we are able to spread a little bit of this 
knowledge around. We were able to pick up 
some of the other fellow's gouges. 
The MIT briefings on the flight programs 
were an invaluable aid. There's no way 
of learning the programs by sitting down 
and reading the GSOP, which is a help; 
but this is not the best way. To discuss 
the programs with the people who are 
writing them -- finding out what the intent 
of the program is and to see· the different 
options that you don't necessarily always 
see in the simulator is a very worthwhile 
piece of training. 
Having the MIT people available when we 
are doing the simulations is important 
because we continually run into problems, 
and we're never sure whether it's a 1MS 
problem, a eMS problem, a program problem, 
or an inter~eter problem in the trainers. 
·CONFID~tAl:> 
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12.12 Systems Briefings 
McDIVITT 
Unless we have the MIT people right there 
to get these notes, to go back to MIT, 
and to run on their hybrid, we never 
really get the answer. We discovered a 
number of significant items on the sim­
ulator and had them checked. Some of 
them, we found were really and truly in 
the flight programs; and some of them 
were just simulator problems. TYing 
the MIT system into the training in the 
last 6 or T months is certainly highly 
desirable. We had the MIT people avail­
able to us the last month, but I think 
earlier than that would be profitable. 
They were available during software 
verification, when we ran through the 
programs at North American. This was 
very helpful. They took notes, and we 
got direct answers immediately to almost 
all of our ~uestions. It was a big help. 
The systems briefings that we had on the 
launch vehicle and on both spacecraft are 
-EGNFIDENTIAl 
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a real time consumer. When you try to 
get a good systems briefing on all the 
systems in the 1M, in the command module, 
and in the launch vehicle, you find that 
you're just completely overwhelmed with 
systems briefings. If we just spent one­
half a day on each one of these systems, 
it seems to take weeks. If I had it to 
do allover again, I would move my systems 
briefings up earlier and try to get them 
out of the way by the time we got down to 
T minus 2 months. From there on, I would 
on1y.go to the systems briefings people 
for specific questions. Then, I would 
have the same set of briefings that we had 
the last 2 weeks, where we find out 
just the anomalies in our own particular 
spacecraft systems. 
The WIF exercises were far and above the 
most advantageous; we got more out of it 
from our training standpoint, at least 
for the zero-g part. 
'CONFID€~+IAl 
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The EVA training that was the most use­
ful was the WIF. After having experienced 
the body control in actual conditions, 
that the WIF and the zero g aircraft both 
..give one a more severe body control problem 
than is the case in actual flight. The 
advantage of the WIF is the continuous 
time available as opposed to the 30-second 
increments available in the zero-g air­

craft. It was quite useful for the EVA 

training associated with this particular 
mission. The other very useful element 

of training with the EVA was the chamber, 

both the SESL runs, thermal vacuum, and 
was what I would describe as signficantly 
different from the IMS. The FMES uses 

an actual AGS. It, of course, was far 

superior. If the IMS were upgraded in 

these areas, I do not feel that a signif­

icant amount of training time should be 

spent on the FMES for training on aD-type 

mission. 
- ­
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12.15 Mockups and Stowage Training Equipment 
McDIVI'I'[' 	 The mockups and stowage training equip­
ment at MSC were a big asset to us in 
two major areas. One was the EVA, and 
the other was the tunnel equipment. The 
1M stowage training equipment was some­
what less than high fidelity as far as 
the knobs and switches were concerned. 
But, the stowage was high fidelity, and we 
were able to develop our own stowage 
techniques, as a matter of fact, 99 per­
cent of our EVA techniques in the 1M 
mockup. 
SCOTT 	 The CSM mockups were invaluable relative 
to training, particularly in the area of 
configuring the command module for extra­
vehicular transfer for the actual EVA 
exercise, and also for training on the 
,. 
tunnel equiped with the counterbalance 
and the proper interior configuration. 
I think the procedures were developed to 
the point that they were absolutely 
optimal inflight. Based on the inflight 
experience that we've had, the mockups, 
CONFIDfNTIA~/ 
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SCOTT relative to tunnel exercises, are in an 
optimum configuration. The timeline that 
crewmembers experience on the mockups will 
be very close to the timelines they'll 
experience inflight. 
l2.16 Photography and Camera Training Equipment 
McDIVITT The photography training equipment was 
adequate. We had sufficient number of 
pieces of equipment supplied to us early 
in the training program. We were running 
into a little difficulty at the end in 
getting enough 16mm camera support activities 
and real cameras to support activities in 
both the 1M and the CSM. But, we managed 
to sort of double up on our efforts there 
and used what we had to some degree of 
efficiency. We were adequately trained in 
ase of this equipment at launch. 
12.17 Sextant Training Equi~ent 
McDIVITT One thing which I would have liked to have .,. 
had before I took off was a little more 
use of a real AOT, looking at real stars 
on top of a roof someplace at night. We 
had this in our schedule for one night 
EONFIDEt~TIAl 
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in Houston. We were unable to get 
back to Houston because of bad weather 
and never really got this training. I 
think it would be nice if this training 
were made available at the Cape~ maybe 
up on top of the MSOB. We could spend 
some time looking out at the stars there. 
If we did that~ we would not be so 
susceptible to weather problems. If the 
weather is bad one night, then we would 
have it there the next night~ and the 
night after~ and so forth. 
I did have the opportunity to go up on 
the roof of the G&C building one night 
and utilize a complete AOT sextant~ tele­
scope~ and diastimeter. The flight 
operations people were kind enough to 
supply a helicopter which we used for 
evaluating closing rates and tracking 
with the diastimeter, sextant, and the 
telescope. It was a very valuable session. 
If we could have that type of equipment 
available at the Cape~ it would enhance 
the training considerably. 
CONFIDEN~ 
12-28 
12.18 	 General Support 
McDIVITT 
"60t>~FIDENTIAl 
I really can't say enough about the people 
who supported us during this mission. Dave 
and I were just sitting here talking, and 
he said, "If it hadn't been for the data 
priority meetings, we would still be 
up there looking around for each other." 
I think that was the type of support we 
had all the way through the whole mission. 
We had a very complex mission, and it had 
a lot of new things in it. Unless we had 
had people mobilizing the forces that are 
available to us here at the Manned Space­
craft Center and our associated contractors, 
and if it weren't for these people coming 
up with the answers for us, we would have 
never been able to even scratch the 
surface of this mission. 
We had the support in a number of different 
areas. We had to have procedures support, 
and we had it. We had to have hardware 
support in preparing the two spacecraft 
for flight. We had to have support in 
all the other peripheral pieces of 
~CONFIDEt~lIA~ 
12-29-k9~<JFIDENTIAl 
McDIVITT 
. _ __v'____....· ..'~_,·, 
e~~ipment --the suits, the PLSS, the 
-~,-"","".-
OPS, all those new pieces, and even the 
old standard pieces required looking 
after. Fortunately, I think we had 
the best group of people that could 
possibly be put together to support us 
for these things. 
One of our biggest problems, for this 
particular mission, was to try to figure 
out the procedures that we would use with 
two vehicles instead of one. The dis­
cussions that we had at the data priority 
meetings, ~he conclUsions that were drawn 
.,...-",-­
there from, ~nd the dog work that went 
into digging up the answers to the questions 
that were always raised provided us with 
the knowledge of how to do the mission. 
When we actually did the rendezvous, it 
was almost like old home week. It wasn't 
really anything new. We had been going 
over it since the data priority meetings 
began, almost 2 years ago. That 2 years 
of training and meetings was really put 
to use inflight. 
EONFIDENTIAt­
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12.19 Planning of Training and Training Program 
McDIVITT 	 The planning of training in the training 
program was a very fluid thing, unfortu­
nately. The simulators that we had kept 
changing from one configuration and mission 
to another. We spent, unfortunately, a 
large percentage of our training time 
checking out simulators rather than 
actually simulating in them. I think 
this is unfortunate but was just a fact 
of life. As the program and the mission 
requirements changed, the training had 
to be fluid to accept t'hese changes. 
think we finally arrived at a pretty hard 
and fast training package at 2 months to 
go. 
As it became apparent that this training 
package wasntt being filled with the 
available simulator time and the available 
joint Mission Control/1MS/CMS simulations, 
it was necessary to make a rather drastic 
decision to start training only the prime 
. crew during the last month. I think this 
paid off. There was no other way in the 
-CONFIDE~~TIAb 
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McDIVITT 	 world that we could have possibly flown 
the mission without coming up with this 
hard and fast training schedule and 
sticking to it. 
~ONFIDENTIAb 
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13.0 PERSONAL HYGIENE AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE 
13.1 	 Preflight 
SCHWEICKART I have no comments on.the preflight sec­
tion as regards food and water. 
MCDIVITT 	 I think that the preflight medical care 
and procedures were reasonably adequate. 
The medical briefing that we had was 
good and covered all the aspects of what 
we encountered inf1ight. I think we were 
a little pressed for time to get in the 
proper amount of rest, exercise, sleep, 
and training. 
13.2 Food and Water 
SCHWEICKART 	 My hunger sensations in flight compared 
with 2 weeks preflight were considerably 
different. Until about the 7th day in 
flight, I had no particular appetite 
whatever. Up until that time, it was 
more an awareness that I should eat, 
rather than wanting to eat. Following 
the 7th day, my appetite began to return 
and approach normal responses with the 
exception that there were only certain 
foods within the selection available 
-EONFIDENlIAl .. 
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SCHWEICKART 	 that were in any way appetizing. And 
to a certain extent I would say that a 
fair number of the foods available were 
r--	 ­
unacceptable. This is in constrast to 
my preflight reactions to this food. 
Although it was not particularly appe­
tizing, I had no particular objections 
to any of the food preflight. During 
the first 5 days, it was absolutely 
impossible to follow the eat periods, 
and we ate on a complete catch-as, catch-
can basis. I did, on several occasions, 
use the spoon provided, in conjunction 
with the rehydratable food and found 
that this made the food only somewhat more 
acceptable. I think that by the time I 
got around to using the spoon, my ob­
jections to eating the food were not 
associated with having to squeeze it 
through the tube. In the case of some­
thing like the sausage, is was simply 
easier to get to the food with a spoon 
than it was to force something that 
viscous through the tube. 
OONFIDENTIAL 
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SCHWEI CKART 	 I slept very well~ much better than I 
expected to. This was true even in the 
early portion of the flight. On about 
~--~ 
half of the nights~ 	I used Seconal. The 
MCDIVITT 

primary effect of the Seconal was to 
cause me to drop off to sleep almost 
immed~ately after getting into the sleep 
restraints. Without using the Secon~l~ 
although I slept well~ I tended to re­
view the next day's activities in my 
mind before dropping off to sleep. I 
had no noticeable reaction to the Se­
conal other than drifting off to sleep 
almost immediately. Since I slept in 
the sleeping bag under the right-hand 
couch for the whole flight~ I had no 
disturbances due to INTERCOM or any­
thing of that kind. 
I thought that the food and water was a 
real problem during flight. The water in 
the command module had an excessive amount 
of entrained gas in it; and throughout 
the flight, it was a real problem. If we 
drank out of the drinking gun ~ the amount 
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McDIVITT 	 of air or gas in the water seemed to be 
greater than when we took it from the bags. 
I guess the reason for that is we could 
better separate the gas from the liquid in 
the bags. When we were getting it out of , 
the port on the bag, we tended to use our 
mouth as a separator to get the gas out. 
This was something we could not do with 
the water gun. I 	 think the program we had 
for eating and drinking early in the flight 
was somewhat optimistic. We were unable to 
record the food and water that we drank and 
ate. We were forced, I ~hink, to grab a 
bite of food whenever we could, rather than 
when we were hungry. There were periods of 
time when we went 	18 or 20 hours without 
food during the flight because there wasn't 
r-______________-----------------------------~ 
enough time to work and eat. We weren't 
going to die if we didn't eat; but if we 
skipped what we were doing, it would work 
into the timeline on down the line, and we 
would never have been able to do the mission. 
On my previous space flight, I really looked 
forward to eating. I liked the food; and 
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McDIVITT 	 early in this particular mission, I was 
hungry and ate whenever I could; but to­
ward the end, I sort of lost my appetite. 
The food became leSs and less desirable 
and in the last couple of days, I found it 
~al chore to eat. 
SCOTT 	 I also. had the same feeling about the 
food. It was fine for the first 7 or 8 
days, but then it all got to taste like 
the same thing, and it just didn't seem 
desirable. I might mention that the three 
meals we had of "wet food" were very good 
once you got past tne potatoes. If it's 
desired that the crew eat both potatoes and 
meat, it is suggested that perhaps they be 
mixed together. In the meals, we had the 
potatoes at one end and the meat at the other 
end. If you happened to open the wrong end, 
you ended up with potatoes first. I also 
felt the food was-bland. I would liked to 
have had a salt shaker and some sort of spice. 
The food reconstitution worked fine when 
you could get enough water in the bag to 
reconstitute it; but again, our problem 
CONFIDENTIAt/ 
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SCOTT 	 with the hydrogen bubbles sometimes made 
it difficult to get a complete reconstitution. 
Towards the end of the flight, we opened up 
all the food bags and put the drinks in one 
glove stowage bag, the rehydratables in , 
another bag, the hard tack in a third bag, 
and just tried to sift through the food to 
find some thing that was acceptable to eat 
when it was time to eat. 
MCDIVITT 	 I promised Rita Rapp that I wouldn't say 
( ­
anything about her food, but I just feel 
obliged. Even with this technique, we 
found it very difficult to run across any­
thing that looked really appetizing. I 
do think that we all felt that the drinks 
..-------­
-
the puddings seemed to be good. Then, the 
~ most desirable thin~e the re­
'#.
... 
hydratable dinners, such as the chicken 
and vegetables, beef and vegetables, and 
salmon and tuna salad. Then, we worked 
on down to where the hard cube kind of 
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things were highly undesirable, I feel. 
Also, the bite size sandwiches made crumbs 
like I had never seen before. A number of 
times, we had packages open with these 
samdwiches, and we just could never capture 
all the crumbs that came out of them and 
weren't even able to eat them. We had 
to try to put them down, as far down as 
possible, in our temporary stowage bags, 
so the crumbs would not float back up to 
the surface. 
The palatability of the water, I think, was 
affected by when we had last chlorinated 
the_water. Early in the mission, we were 
so busy we didn't even get a chance to 
chlorinate the water. On one day, and we 
sort of let the whole thing slip until 
in the evening. After we did this, we 
found that it was by far the best technique 
to use. used water that we 
wanted for that day, filled up a water bag 
with either water or some sort of drink 
(grape or orange), then chlorinate the 
-€eNFID ENTIAl" 
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13.3 Work/Rest/Sleep 
MCDIVITT 
water, and went to bed. By the time it 
was time to get up in the morning, some 
of the chlorine had been dissipated in 
the system; and we didn't seem to have as 
much chlorine. 
The next topic is work, rest, and sleep. 
I think the technique of having all three 
~. --------------------­
crewmen sleeping at the same time is far 
superior to any thing that we have had 
~--------------------
before. There was some difficulty in
-
sleeping due to noise in the radio, which 
we solved after the first night and a few 
other minor problems. I think the real 
significant step was that we put everything 
to bed (including the spacecraft) at the 
same time, and got everything up the next 
morning at the same time. Even if you 
just laid there and didn't sleep, you 
were certainly resting; and you didn't 
have all the distraction of jets firing, 
transmissions on the radio, and people 
CONFIDEt'~TIA~ 
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McDIVITT 	 scurrying around the spacecraft. I highly 
recommend this technique for all future 
flights. 
SCOTT 	 One thing I noticed that surprised me was 
the quietness of the spacecraft when every­
body was sleeping. If somebody stirred or 
made the slightest noise it was very audible. 
We slept with light weight headsets on and 
with one ear piece in and the other ear 
piece out. I cinched myself down in the 
right-hand couch rather firmly and found 
that I didn't sleep ~oo well. Subsequently, 
I loosened the restraint harness. I used 
the waist and shoulder restraints on the 
right couch; I loosened it to the point 
where I would float up about 2 or 3 inches 
------------~-----,---
off the couch and found that this was very 
r----____------__ ____-----____ 
comfortable. I got 	some real g;;oa-sleep 
-~ 
on subsequent nights. 
McDIVITT 	 I slept on the left-hand couch; I used 
the lap belt and the shoulder harness to 
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hold myself down, but I had them very, 
very loose. I also took the left-hand 
shoulder strap from the the center couch, 
placed it across my chest, and snapped it 
on the left-hand shoulder harness of my 
", 
restraint system to hold me in. One gross 
oversight. was that we had two sleeping 
bags in the spacecraft and three people 
trying to sleep simultaneously. It got 
quite chilly at night. The poor eMF had 
to put on a couple of pairs of long under­
wear and a bunch of other things. If we 
have three people sleeping at one time, I 
~ 
recommend that we carry the third sleeping 
,----- ---­
bag. After the first or second night of 
being cold, I took the sleeping bag out 
from underneath the right-left hand couch 
and crawled into it. It provided enough 
insulation to keep me warm. I wasn't cold 
after that. 
Something the psychiatrist will probably 
be very happy---------to find out is I got tired 
·-  ' 
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13.4 Exercise 
SCHWEICKART 
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of sleeping on my back, even though there 
wasn't any up-down or otherwise in zero-g. 
I found that, during the course of the 
evening, I had a strong desire to rollover 
onto my side, and I actually did this on 
most of the nights. I would roll onto my 
right ~ide and put my head on the headrest. 
Even though I tended to float off, I got 
the sensation of lying on my side. I 
seemed to get my legs in a different 
position than what I did when I was lying 
on my back. I felt a lot more relaxed and 
felt that I could sleep better by actually 
being in different positions during the 
night. I even rolled from my right side 
to my left side underneath the restraint 
system and found that to be a different 
position, as far as I was concerned. 
I did no exercise until the 6th day 
due to the crowded workload during the 
first 5 days. On the morning of the 
8th day when I went to exercise, I had 
-€ONFIDENTIA~ 
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 the tension in the exerciser set fairly 
high. Unfortunately, I straightened out 
out a metal ring which fastened the foot 
loop to the rope. After straightening 
out the metal ring, it was apparent there 
was no way to hook the thing back together 
and that .was the end of the exercise. 
I felt that we certainly could have used 
~-------------------------
some more exercise during the flight, not 
.....-­
necessarily the first 5 days because we 
got plenty then but during the last 5 da~. ~ 
I also feel that the exerciser that we had 
with us inflight certainly was far from the 
desirable one. Any period of exercise 
caused the metal portions of the exerciser 
to become so hot that I almost felt it was 
a hazard to the flight, because we might 
catch something on fire with the tremendous 
heat generated by the friction -- sliding 
the nylon rope back and forth across the 
metal bars. Unfortunately, when the 
exerciser broke, there wasn't any exercise 
machine of any type to be had for the last 
3 or 4 days of the flight. 
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13.6 	 Housekeeping 
McDIVITT 
Oral hygiene was no problem at all. It 
was a reasonably pleasant portion of the 
day when I decided to brush my teeth. I 
averaged one and a half brushing exercises 
a day. I did not use a dental floss. 
I found that brushing my teeth did seem 
to freshen my mouth somewhat. I did not 
use any dental floss; the toothpaste was 
okay. As a matter of fact, the toothpaste 
tasted a lot better than the food sometimes • 
.... -	 ~
I had no problem using my toothbrush after 
it had been closed up in a container. The 
quantity of oral hygiene supplies was cer­
tainly adequate. 
I think that we have an awful lot of 
comments on this. Generally, we found 
that 'we always got to bed much later than 
at the beginning of the rest period because 
we were doing housekeeping. When we got 
up in the morning, if we got up at the 
right time, we found that it took longer to 
get ready to do the next real period of 
-  ­
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activity in the spacecraft, because it 
took longer to do the housekeeping. The 
tasks were: change the lithium hydroxide 
canister, dump the waste water tank, 
chlorinate the water, urinate, defecate, 
brush your teeth, and get your food ready. 
All these, things take abnormally long times 
in flight. I can get up in the morning 
1 hour before I have to be at work and shave, 
r 
shower, eat, and so forth, and still have 
plenty of time to get to work. '1'-But that's
certainly not the case in the spacecraft. 
r---- ­
I think we'd like to discuss some specific 
items here. Generally, this period of 
getting ready to do something and regroup­
ing after you've done it is considerably 
involved and should not be overlooked in 
flight planning. One of the things that 
was a continueus problem in the command 
module were the metal shades that we used 
to cover the windows. When they covered 
the window, they kept the light out and 
did a superb job; however, they did not 
fit. Early in the mission, we were 
.. C 0 I'J F I DENTIAl oJ 
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SCHWEICKART 	 propping the shades up with checklists 
and trying to keep the light out with tape 
and things like that. Finally after a 
couple of days, we decided it would be 
better to adjust the locking mechanism 
every night when we put the shades on; so 
we got the screwdriver out. Every night, 
we loosened up the lugs, put the shades in, 
and tightened the lugs down so that the 
window shades would stay in. Unfortunately, 
~-.'""-. 
when we took the window shades out in the 
morning, we were always in such a rush that 
we didn't have time to tighten them back 
down, and at least three or four times 
during the flight, we found screws and the 
associated locking lugs floating across 
the spacecraft. I think, on retro morn­
ing, we were not quite able to retrieve 
all the pieces; and we ended up missing 
one piece off the number 1 window. Dave 
says fortunately we didn't have to spend 
the night in the water, but this was a 
real problem with us. The other thing 
that was a continuous source of irritation 
 / 
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was the lack of numbering on the lithium 
r-­
hydroxide canis I checked since I've 
returned to the ground and found that there 
were supposed to have been numbers on it; 
there was every indication that they were, 
except we couldn't see them. I'm going 
to have to check those lithium hydroxide 
canisters again to make sure that there 
weren't any numbers. We examined them at 
length in good light and never once saw any 
y 
number that would distinguish one canister 
from another. A couple of other house­
keeping (or, I guess they were medical 
problems) were: my n~ was a little dry 
during the early portion of the flight so 
I thought I would open up the bottle of 
nose ointment and put a little on my nose. 
When I unscrewed the cap, it appeared that 
the bottle had been sealed at 15 psi; and 
all the nose ointment squirted out al 
~. Because it was highly 
aromatic, it certainly smelled up the cabin. 
I'm not sure that it wouldn't have been 
slightly corrosive to the eyeballs if we 
-GONFIDEtt4TIAt 
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some time retrieving all the little drop­
lets that had squirted out, putting them 
in a plastic bag, sealing it up, and de­
positing it in the temporary stowage bag. 
That was the end of the nose ointment. 
Then a couple of nights later, I decided 
I would use some nose drops. I took the 
cap off the nose-drop bottle and exactly 
the same thing happened. The nose drops 
went allover the spacecraft. When it 
stopped flowing out and the pressure 
equalized, I gave it a squirt but all 
the nose drops had already gone out. So, 
we had three bottles of useless nose drops. 
The very stiff black hoses were a problem 
that really complicated the suit-on portion 
of the housekeeping. 
SCOTT 	 There is enough Velcro in the spacecraft 
-- it's just not placed in the most useful 
location. It seems that most of the opera­
tion take place either in the couch or in 
the LEB. We found that some of the most 
useful pieces of Velcro were those we had 
-CeNFIDENTIAl .. 
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put on the MDC for panel cards. It seems 
like the Velcro should be placed around 
the areas of operation rather than under­
neath the couches and burie~ in the bottom 
portions of the LEB where it is absolutely 
unusable. 
I think tpe really significant thing about 
the house-keeping in the suited mode is 
that, wh~n the crewmembers do not have their -< 
pressure suits on, they're essentially free 
to maneuver where they would like. They 
can go down underneath the seats and back 
up on top and do all tne things that they 
want. Once they put their suits on, they 
pretty much have to put their suit hoses 
on to provide cooling. Once they put the 
suit hoses on, they become very much re­
stricted; and it's difficult to get down 
underneath the couches. Thus, you're 
much less mobile. Now, that is for one 
man. When we get three people in there 
with suits and suit hoses on, it becomes 
almost impossible for people to work in 
parallel. You almost have to work serially. 
·€ONFIDE~IAI: 
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There is only room for one person to get 
up with the suit hoses on, to get under­
neath the couches, and to perform the kind 
of things that you need to do down in the 
lower equipment bay. I think the planning 
should be that, once the crewmembers are 
suite~ up, one man does all the operations. 
When you go to that kind of a mode, you 
have to put enough time in the timeline to 
take care of solo operation rather than 
three people. Instead of the other two 
people being an asset, they are actually 
a hindrance. I think one person by him­
self can operate in the spacecraft better 
with a suit on than with three people in 
the spacecraft. It should be me~tioned 
here, that it takes longer to put the 
suit on when you are wearing the LeG than 
it does when you are wearing the light 
weight underwear. 
